Last time we spoke about the Hitler’s decision to go to war. As June 1941 approached, Hitler prepared for Operation Barbarossa, an audacious plan to invade the Soviet Union before decisively defeating Britain. Stalin, sensing danger after the Winter War, had restructured the Red Army, but both sides were plagued by logistical woes. Hitler's directive emphasized destroying the Red Army, while his generals, led by Halder, argued for capturing Moscow first. Ignoring Soviet warnings, the Wehrmacht faced weakened armored divisions and critical supply shortages, stemming from a lack of standardized equipment and logistical planning. As the campaign unfolded, divisions became diluted, and the vastness of the front posed significant challenges. War games conducted by Paulus revealed critical insights about Soviet reinforcement capacities, indicating that rapid mobilization could counter German advances. The audacity of the invasion clashed with the grim reality of Nazi genocide plans, shaping a conflict that would become one of history's darkest chapters. Would this confrontation lead to Hitler's ruin, or could he outmaneuver his greatest rival?

This Special episode is: the Development of Blitzkrieg

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Yes, this week we actually have a special episode, just before we dive into Operation Barbarossa! What a horrible way to tease you all I know.

Now for today we are delving into a concept that has shaped our understanding of World War II, Blitzkrieg. When we hear the term, vivid images may come to mind: daring Panzer commanders leading their troops from the turrets of their tanks, crashing through unsuspecting Allied soldiers, with the ominous screech of Stukas overhead and infantry riding behind in half-tracks. However, these depictions are more myth than reality, largely crafted through decades of propaganda. Much of this narrative was constructed after the war by none other than the Panzer generals themselves. Figures like Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian played pivotal roles in this movement, striving to cultivate an image of a glorious Wehrmacht, one that was supposedly only thwarted by the stubbornness of the mad dictator, Adolf Hitler. This self-serving imagery not only enhanced their own reputations but also cast a shadow over the complex realities of the war.

Let’s take a closer look at what people actually mean when they use the term Blitzkrieg. Generally, it refers to German military operations conducted from 1939 to 1941. At its core, Blitzkrieg is often characterized by the speed and efficiency with which these operations were executed, hence, the term translates to “lightning war.” A prime example of this concept can be seen in the Battle for France in 1940. In that campaign, German forces dealt a staggering blow to the French and British armies in a matter of days, nearly knocking them out of the war. The initial phase of the Battle of France was nothing short of catastrophic, as the British Expeditionary Force or “BEF” and the French Army were on the verge of annihilation. However, it’s crucial to note that this rapid offensive did not mark the end of hostilities in France. In fact, serious fighting continued for another three weeks following the evacuation at Dunkirk. While the Battle of France concluded relatively quickly, around six weeks total, the German tactics were not as decisive as they were often portrayed. For comparison, let’s look back at the Schlieffen Plan from 1914, which reached its climax in front of Paris within four weeks. The Schlieffen Plan was Germany’s military strategy in the early 20th century, designed to avoid a two-front war against France in the west and Russia in the east. Conceived by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905, the plan aimed for a rapid German victory over France by invading through neutral Belgium and encircling Paris from the north. Schlieffen assumed that Russia would take longer to mobilize its vast army, giving Germany time to defeat France quickly and then redirect forces to the Eastern Front. The plan relied heavily on speed, coordination, and violating Belgian neutrality, bringing Britain into the war when Germany invaded Belgium in August 1914. In execution, the plan faltered. The right wing of the German army, intended to sweep through Belgium and northern France, was weakened to reinforce the left, slowing momentum. Belgium’s resistance, logistical problems, and the unexpectedly fast Russian mobilization forced Germany to divert troops eastward earlier than planned. By September 1914, German forces were halted at the First Battle of the Marne.

The Germans were bogged down at the Battle of the Marne in early September 1914 due to a combination of strategic miscalculations, logistical issues, and effective Allied resistance. The German army, following the Schlieffen Plan, had advanced rapidly through Belgium and northern France, aiming to encircle Paris and force a quick French surrender. However, the rapid advance stretched their supply lines thin, leaving troops exhausted and short on food, ammunition, and reinforcements. Crucially, German command weakened the right flank, the part of the army responsible for encircling Paris, to reinforce other sectors, undermining the original plan. As German armies moved south of the Marne River, a significant gap opened between the First and Second Armies. Allied forces, particularly the French under General Joffre and the British Expeditionary Force, identified and exploited this vulnerability. The French famously used Parisian taxis to rush reinforcements to the front, helping launch a strong counterattack. Fearing encirclement and unable to maintain their offensive, German commanders ordered a retreat to more defensible positions. This retreat marked the failure of the Schlieffen Plan and the end of mobile warfare on the Western Front. The armies dug in, and what followed was a prolonged, grinding stalemate marked by trench warfare.

In 1940, however, there was no such miracle for the French. This so-called Blitzkrieg had not achieved a swift and definitive victory; instead, it revealed multiple underlying issues that contributed to France's downfall. There were numerous reasons behind the collapse of the French forces, and their performance was shockingly poor. Yet, in the aftermath of the defeat, very few in the Allied world were willing to confront the uncomfortable truth that the failures of France and Britain played a significant role in this unexpected outcome. It was far easier to believe that the Germans had created something revolutionary, a unique approach to warfare, that had caught the French and British armies off guard.

The reality was that the Germans had never anticipated the war would unfold as successfully as it did. Even the operational plan for the Battle of France emerged from a recognition that the overall strategic situation was grim. Invading France through the Low Countries was the only viable option for bringing substantial German forces across the Rhine. Interestingly, the early drafts of the 1940 plan resembled something directly from the desk of Helmuth von Moltke back in 1908, offering little innovation or new strategy. The German General Staff had spent years analyzing the failures of the 1914 campaign and concluded that there was little hope for a fresh or groundbreaking approach. They believed that only time, luck, and superior organization could allow them to overcome the Allied forces. In May 1940, the actual plan put into action was a reaction to unexpected circumstances. The Allies accidentally acquired a copy of the German plans, prompting the General Staff and Hitler to realize their operational blueprint had been compromised.

Known as the Mechelen Incident, d on January 10, 1940, during the Phoney War phase a German aircraft, carrying the plans for the German invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands, codenamed Fall Gelb or Case Yellow, crash-landed in Belgium near Vucht, now part of Maasmechelen. It was certainl a case of oopsy daisies. The pilot, Major Erich Hoenmanns, was flying a Messerschmitt Bf 108 when low fog caused him to lose his bearings. While trying to reorient himself by heading toward the River Rhine, he inadvertently crossed into Belgian airspace after mistakenly flying over the frozen Rhine. He then encountered mechanical failure after inadvertently cutting off the fuel supply to the engine, forcing him to land in a nearby field. Although the aircraft was severely damaged, both he and his passenger, Major Helmuth Reinberger, survived. Reinberger was carrying key documents related to the planned invasion, a fact that alarmed both men upon realizing the implications of their crash and their accidental entry into Belgium. In a frenzied attempt to destroy these documents, Reinberger tried, but failed initially, to set them on fire. He eventually managed to burn some, but Belgian border guards discovered the scene, leading to the capture of Hoenmanns and Reinberger.

The reaction in Berlin was one of shock and anger upon learning that their plans had fallen into enemy hands. Adolf Hitler ordered the immediate dismissal of senior Luftwaffe commanders and debated the potential compromise of their military strategy. Despite the initial panic, it was determined that the attack would proceed as planned. Following much deliberation, they decided to develop a new strategy, partly crafted by General Erich von Manstein. This innovative plan called for a rapid thrust through the Ardennes, with the goal of driving to the coast to encircle and cut off the primary Allied field armies positioned in the Low Countries. While this plan was bold, it wasn't entirely original to Manstein; elements of it had been discussed in earlier planning stages but had been dismissed. It was only the urgent need for a fresh strategy to meet Hitler’s timeline for an invasion of France that led to the adoption of Manstein’s ideas. Moreover, this approach conveniently placed Manstein in a key position at the heart of the Wehrmacht’s main offensive. As chief of staff to Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of the Army Group responsible for this area, Manstein's influence and strategic vision became critical to the operation's success.

Now we don’t need to delve into the intricate details of the planning or execution of the Battle of France. Instead, it's important to clarify one crucial point: those involved in German military planning did not initially view the battle as a “Blitzkrieg.” While the term "lightning war" has become iconic, it was perceived by the German high command primarily as a strategic concept, rather than the operational doctrine that contemporary audiences often associate it with. Historically, German and Prussian military theorists had grappled with their nation's strategic challenges, particularly following their defeat by Napoleon. This pivotal moment shaped their military thinking for decades. One of the central dilemmas they faced was the fear that any conflict could escalate into a prolonged struggle, a scenario that the resources and political stability of Germany could ill afford. From prior to World War I, military planning had emphasized the importance of avoiding a two-front war, allowing the nation to concentrate its resources and efforts on a single front. This strategy was vital for Germany's aim of achieving a swift resolution to conflicts. It’s crucial to note that Germany was not unique in its desire for short wars; the prevailing sentiment across many nations at the time was a general reluctance to engage in lengthy conflicts. The concept of a short war was a common thread in strategic planning, and it would be misleading to suggest that Germany’s approach was radically different from that of its contemporaries. Understanding this context, we can see that Blitzkrieg was not strictly a doctrine of operations nor a specific set of tactical maneuvers. For the Wehrmacht in 1940, it represented more of an abstract idea, loosely connected to the long-standing principles of German strategic thought that had been evolving since 1870. This concept would later manifest in a unique combination of speed, surprise, and coordinated assaults, but its origins lay in a broader strategic mindset that prioritized quick and decisive victories over drawn-out warfare.

If Blitzkrieg wasn’t the driving force behind Germany’s remarkable victory over France and Britain in 1940, what accounted for this stunning achievement? One significant factor was sheer luck. Reflecting on the campaign, General Heinz Guderian mused that their success felt “almost a miracle.” A combination of fortunate circumstances and a series of critical missteps by the Allies played a fundamental role in the outcome. The Allies’ mistakes were compounded by poor communication between the British Expeditionary Force and the French Army, which ultimately allowed the Germans the crucial time they needed to execute their decisive maneuvers. This became especially evident following the breakthrough across the Meuse River, where the Germans seized the initiative. As the situation unfolded, the Allies consistently faltered in their response. In France, the political landscape was rapidly deteriorating, leading to significant confusion. The day the Germans launched their invasion, Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister, which added another layer of instability during a critical moment. Meanwhile, the French military command experienced turbulence as well, with changes in Army leadership occurring at the height of the campaign. Debates over British support in the field intensified, and inadequate reserves were deployed in a piecemeal fashion. Incompetent military leadership, poor coordination, and muddled political directives all significantly contributed to the success of the German campaign. Yet, despite these advantages, the level of success the Wehrmacht achieved was unexpected, even for their own generals. Hitler and his advisors expressed concerns that their forces were becoming overextended and could be vulnerable to a counterattack from the Allies. Ultimately, it was a combination of fortunate circumstances and these various factors that shielded the Germans from facing the consequences of potentially overreaching their capabilities.

The tactics employed in World War II were fundamentally shaped by the experiences and lessons learned during World War I. This was true for every army around the globe at that time. Each nation emerged from the First World War with a unique understanding of warfare, shaped by their specific experiences and challenges. However, a few key insights were universally recognized. Firstly, it became evident that armor, infantry, artillery, and reconnaissance units needed to operate in harmony. The concept of "combined arms" was not merely a theoretical idea; it was increasingly understood as a vital necessity for effective military operations. Effective coordination among these branches was crucial for overcoming the complexities of modern warfare. Secondly, by 1939, there was widespread consensus that aerial power would play a critical role on the battlefield. The question was no longer whether to incorporate air support into military strategies, but rather how to best integrate these elements to maximize their effectiveness. Military planners and political leaders debated strategies for employing combined arms, seeking the most effective methods for coordination and execution. This evolving understanding led to innovative doctrines that emphasized speed, flexibility, and the importance of communication among different branches of the military. Countries began experimenting with various formations and tactics, ultimately paving the way for revolutionary approaches to warfare that would be realized during the conflict.

The French military recognized that their overarching strategy needed to emphasize the use of combined arms in continuous defensive lines. To achieve this, they implemented infantry-tank teams that operated at the pace of infantry, prioritizing reliability over speed. While this approach limited the rapid mobility of their forces, it was designed to ensure that the coordination and effectiveness of armored units were maintained alongside their infantry counterparts. In 1940, French tanks were among the best in the world, significantly outclassing their German counterparts in terms of armor and armaments. However, substantial flaws were embedded within their tactical framework concerning these continuous defensive lines. French military leaders had not been trained to deploy their units in aggressive, independent assaults, as such maneuvers might disturb the carefully controlled lines determined by higher command. This rigidity hindered their operational flexibility and responsiveness. Moreover, difficulties in equipment acquisition left many French tanks without radios, severely impacting their communication capabilities on the battlefield. This lack of effective communication further complicated coordination among combined arms teams, limiting their effectiveness in rapidly evolving combat situations. On the other hand, the British government believed that supporting the French on the continent necessitated a strong naval and air presence, with limited ground forces. Consequently, the British field army was relatively small, consisting of troops that were better trained in colonial policing than in executing large-scale combined arms maneuvers alongside their French allies. Although the British fielded notable tanks, such as the Matilda, their focus was not on large maneuver elements. The insufficient scale and coordination on the French side meant that the British also did not prioritize the development of such capabilities. This strategic divide between the French and British forces contributed to the challenges both nations faced during the early stages of World War II, as they struggled to adapt their tactical approaches to the realities of modern warfare.

The primary lesson the Germans gleaned from the brutal trench warfare of World War I was that maneuverability was paramount in modern combat. They recognized that the stagnation of movement had transformed the conflict into a horrific slugging match, resulting in millions of casualties. This static warfare, devoid of maneuver, had become an industrial exercise in destruction, one that Germany, due to its limited manpower and resources, could not sustain in the long run. The sheer weight of the combined British and French forces matched their own, and with the arrival of American troops, the prospect of victory slipped further out of reach. Throughout the war, the Germans had consistently outmaneuvered their Russian opponents, a strategy that allowed them to effectively manage their limited resources while achieving tactical successes on the Eastern Front. However, in the West, opportunities for these maneuvers had been severely curtailed, leading to stalemate and attrition. To counter this, Germany dedicated the interwar period to mastering the principles of combined arms warfare, focusing on how to create formations that could execute swift maneuvers and independent actions. This effort culminated in the development of the Panzer division, an innovative military structure that emphasized speed, maneuverability, and operational flexibility. The Panzer divisions were meticulously designed to facilitate rapid movement and to empower local commanders to make decisions on the battlefield without waiting for orders from higher-ups. This decentralized command structure allowed for greater responsiveness and adaptability during combat operations. Over time, these divisions would evolve into Panzer Corps and Panzer Armies, further enhancing the German military's ability to perform combined arms operations effectively. This focus on maneuverable warfare not only defined German tactics but also set a new standard for military strategy in the years leading up to World War II.

However, this strategic vision was far from perfect. Germany faced significant challenges in building a robust industrial base capable of mass-equipping its armies with the advanced mechanized units envisioned in their plans. Germany took a very long time to initiate a full wartime economy during World War II due to a mix of ideological, political, and strategic factors, all of which severely impacted production efficiency in the early years of the war. When the war began in 1939, Adolf Hitler deliberately avoided transitioning Germany into a total war economy. He wanted to maintain civilian morale and avoid the harsh sacrifices Germans had experienced during World War I, especially food shortages and labor conscription. Consumer goods production continued, cinemas stayed open, and rationing was minimal in the early years. Hitler believed that a Blitzkrieg strategy would lead to quick victories and negate the need for total mobilization. This mindset was supported by Nazi ideology and bureaucracy. Hitler's government was fragmented, with various competing agencies, like the Wehrmacht, the SS, and different ministries, all vying for control. Economic planning was disorganized, with no centralized authority to oversee efficient industrial production. Industry leaders were left to make decisions based on profit and political loyalty, rather than wartime necessity. Germany also did not fully utilize its available labor force. For ideological reasons, the Nazis were reluctant to employ women in heavy industry as extensively as the Allies or the Soviet Union. Instead, they increasingly relied on forced labor from occupied countries, which was inefficient, underpaid, and poorly managed. By 1942, Germany had suffered major setbacks, especially on the Eastern Front, and Hitler realized that a more serious mobilization was needed. This is when Albert Speer was appointed Minister of Armaments and War Production. Speer introduced rationalization measures, streamlined production, reduced duplication, and centralized control of industry. Under his leadership, German armaments output significantly increased, even amid intensified Allied bombing. However, these improvements came late. The delays in shifting to a war economy meant that Germany missed its chance to build overwhelming material superiority early in the conflict. Allied powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, vastly outproduced Germany by the mid-war years. US industry operated at full capacity, and the USSR, despite massive losses, reorganized its economy behind the Urals for war-focused production. This all resulted in unstable production lines, making it difficult to develop standardized equipment and maintain a long-term acquisitions pipeline. Consequently, the German military resorted to a mixed approach. They developed a small number of elite mechanized divisions, equipped to the highest standards with the latest technology. In contrast, additional infantry divisions were motorized to a degree, utilizing truck-drawn artillery to enhance their mobility, while the majority of the army remained largely traditional in structure. These standard infantry units, reminiscent of their historical counterparts, carried their supplies on their backs, with horse-drawn wagons following behind to transport heavier equipment.

As a result, the infantry of the Heer could only move at a pace consistent with historical infantry tactics: approximately five kilometers per hour, neither faster nor slower. This limitation proved to be a significant shortcoming, particularly on the Eastern Front. The infantry struggled to keep pace with the rapidly advancing Panzer divisions, leading to logistical challenges. Frequently, the panzers and motorized infantry found themselves forced to pause their advances, waiting for the slower-moving infantry to catch up and take their positions. This situation undermined the very advantages in speed and maneuverability that the Germans had sought to create, disrupting the flow of the campaign and hindering effective combat operations. In essence, while the innovative structures like the Panzer divisions were designed to revolutionize warfare, the failure to fully mechanize and equip their entire army would ultimately constrain Germany's tactical flexibility and responsiveness, especially in the vast theaters of the East.

The doctrine governing the employment of panzer divisions in the German army is notably difficult to define. In a post-war interview, General Heinz Guderian’s deputy, General Hermann Schweppenburg, asserted that there was no cohesive doctrine for employing panzer divisions throughout the conflict. This assertion has sparked endless debates across forums, academic papers, and casual discussions in cafes since the war concluded. However, taking Schweppenburg’s claim at face value requires us to traverse generational and cultural divides in a manner that may prove unattainable. There is no universally accepted benchmark to ensure that we share a common understanding of what he meant by the absence of doctrine. Unfortunately, no one could ask him for clarification now, given that he has been deceased for over half a century. Therefore, we must base our analysis on common sense and the evidence available to us. It is essential to consider the context in which these panzer divisions operated. While Schweppenburg may have perceived a lack of formal doctrine, various operational principles and methodologies were indeed developed and employed throughout the war. The German military did prioritize speed, flexibility, and combined arms operations, reflecting the lessons learned from both World Wars. The effective use of panzer divisions often relied on the initiative and adaptability of local commanders, who were empowered to make real-time decisions in response to the fluid nature of battle. This decentralized command structure, although not a formal doctrine in the traditional sense, created a framework for coordination that was essential to the success of their armored units. Ultimately, while it may be tempting to view the absence of a formal doctrine as a weakness, it can also be interpreted as a strength, one that allowed for a responsiveness to the dynamic conditions of warfare. We must critically assess the available evidence and acknowledge the complexities therein, recognizing that the execution of panzer operations was shaped as much by opportunistic innovation as by any rigidly defined doctrine.

First, what is doctrine? While there are many interpretations of the term, a concise definition from the United States Marine Corps encapsulates its essence: “Doctrine is the fundamental principles, including tactics, techniques, and procedures, by which forces guide their actions through training, education, and operations.” Importantly, this definition does not necessitate the existence of a formal written document. In this context, General Schweppenburg's assertion may hold validity if he was referring specifically to the absence of a documented doctrine outlining the principles of armored force employment. However, it is crucial to recognize that there existed common understandings among panzer commanders regarding their roles and responsibilities within the German army. Without these shared insights and precepts, chaos would have likely ensued, rendering cooperative actions among units nearly impossible. The absence of a formal document does not imply a lack of coherence in operational strategies. On the contrary, the effectiveness of panzer divisions was predicated on a foundational commonality of purpose and approach. Commanders across the board shared an understanding of the strategic objectives and the methods necessary to achieve them, which facilitated coordination and unity of effort in combat situations. This implicit doctrine, built upon shared experiences and lessons learned, allowed the German military to execute complex maneuvers effectively and adapt to the dynamic conditions of warfare.

What we know about actual panzer doctrine can be corroborated through operational histories. The Panzer divisions were regarded as self-contained mobile forces specifically tasked with breaking through enemy lines. After achieving this breakthrough, they were assigned various missions, the most common of which included cutting enemy lines of communication, disrupting retreats, and targeting logistics. During Operation Barbarossa, this doctrine was vividly illustrated in the battles of Minsk, Smolensk, and Kyiv. Large independent panzer units were directed to penetrate Soviet lines and establish connections behind the enemy's main body. In this operational framework, infantry units were to advance behind the panzers, securing the lines of communication essential for sustaining the panzer forces. Once encirclement was achieved, efforts would shift to reducing the encircled pocket, a tactic known as the Kesselacht, or cauldron battle. This concept was historically rooted in the strategies of Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke and later adapted by his successors, including those influenced by Schlieffen's principles. These encirclement battles involved infantry forces advancing from all sides into the pocket to reduce its size. Ultimately, the destruction of the encircled enemy forces would be achieved either through a decisive assault or the enemy's surrender. However, the aforementioned slow pace of infantry movement often led to situations where panzer units found themselves bogged down in heavy fighting unsuited to their capabilities while waiting for infantry to relieve them. Once the pocket was fully encircled and secured, or once relief was achieved, the Panzers would continue their advance. These encirclement strategies were designed to operate on a massive scale, often targeting entire field armies and, in the cases of Minsk and Kyiv, large Soviet army groups. Yet, the scale of these operations was not always consistent. Tensions frequently arose between Hitler and his generals regarding the aggressiveness of the panzer advances. Hitler often expressed concern that field commanders were overextending themselves, advocating for more manageable encirclement operations. This was notably evident in France in 1940, when he ordered a pause in the panzer advance to allow the infantry time to catch up and secure the communication lines for Kleist’s panzer group. Similar disagreements occurred after the battle of Minsk in 1941, when Hitler and Army Group Center's commander, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, clashed over the size of future encirclement attempts. Surprisingly, in this instance, Hitler was unable to impose his strategy on the seasoned Field Marshal. Army Group Center proceeded with large-scale encirclements, culminating in the significant encirclement operation at Smolensk in July 1941.

The emphasis on encirclement battles was not solely beneficial to the Panzers and motorized units; all branches of the German military were encouraged to seek encirclement whenever possible. The 1933 Heer Field Service Regulations called for artillery, infantry, armor, and air support to work together down to the company level. This cooperation was primarily to be facilitated through direct communication among the respective commanders. The regulations stipulated that artillery commanders should position their command posts as close as possible to those of infantry commanders. If personal communication was not feasible, liaison officers were to be assigned to link the respective units. Additionally, the use of radios and telephones was recommended wherever possible. The inclusion of radio and telephone communication at the end of this hierarchy may seem counterintuitive. However, the Germans were acutely aware of how easily telephone lines could be severed by enemy artillery fire, while radios were susceptible to jamming and interception. Electronic warfare was absolutely utilized by both sides on the Eastern front, but it does not get as much attention in secondary accounts of the war. Perhaps the most noteworthy example was at Kursk where the Red Army and the Wehrmacht battled it out over the radio waves, jamming, intercepting and triangulation of the other sides observers and command posts.

During the North Africa Campaign of World War II, radio communications were essential for both Axis and Allied forces operating across the vast, open desert. The terrain demanded mobile, long-range radio systems, but this also made transmissions highly vulnerable to interception, jamming, and triangulation, tools that became critical in the evolving landscape of electronic warfare. Interception played a particularly important role. British intelligence units, especially the Y Service and those linked to Ultra at Bletchley Park, routinely intercepted German and Italian radio traffic. German forces often used open channels or weak encryption, allowing the British to gain valuable insights into Axis troop movements, supply lines, and battle plans. This intelligence edge was a major factor in key victories, such as the Second Battle of El Alamein, where Allied forces were able to preempt German strategies. Jamming techniques were also employed, though they were less refined than in later stages of the war. Both the British and Germans attempted to disrupt enemy communications by broadcasting on similar frequencies, particularly during major offensives or air-ground coordination efforts. However, the technology was still developing, and jamming sometimes interfered with friendly transmissions as well. Triangulation became a highly effective method for locating enemy radio operators. British forces used mobile direction-finding units mounted on vehicles to track the origin of German transmissions across the desert. When combined with intercepted messages, this allowed commanders to accurately identify the positions of enemy headquarters and convoys, enabling more precise attacks. Altogether, the effective use of radio interception, jamming, and triangulation gave the Allies a significant advantage in the North African theater, demonstrating the growing power of signals intelligence in modern warfare. By the way, if you haven't checked it out yet, me and my Co-host Garauv over on Echoes of War podcast did a 10 episode series on the entire North Africa Campaign, I highly recommend it.

Needless to say the Nazi regime utilized a lot of propaganda that contributed to the myths perpetuated by generals long after the war concluded, take for example the idealization of the "clean Wehrmacht." This romantic notion of advancing panzers emerged not only at the war's conclusion but also started soon after the Germans captured Paris, which they viewed as a stepping stone towards imminent victory. The propaganda machinery of the Third Reich rapidly began producing films, news stories, and radio broadcasts that framed the Wehrmacht's success in the West as an inevitable result of German superiority. These narratives circulated widely within the army and across the conquered territories of Europe. The impact of this propaganda was immediate, with German officers, who should have recognized the realities of warfare, beginning to believe their own rhetoric. Many perceived their operational success in the so-called Blitzkrieg as evidence of unparalleled military brilliance. The swift collapses of the Low Countries, France, Poland, and the British Expeditionary Force reinforced their belief that they had created something unique in military history.

However, this belief was fundamentally flawed. The Wehrmacht of 1939-1940 capitalized on the unpreparedness of their enemies for a war of maneuver, leveraging superior training and communication capabilities to outflank the bewildered Allies. This was not a unique ability, nor was it one that could not be replicated by other nations. As the Wehrmacht geared up for the invasion of the Soviet Union in the winter of 1940-1941, the professionalism that had characterized German planning for decades began to erode. Generals increasingly assumed best-case scenarios for their maneuvers while neglecting the significant obstacles they would face. These critical missteps would soon become apparent within weeks of the start of Operation Barbarossa. Before long, many high-ranking officers in the Wehrmacht would begin to doubt the war's outcome, with some losing all hope of victory long before the onset of winter.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

As blitzkrieg tactics, asserting speed and coordination, manifested in the rapid defeat of France, they obscured deeper issues. While the myths surrounding Germany's military prowess grew, luck played a crucial role in their early victories. As blunders unfolded in the east, doubts about the war's outcome began to gnaw at German high command, foreshadowing the inevitable struggle ahead.