Last time we spoke about the planning for Operation Barbarossa. In 1940, as Europe faced the aftermath of the swift German Blitzkrieg, Stalin realized the imminent threat to the Soviet Union. Following the Winter War with Finland, he restructured the Red Army, appointing General Zhukov as Chief of the General Staff. Zhukov's remarkable military background shaped his strategies for upcoming conflicts. However, despite receiving numerous warnings about a German invasion, Stalin hesitated, believing the alarms to be fabrications. As tensions escalated, the Soviet military was still underprepared, facing critical shortages of equipment and personnel. On June 22, 1941, the Germans launched their attack, exploiting the Red Army's disorganization and lack of readiness. Stalin, desperate to fortify defenses, rushed military production but was starkly unprepared for the rapid devastation that ensued. This catastrophic failure would haunt the Soviet Union as they struggled to adapt and respond to the unexpected German onslaught in the early days of Operation Barbarossa.

This episode is Prelude #11 Hitler’s decision to go to War

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

In the last episode we examined how Hitler began WW2 against western europe and the planning behind Operation Barbarossa. Today we are going to dive into Hitler’s ultimate decision for war against the Soviet Union.

In December of 1940, a pivotal moment in World War II unfolded when Adolf Hitler signed War Directive Twenty-One. Hitler’s war directives were a sort of executive order that he signed and published as a means of putting his priorities into action by the regime’s various mechanisms. Throughout the war, he would sign 74 of them, the last ones devolving to little more than his ideological rants and attempts to intervene in the smallest tactical decisions. You know Hitler sandbagging his own generals and such. This critical order called for the German Army and Air Force to begin preparations for a bold and aggressive invasion of the Soviet Union. Hitler recognized that this operation would likely need to occur before Germany could conclusively defeat Britain, underscoring the urgency and precariousness of the Nazi strategy. War Directive Twenty-One provided a rough outline for the invasion, revealing Hitler’s expansive ambitions. The planned advance was to stretch from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, encapsulating a massive swath of territory. The directive's strategic vision targeted the annihilation of the majority of the Red Army, alongside a crucial goal, capturing the strategic city of Leningrad.

Interestingly, this initial draft revealed that any push toward Moscow was envisioned as a subsequent objective, to be contemplated only after achieving the first goals of the campaign. Hitler’s strategy highlighted an astonishing military undertaking: he stipulated that the German forces would not advance beyond a delineation he had in mind, spanning roughly from Arkhangelsk in the north to the Volga River in the south. This indicated a monumental task, covering a staggering 2,000 kilometers from the starting point of the German forces. To put this in perspective, the German front was already vast, measuring 1,400 kilometers wide, but by the end of the planned campaign, it was expected to expand to over 2,100 kilometers. War Directive Twenty-One proposed a campaign unparalleled in military history, setting the stage for what would be the most ambitious military operation ever executed.

Ambitions aside, the planning for the invasion highlighted significant issues within the Wehrmacht from the very beginning. A critical source of tension was the stark contrast in strategic vision between Adolf Hitler and his generals at the Oberkommando des Heeres or “OKH”, the German Army High Command. It was subordinated to OKW or “Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht”. OKW was the German Military’s unified military high command. Hitler rarely followed the chain of command and regularly consulted with OKH staff without first talking to OKW and vice versa. Being someone who suffers the life of bureaucracy, working for what is essentially the federal government of Canada, won't get into details, I can assure that this was a bold strategy cotton. At the helm was Colonel General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Army General Staff. Halder was a professional officer who had been selected to be the next chief of the Army General Staff after the resignation of his predecessor General Ludwig Beck over disagreements with Hitler concerning the latter’s plan for Czechoslovakia. Although a loyal supporter of the Nazi regime, Halder firmly believed that Hitler was mistaken and misled in his approach to conquering the USSR. Hitler’s strategy emphasized the destruction of the Red Army as the primary objective of any campaign, suggesting that this would pave the way for the subsequent seizure of vital industrial and agricultural centers in Ukraine. He prioritized swift and decisive action aimed at neutralizing Soviet military capability, viewing it as essential for a favorable outcome.

In contrast, Halder advocated for focusing efforts on capturing Moscow first, arguing that securing the Soviet capital would destabilize the Soviet government and lead to a quicker resolution of the conflict. He believed that after taking Moscow, the Wehrmacht could negotiate for the economic and industrial resources necessary for a prolonged war in the West. This fundamental difference in perspective reflected not only tactical considerations but also divergent visions for the overall campaign in the East. These conflicting strategies created a hazardous environment where, although Hitler ordered one campaign plan to be developed and prepared, Halder and his subordinates only committed half-heartedly to fulfilling Hitler's directives. Instead, they began laying the groundwork to implement their strategy, banking on the idea that initial victories in the campaign would provide an opportunity to persuade Hitler of the merits of their plan. They believed that demonstrating success on the battlefield could sway the Führer to adopt their approach, thereby enabling a more focused and effective strategy in the East.

Beyond strategic disagreements, the Wehrmacht faced several fundamental issues that severely impacted its campaign in the East. A critical challenge was the sorry state of equipment standardization, which affected everything from the readiness of fighting units to the intricacies of logistics planning. During the buildup for operations, Colonel General Halder’s staff discovered that the Heer, aka the German Army was equipped with no fewer than 150 different models of trucks, each produced by various German manufacturers. This hodgepodge of vehicles created significant logistical headaches. Many of the trucks used to transport supplies and maintain mobility for the Panzer and motorized forces were actually civilian models that had been requisitioned during previous campaigns in Poland and France. This diverse assortment of vehicles meant that it was impossible to establish a comprehensive inventory of spare parts, which had dire implications for maintenance and the longevity of the trucks. As the units faced the harsh conditions of the 1,200-kilometer march to Moscow, the reliability of their transportation would inevitably suffer.

Many of you might gloss over what essentially amounts to a logistical issue, however, logistics is honestly what defeated the Axis during WW2. No members of the Axis held significant oil, excluding Romania who was dishing it out to them all, but it was not nearly enough. On top of that, Germany had a beautiful way of making automotive vehicles, but it was also glaringly idiotic. To overly simplify, the Ford assembly line, created by Henry Ford had workers creating all the different parts that made up a car over assembly lines. This meant the worker teams each made separate parts that would be placed together at the end basically. For Germany it was mostly the opposite. The German workers would build up their vehicles or panzers from start to finish, providing excellent craftsmen for sure, but it was unbelievably inefficient compared to the US and other allied nations. The Germans would be dishing out panzers at pathetic rates compared to their enemies and worse yet, all the German manufacturing companies did not standardize their parts. This meant there was a ungodly amount of different parts for all their vehicles, requiring specializations for repairs teams and a ton of reserve parts that all need to be brought to the front lines. In comparison, the Allied repair teams all used standardized parts, even shared between the British and Americans. The Allies were out producing, out repairing the Axis like no tomorrow, it proved to be a decisive factor in the North African campaign, which me and my cohost Gaurav over at Echoes of War Podcast did a 10 episode series on, go check it out. On top of all of that, the German economy did not even became a full war time economy until 1944 when Albert Speer took over and honestly he freaked out at what he found out was going on. German manufacturers were literally stealing from each other, all scrambling for steel, sometimes sabotaging another and outright refusing to cooperate on designing and other factors. While many tank bro’s get wet in their pants thinking about the glory that was the Tiger 1, in the end 3 beat up Shermans could take them down, or T-34’s at a fraction of the cost. Das Auto indeed.

By May of 1940, the ten Panzer divisions each averaged 256 tanks. However, by June of 1941, the number of Panzer divisions had increased to twenty, but their average strength had diluted to just 190 tanks per division. More importantly, the strongest Panzer divisions in 1940 were the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Panzer, each boasting over 300 tanks. In marked contrast, by 1941, the most powerful divisions shifted to the 6th, 7th, and 20th Panzer, with only one of them exceeding 250 tanks. This dilution of the Wehrmacht’s critical armored capability was deemed necessary to provide broader coverage across the vast front envisioned for Operation Barbarossa. While this strategy allowed for greater territorial reach, it came at a significant cost: a marked reduction in the striking power of the Panzer divisions. The very core of the German military's offensive capability was weakened, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the entire campaign in the East.

Despite the challenges posed by the restructuring of the Wehrmacht, there was a silver lining. Many of the now decidedly obsolete Panzer I and Panzer II tanks were being phased out and replaced with more modern armored vehicles. Among these replacements were the Czech-built Pz-35(t) and Pz-38(t), along with the more robust Panzer IV and Panzer III models. Notably, about 700 of the newly introduced Panzer III were the Ausführung F variant, equipped with a significantly improved 5-centimeter gun. This weapon boasted superior armor penetration capabilities, making it effective against the lighter Soviet tanks that the Heer would encounter in the East. To get in more gritty details, the 5 cm KwK 38 was the close cousin of the PaK. 37 wheeled anti-tank gun that was also being introduced into service around this time. Unfortunately, neither of these weapons proved to be a match for the best Soviet armor that would be encountered in the coming campaign. Eventually they would be replaced by the 5 cm KwK 39 with a longer barrel. Even this proved inadequate. At that point, the Panzer III would reach its maximum development capacity, and the Panzer IV would take over the anti-tank role, eventually being fitted with the 7.5 cm KwK 40. This upgrade was an essential enhancement compared to the older tank models, which were increasingly outmatched on the battlefield. However, this mix of tank models soon became a logistical headache that would plague the German war effort in the East. As the distances between frontline troops and the industrial heart of the Nazi war machine expanded, ensuring the availability of spare parts for this diverse array of armored vehicles posed significant challenges. The complexity of maintaining and supplying such an eclectic fleet of tanks would complicate operations, making the already daunting logistics of war even more arduous. As the campaign progressed, the Wehrmacht's ability to sustain its operations would be increasingly tested, revealing the stark limitations of an overly diversified vehicle inventory during the intense and prolonged engagements in the Soviet Union.

Logistics planning for Operation Barbarossa uncovered serious problems that had only been minor issues during the previous campaigns in the West. While the standardization issues with trucks we discussed earlier contributed to these logistical headaches, sheer numbers also became a critical concern. The Heer faced a significant shortfall in trucks as early as February of 1940, and this situation would worsen dramatically over time. German industry was only managing to replace about half of the losses sustained, leaving the army struggling to maintain its mobility. Adding to the complexity, requisitions from civilians and captured stocks further complicated the standardization issues. Although these measures provided a temporary reprieve, they were not a sustainable solution to the broader problem of equipment replacement. Compounding the challenges for logistics planners in 1941, was the fact that Soviet railroads operated on a wider gauge track than the standard used throughout the rest of Europe. Yes, what could seem such a minor detail as the gauge of the track would have a profound effect during WW2. As you can imagine, the most powerful land based logistical method, even to this very day, is by rail. The Germans depended heavily on rail and to be honest upon horse and mule.

The Soviet rail gauge in 1941 was defined as 1524 mm between the rails. In 1970, the Soviet Gauge was standardized as 1520 mm. European rail gauge at this time was 1435 mm. This is now known as “standard gauge.” Most if not all of the continental track was set to this size before the turn of the century. The notable exception was the Iberian Peninsula which ran 1672 mm in Spain and 1664 mm in Portugal. This discrepancy became a formidable obstacle in transporting supplies and reinforcements to the front lines. There were essentially two possible solutions to this problem: the Germans could either capture substantial amounts of Soviet rolling stock and locomotives or re-lay the railroad tracks to conform to the narrower European standard. The first option hinged on operational luck, a variable steeped in uncertainty and unpredictability, particularly in the chaos of war. The second solution would demand vast amounts of manpower and time, resources that were already stretched thin due to the expansive nature of the campaign. As logistical planners looked toward the challenges ahead, they faced a daunting reality: without effective and responsive logistics, the Wehrmacht's operational success in the East could be severely compromised.

The actual plans and troop dispositions for the invasion of the Soviet Union went through three major phases of planning. The first phase was an operational study conducted by Major General Marcks. Marcks was the chief of staff of the 18th Army. He was selected for this first draft because he was a longtime friend of Halder and had a reputation for being a competent mind. Additionally, Halder had already asked him to start sketching out a draft. His planning received official sanction on July 29, 1940, well before Adolf Hitler issued War Directive Twenty-One. Marcks' initial plan called for the establishment of two army groups: one positioned north of the Pripyat Marshes and the other to the south. The Northern Army Group was designed to be the dominant force and the main effort of the campaign. In his assessment, Marcks estimated the strength of the Red Army on its western front at 96 infantry divisions, 23 cavalry divisions, and 28 motorized brigades. Interestingly, it seems that Marcks was not fully aware of the existence of the Soviet tank divisions or the mechanized corps, which would later prove significant in the conflict.

To counter the estimated strength of the Red Army, Marcks utilized figures that included the planned continued expansion of the Heer, ultimately assigning a total of 147 divisions for the operation. This formidable force consisted of 110 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 24 Panzer divisions, and 12 motorized infantry divisions. The breakdown of troop allocations was as follows: the Northern Army Group would receive 50 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 motorized divisions, and 15 Panzer divisions. Meanwhile, the Southern Army Group would be allocated 5 Panzer divisions, 6 motorized divisions, and 24 infantry divisions. The remaining divisions were earmarked to form a substantial operational reserve, intended to plug any gaps that might arise as the army groups advanced into the vast expanse of the Soviet Union. This early planning phase was critical in setting the stage for what would become one of the largest military operations in history, reflecting both strategic ambition and the challenges ahead. The source material is unclear on exactly how the Wehrmacht thought the Soviet tank arm was fielded in the army. A fair guess might be that they understood the Red Army to be organized along the French model which had tanks in brigades and regiments attached to rifle divisions and corps. Ultimately, this is a significant sign of the poor state of Wehrmacht intelligence at this time.

Major General Marcks divided his operational concept for the invasion into four distinct phases. Phase One focused on the army groups pushing the Red Army back approximately 400 kilometers, with the objective of encircling the bulk of Soviet forces. This initial push was essential to secure a quick victory, as failing to achieve this would lead to significant complications.Phase Two would involve a renewed attempt to break through any new defensive lines established by the Soviets, aiming to encircle the defenders over a distance of 100 to 200 kilometers. Marcks projected that these first two phases should be completed within a span of seven weeks. However, he recognized the risks: if the initial operations failed, the outcome could devolve into positional warfare, where secure lines of communication would be jeopardized. Units of the Red Army that could not be decisively surrounded and defeated would eventually drain the strength of the invasion force. Scattered Soviet troops could pose threats to supply lines, demanding the attention of larger Wehrmacht units to eliminate these threats. Phase Three of the operations called for a simultaneous advance through Eastern Ukraine, along with the strategic capture of both Moscow and Leningrad. This was an ambitious vision and Marcks emphasized that it was heavily contingent on the success of the first two phases, along with a robust logistics framework to support the campaign. Finally, Phase Four was even more audacious, envisioning a broad push towards Arkhangelsk in the north and Rostov in the south, with Gorki marking the easternmost limit of the advance. This expansive objective reflected not only the ambitious nature of the plan but also the extensive logistical challenges the Wehrmacht would face in executing such a sweeping campaign. At this stage, the strength of the Heer’s logistics would be measured by the number and condition of the trucks, as well as the progress made in conversion of the Soviet rail gauge.

Major General Marcks also developed a geostrategic analysis of Germany's position following an invasion of the Soviet Union. He cautioned that an immediate alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would be unavoidable, which would likely lead to increased economic aid from the United States, a nation already heavily committed to supporting the UK. Marcks was astute enough to recognize that the Western Allies would seize any opportunity to land in Europe and begin efforts to liberate their fallen allies. He stressed that Germany would struggle to conduct a war on two fronts effectively. To mitigate this impending crisis, Marcks emphasized the necessity for the Wehrmacht to defeat the Soviet Union swiftly. While he acknowledged that such a rapid victory could not be guaranteed, he firmly believed that capturing Moscow was crucial to achieving this goal. In this regard, he echoed the sentiments of his friend Colonel General Halder, who was at that moment attempting to persuade Hitler to pursue this very course of action. The operational plan Marcks proposed represented an incredibly ambitious undertaking, all within a 17 week timeline. Yet, it was not the most audacious plan devised by the Wehrmacht for the invasion of the Soviet Union. That dubious honor belongs to the subsequent plan, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg.

On September 19, 1940, Colonel Walter Warlimont’s National Defense Division of the OKW presented its proposal for a new campaign, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg. This plan, now known as the "Lossberg Study," outlined four key objectives for the Eastern campaign:

To destroy enemy forces in Western Russia.

1. To prevent capable enemy units from retreating into the interior.
2. To isolate Western Russia from the sea.
3. To seize crucial Russian resource areas.

Lossberg’s plan called for three army groups: North, Center, and South. It aimed for a primary advance on Moscow via Smolensk while also allowing part of Army Group Center to divert northward to assist Army Group North. Additionally, the plan included a southern advance by German and Finnish forces through Karelia.

Among all German studies, Lossberg’s was unique in addressing the deficiencies of the Russian road and rail network. He asserted, “All German operations must be supported in their later stages by reliable Russian railways, as a transport system solely based on roads will be insufficient in the vast expanses.” There were two main ways to meet this requirement:

1. By seizing enough enemy rolling stock and locomotives to utilize existing tracks.
2. By converting Russian tracks to European Standard Gauge.

Both approaches presented challenges. One solution was to leverage naval power. If the Wehrmacht could swiftly capture and repair eastern Baltic ports and eliminate the Soviet Baltic Fleet, most logistical needs for AGN could be fulfilled by sea, allowing engines and rolling stock to support the other two army groups. In the campaign’s second phase, supplies transported by sea could sustain advances toward the Volga, Gorki, and Archangel. The incorporation of sea supply in the OKW plan was a significant development, marking the first time planners considered the impact of naval power on the campaign. Historically, the German High Command had displayed a marked ignorance of maritime strategy, a failing more evident now than ever. At this point, the Navy was unaware of the impending invasion, and the OKM staff had not participated in the planning process. The OKH studies conducted thus far appeared as if created by individuals who believed the world ended at the shoreline. The Lossberg Study changed this perspective.

Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg conducted his study concurrently with Major General Marcks’ planning efforts. Unlike Marcks, who operated under the aegis of Colonel General Halder, the chief of staff for the OKH, Lossberg worked under Colonel General Jodl, the chief of staff for the OKW. The OKW and OKH were engaged in a serious rivalry for influence within the Nazi state at this point, and OKH was losing ground. One area where their influence would hold strong was the operations in the east. Nevertheless, OKW still commissioned their own study of potential operations. While Lossberg's plan bore similarities to Marcks', it featured three notable differences. First, Lossberg divided the field army into three army groups rather than two, a change that would prove to be significant and enduring in the context of the invasion strategy. Unfortunately, an exact order of battle for his plan is elusive, and it remains unclear whether Lossberg even formalized one. Halder was still fundamentally in charge of crafting operational plans and leveraged the full extent of his historical responsibilities to authorize Marcks’ study, lending it considerable weight. In contrast, Jodl, despite being nominally superior within the OKW, lacked the gravitas associated with Halder’s position. His role was much less clearly defined, and while this sometimes allowed him to seize power in areas beyond the Army’s purview, it could also act as a hindrance. In this instance, it proved to be more of a disadvantage for him.

Lieutenant Colonel Lossberg faced significant limitations in developing a comprehensive operational plan due to the lack of resources and staff at his disposal, a direct result of his boss, Colonel General Jodl, not having those resources. Consequently, Lossberg’s plan was more truncated in detail compared to Marcks’ extensive study, despite having access to the completed version of that plan. His primary mission was not to devise the operational blueprint for the Heer, but rather to keep Jodl informed of potential strategies and scenarios that could emerge. Jodl needed ammunition in his power struggle with Halder, and Lossberg's insights were to provide that. The ultimate aim of this struggle was to influence the outcome of the planning process, and in that respect, Lossberg's contributions did have a notable impact. The three-army group disposition in his plan is a clear reflection of his influence.

The second key difference in Lossberg’s approach was his evaluation of the logistics situation. He recognized that without capturing significant amounts of Soviet gauge rolling stock, the strain on the existing truck resources would be insurmountable. He proposed that as much supply as possible be funneled through captured ports in the Baltic and Black Sea, a strategy that would eventually be integrated into the final invasion plan. The third major distinction between Lossberg’s study and that of Marcks was his identification of potential support among the local populace in the Soviet Union. He noted that the Baltic states were still in the process of being incorporated into the Union, and that Stalin faced considerable opposition, although mostly unarmed. Ukraine was also recognized as a possible source of support against the Soviets. However, while these ideas presented intriguing possibilities, they overlooked the racial ideology that underpinned the Nazi state. The regime was engaged in an aggressive war of conquest, not one of liberation. The encouragement of local independence was fundamentally at odds with the Nazis’ genocidal ambitions and their desire for cultural domination over all non-German peoples. We will delve deeper into these themes shortly, but first, let’s discuss the final iteration of the plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

The final plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union was organized and supervised by Lieutenant General Paulus. Paulus would go on to become infamous for his command of the 6th Army in Stalingrad. At this point however, he was a well-respected staff officer who had worked for Guderian and Lutz. At this point, he had been made the Quartermaster General of the Army, the same position that Ludendorff had held when he was military dictator in all but name during the latter part of the First World War. The position did not carry the same power in Paulus’ time but was still one of real prestige and influence. Operating under a mandate from Halder, Paulus was tasked with refining the work done up to that point, and he approached this through comprehensive wargames. He initiated these exercises in December, benefiting from Hitler's clarified political directives and updated intelligence and force estimations provided by the OKH staff. Paulus’ studies centered around the concept of three army groups, mirroring the structure proposed in Lossberg’s plan. One of Paulus’ most significant contributions was his insightful assessment of the Red Army’s force regeneration capabilities, a factor that the previous planners had largely overlooked. While both Marcks and Lossberg had assumed that the destruction of the main enemy forces, coupled with the occupation of the most developed regions of the western Soviet Union, would render the Red Army incapable of rebuilding, Paulus was far less optimistic. He estimated that the Soviet Union could mobilize 30 to 40 new divisions to reinforce the main defense within the first three months of the war. These divisions would come from newly conscripted soldiers and force transfers from other theaters of conflict. Furthermore, he projected that this number could rise to a total of 100 new divisions within just six months of the invasion’s commencement. This potential for rapid expansion was unprecedented and would have been difficult for the Nazi leadership to fully comprehend. In military history, there had never been an instance of such a quick mobilization of forces. The idea that the Soviet Union could muster 30 to 40 new divisions in such a short timeframe challenged many of the Nazi leaders' beliefs and assumptions, running counter to their entire ideological framework. Yet, as we will see, the reality was even more striking, the Red Army not only met these expectations but actually exceeded them. This resilience would prove to be a significant factor in the unfolding conflict.

In addition to this critical insight, Paulus’ wargaming also revealed another key lesson: neither of the flanking Army Groups, the North or South, was sufficiently strong to accomplish their respective objectives. This shortfall led to a significant bulge along the front, with Army Group Center advancing much farther than its northern and southern counterparts, leaving its flanks exposed. To address this vulnerability, the two weaker groups would need to request Panzer support. This support was essential, as Army Group Center would struggle to adequately cover its flanks, decisively crush its encircled enemies, and support its own front. The resulting weakening of the center ultimately led to a grinding halt of the advance on Moscow, providing the Soviets with the time and space they needed to organize a more effective resistance. Paulus concluded that the advance through the center had to be the primary effort, regardless of other objectives, and that Moscow should be the singular target for all three Army Groups. This conclusion may have seemed the only reasonable one, or perhaps Paulus recognized that Halder would be unwilling to accept any alternative strategy. At this time, Halder was deeply entrenched in his own struggle for influence over Hitler. He was desperate to persuade the Führer of the “Moscow above all else” framing of the campaign. It remains unclear whether Halder genuinely believed this was the best path to victory or if he was merely trying to demonstrate his strategic competency to Hitler.

The final topic we’ll cover this week is the profound impact of Nazi plans for genocide on the operational considerations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. These plans were fundamental to the entire Nazi conception of the war and its purpose. The regime believed that only through war could Germany achieve its goal of acquiring land, ominously termed “Living Space.” To secure this living space, it was essential to clear the region of those they deemed racially inferior, which meant nothing short of genocide and ethnic cleansing on a scale that dwarfed anything else in history. This was enshrined in the General Plan East, which had roots in Hitler’s earliest ideas about expansion. On an operational level, the Nazis committed significant resources to execute this horrifying plan. Einsatzgruppen formations were prioritized within the Heer’s logistics plans. The Einsatzgruppen or “Special Task Forces” were the death squads of the SS. They were tasked with roving the rear areas in the wake of the Wehrmacht. They especially targeted Jews as part of the final solution, but were not hesitant to murder anyone else. The Einsatzgruppen would number around 3,000 men. They were allocated special privileges for transportation and supplies. Efforts were made throughout the campaign to accommodate the Einsatzgruppen in their murderous mission. These units would follow the front-line troops, systematically carrying out mass murders throughout the Soviet Union. They operated with the cooperation of many regular army personnel and, at times, received active assistance. No one was to escape this war unscathed, physically, morally, or otherwise. This brutal strategy not only shaped the course of the invasion but also left an indelible mark on the psyche of those involved, transforming the war into a harrowing chapter of human history.

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In June 1941, Hitler planned to launch Operation Barbarossa, a bold invasion of the Soviet Union, aiming to destroy its military before fully conquering Britain. Despite initial planning, the Wehrmacht faced critical logistical issues and ignored warnings about Soviet defenses. Strategic disagreements arose between Hitler and his generals regarding objectives, with General Halder advocating for capturing Moscow first. Would the whole rotten structure cave in when they kicked the door? Or was Hitler about to engage his greatest rival yet?