Last time we spoke about the myth of the German Blitzkrieg. As summer approached in 1941, Hitler readied his forces for Operation Barbarossa, a bold invasion of the Soviet Union aimed at securing rapid victory. Despite Stalin's restructured Red Army, both sides faced logistical challenges. Hitler's goal was to annihilate the Red Army, while his generals prioritized capturing Moscow, leading to debates and miscommunication. The Wehrmacht’s initial successes relied more on luck and enemy blunders than revolutionary tactics like Blitzkrieg, a concept popularized after the war by German generals seeking to explain their swift victories in France. However, these tactics were not as groundbreaking as portrayed; they stemmed from long-standing principles of maneuverability. As the campaign progressed, the reality of a harsh Eastern Front began to set in, casting doubt among German leaders about their ability to sustain their rapid advances amidst logistical nightmares, foreshadowing the monumental struggles that lay ahead.

This episode is: Day 1 of Operation Barbarossa

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Its finally time to begin the Eastern Front. For the last few weeks we went through 11 prelude episodes and 1 special, but the time has come for Germany to unleash Operation Barbarossa. But before we begin I have to mention a few things going forward. We are now embarking on an incredible journey through the vast and complex campaigns of the Eastern Front, a scale that is truly monumental. While the distances involved might remind some of our Pacific War series, the nature of these land campaigns means that they engaged far more troops. Millions of soldiers from both sides were mobilized, organized into hundreds of divisions and thousands of regiments, creating a colossal theatre of war. Given the immense scale, it's important to note that we cannot possibly cover every movement of every unit within the confines of the youtube episode format, let alone this humble podcast. I am going to do my best to give you the macro and micro picture of this colossal event. Ironically the scope of it begins on a huge scale as I am sure most of you know, Barbarossa is simply insane.

The soldiers of the Heer remained largely unaware of Operation Barbarossa until the late afternoon of June 21st. Only then did they receive the shocking news through a proclamation from Adolf Hitler, announcing that the long-anticipated conflict would soon begin. For many of these soldiers, this revelation was breathtaking, yet it was met with a surprising sense of confidence rather than fear. Most soldiers had anticipated that such a day might eventually come, and their response was characterized by a grim determination. They firmly believed in the ideological righteousness of their impending invasion, convinced that their mission was justified and necessary. With the start time for the operation looming just a few hours away, sometimes as little as six hours after they had received Hitler's message, they swiftly set to work preparing themselves for the challenge ahead. In this charged atmosphere, there was little room for doubt. The soldiers focused on their tasks, their minds geared towards executing the orders that would soon propel them into one of history's largest military engagements. With the weight of their convictions behind them, they were ready to embark on a campaign that would forever alter the course of the war.

Adolf Hitler was convinced that a series of decisive defeats would lead to the collapse of Joseph Stalin's government. He expressed this belief to General Alfred Jodl, stating, "We have only to kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down." This mindset reflected a broader expectation among many high-ranking officials within the German military, who shared the belief that a swift and overwhelming victory was imminent. Field Marshal Paul von Kleist later reminisced about this prevailing sentiment in a conversation with Basil Liddell Hart after the war. He remarked, "Our hopes of victory were largely predicated on the assumption that the invasion would trigger a political upheaval in Russia. There was an excessive expectation that Stalin would be overthrown by his own people if he suffered significant defeats." This optimism was further nurtured by Hitler's political advisers, who painted an overly simplistic picture of the political landscape in the Soviet Union. Von Kleist acknowledged that, as soldiers, they lacked sufficient understanding of the intricate political dynamics at play to challenge these assumptions. This misplaced confidence in a quick resolution would ultimately prove to be a critical misjudgment as the campaign unfolded and the realities of the Eastern Front became starkly evident.

Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, was notably opposed to the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. He articulated his stance with striking clarity, stating, "I can summarize my opinion on a German-Russian conflict in one sentence: if every burned-out Russian city were as valuable to us as a sunk English battleship, I would support a German-Russian war this summer. However, I believe we can only defeat Russia militarily, but such a conflict would ultimately be detrimental to us economically." Ribbentrop acknowledged the allure of delivering a decisive blow to the Communist system, suggesting that there was a certain logic in allowing the continent of Europe and Asia to unite against the Anglo-Saxon powers and their allies. Yet, he emphasized one critical point: "The decisive factor is whether this undertaking would hasten the fall of England." He expressed concern that a German attack on Russia would actually bolster English morale, framing it as an indication of German doubt in the success of the war against England. According to Ribbentrop, this military venture would not only signal that the conflict would persist for a longer duration but could also inadvertently prolong it. By diverting attention and resources toward the Eastern Front, Germany risked undermining its campaign against Britain, thereby complicating an already challenging war effort.

General Walter Warlimont issued a chilling order to all military commanders in the German Army regarding the planned occupation of the Soviet Union. The directive outlined several ruthless measures aimed at eradicating any political opposition. The key points included: Liquidation of Political Officials: The order explicitly stated that all political officials and leaders were to be eliminated. This directive underscored the Nazi regime’s determination to dismantle any structures of Soviet authority and suppress potential resistance. Disciplinary Authority: In cases where political officials were captured by German troops, an officer with the authority to impose disciplinary punishment would decide whether the individual should be liquidated. The mere fact that a person was identified as a political official was sufficient justification for this deadly decision. Treatment of Political Leaders: The order also specified that political leaders within the Soviet armed forces (Red Army) would not be recognized as prisoners of war. Rather, they were to be executed at the earliest opportunity, specifically stating that such actions should occur in prisoner-of-war transit camps at the latest. This directive revealed the brutal approach taken by the German military against perceived enemies, reflecting a broader strategy of annihilation aimed at consolidating control over the occupied territories and eliminating any political influence that could challenge Nazi authority.

The attack commenced with the thunderous roar of artillery fire just after 0300 hours. As dawn began to break in the northern regions of the Soviet Union, the sound of the opening salvos shattered the early morning calm. Above, Luftwaffe bombers streaked across the sky, their engines shrieking as they flew toward crucial targets, including ammunition depots, military headquarters, and other strategic installations. At the tactical level, the Soviet military was caught entirely off guard. A crucial lack of communication meant that no alert had been issued to front-line troops, leaving them unprepared for the onslaught. Key infrastructure was left defenseless; bridges remained unguarded, and artillery positions were unmanned, creating a significant vulnerability that the German forces were poised to exploit. In addition, many Soviet aircraft stood idle on tarmacs, completely unprepared for action as the attack unfolded. This lack of readiness would have dire consequences for the Soviet response, as the Wehrmacht took swift advantage of the element of surprise, launching a fierce assault that would set the tone for the devastating campaign that lay ahead.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Leeb's Army Group North was tasked with a crucial mission, with its area of operations extending from the Baltic port city of Memel in the northwest to the vicinity of Suwalki in the south. The left flank of this vast formation was commanded by Colonel General Georg Kuechler, who oversaw the 18th Army. As the divisions of the 18th Army advanced across the border, they did so with a surprising lack of fanfare. This muted initiation was a direct consequence of the German high command's strategy, which centered heavy artillery preparations primarily in areas opposite the advancing Panzer groups, diverting attention from Kuechler's forces. Kuechler's command comprised six infantry divisions, stretched across a front of approximately one hundred kilometers, with an additional division held in reserve for contingency operations. In stark contrast, the opposing Red Army mustered only three Rifle divisions organized into two corps. Notably, the 10th Rifle Division bore the brunt of the assault, holding a significant stretch of nearly eighty kilometers of the front that the 18th Army was targeting. By midday on the first day of the offensive, Kuechler was pleased to report that his troops had achieved advances ranging from eight to ten kilometers along the entire front. This progress was particularly noteworthy given that many forward Soviet units appeared to be out of position, contrary to the expectations set by the OKH. Although the fighting was fierce in several border towns, overall resistance was assessed as light, a fact that deviated from the German command’s anticipations of a more robust Soviet defense.

Despite this relative ease, substantial victories remained elusive across most sectors. Nevertheless, one unit stood out amid the prevailing conditions: the independent 291st Infantry Division, which was rapidly advancing through disarrayed Soviet positions. By the end of the first day, this division had surged nearly 65 kilometers into enemy territory, effectively traversing the vast Lithuanian countryside before securing a strategic bridgehead into Latvia. The remaining five divisions of the 18th Army, the 1st, 11th, 21st, 61st, and 217th Infantry, also made commendable progress as the day drew to a close. While they encountered sporadic resistance and engaged in tough fighting in certain locations, the overall lack of determined opposition allowed them to maintain momentum. This initial success set the stage for further operations in the coming days, as Kuechler’s forces aimed to exploit the disarray within the Soviet ranks.

On the right flank of the 18th Army was the 4th Panzer Group, commanded by Colonel General Ernst von Hoepner. Hoepner played a critical role in the campaign to come. His personal resistance to Hitler’s orders would end his career however and eventually his life later in the war. He orchestrated the operations of 602 tanks distributed among 3 panzer divisions, which were organized under the command of two Corps leaders: General Erich von Manstein, at the helm of the 56th Panzer Corps, and General Reinhardt, who directed the 41st Panzer Corps. These men both would go on to much higher commands later in the war. Manstein's singular objective was to drive his forces toward the critical bridge over the Dubyssa River at Ariogala, a strategic point essential for the continued advance into Soviet territory. If this bridge was destroyed before it could be secured, Army Group North would be delayed by weeks, if not months. The terrain was especially hard to traverse, and this bridge was one of the only passages fit for tanks over the Dubyssa river and its gorges.

The lead element of Manstein’s offensive was Major General Brandenberger’s 8th Panzer Division. As they approached the town of Girdziai, positioned a mere 13 kilometers from the border, they encountered fierce resistance from the Soviet 125th Rifle Division. The defenses around Girdziai were formidable, prompting German commanders to attempt a tactical bypass of the town. However, despite the opposition, the relentless advance of the German Panzers continued. By late evening, the 56th Panzer Corps came to a halt for the day after an impressive advance. The Corps had successfully mobilized troops and tanks over a distance of 92 kilometers from its starting point, achieving all of its primary objectives. Girdziai, though it had temporarily thwarted the advance of major elements, ultimately succumbed in the late afternoon, allowing Manstein’s forces to press onward. Meanwhile, the 41st Panzer Corps operated on the left flank of the Panzer Group, engaged in its own fierce battles. As they pressed forward, German troops encountered staunch resistance from the Red Army, which fought tenaciously in the densely wooded areas lining the attack route. Despite their efforts, Reinhardt’s Corps could not secure all of its planned objectives for the day, falling short of the essential crossings at Raseinai. The challenges faced in these wooded terrains highlighted the determined resistance of the Soviet forces and the obstacles that lay ahead for the advancing Panzers.

On the southern flank of Army Group North was the 16th Army, commanded by Colonel General Busch. Busch was an ardent supporter of Hitler, using this connection to get himself out of trouble and into higher positions throughout the war. Tasked with securing a front measuring 100 kilometers, the 16th Army played a pivotal role in repelling the Soviet 16th Rifle Corps to safeguard the left flank of the advancing Panzers. At the outset of the offensive, the Soviets began to retreat in a state of disarray, reflecting the initial effectiveness of the German strategy. However, as the day wore on, communication became increasingly unreliable, with reports indicating that contact was lost with some subordinate units of the 16th Rifle Corps. As the day progressed, German forces found that resistance from the Soviet troops was stiffening. Small unit commanders within the Wehrmacht reported being engaged by Soviet forces emerging from areas that had been bypassed during the advance. This situation created a sense of uncertainty, as secure positions were elusive, and the Heer soon discovered that this reality was pervasive throughout the Soviet Union. If you were to look at a map of operation barbarossa it would fill you mind with overwhelmed German avances, but this does not necessarily reflect the reality. The Germans struggled for the entirety of their occupation of the Soviet Union to properly secure and make safe any rear area. Organized Partisans ensured that nowhere was safe for the invaders. This compared with the relatively docile occupied France and the Low Countries, where serious resistance would not become a problem until much later in the war.

Particularly in this sector, small bands of Red Army soldiers demonstrated remarkable resolve and combat skill, often catching their German adversaries off guard with sudden counterattacks. It was evident to all involved that this campaign would not unfold as smoothly as the blitzkrieg in France had just a year prior. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the 16th Army had achieved tangible success. Its divisions made better-than-expected progress in several areas, and despite the challenges faced, they had not encountered significant delays in their advance. The day’s outcomes bolstered the morale of the German troops, setting a hopeful tone for the ongoing operations, even as the specter of a determined enemy loomed ever larger. Army Group Center, under the command of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, was designated as the primary effort of the entire campaign. As such, it commanded the widest front and the most extensive resources. Bock’s lines stretched from Suwalki in the north to the notorious Pripyat Marshes in the south. The left flank of this formidable advance was anchored by General Hermann Hoth, who commanded the 3rd Panzer Group. As the advance commenced, Bock’s forces were preceded by a considerable artillery barrage, complemented by Luftwaffe close air support that relentlessly bombarded positions held by the Soviet 11th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Kirill Morozov. Notably, Morozov had strategically positioned his forces slightly behind the border, allowing for some protection against being completely overrun during this initial onslaught. Even so, parts of the 57th Panzer Corps managed a remarkable advance of up to 70 kilometers on that first day. Hoth’s command also included two infantry corps: the 5th and 6th Corps. These formations, moving at a slower pace than their armored counterparts, did not cross the border until 04:00 hours. Nevertheless, they managed to foot march an impressive 40 kilometers before halting for the day, enduring some level of combat during their progress. Another of Hoth’s Panzer Corps, the 39th, advanced on the left flank, closest to the dividing line of the Army Group. With a front only 20 kilometers wide, this corps was densely packed and faced little opposition, encountering only fierce house-to-house fighting in a small village near the border. As pertaining to General Hoth’s 3rd Panzer group’s war diary after completing the first day of Operation Barbarossa, “Where the enemy appears he fights tenaciously and courageously to the death. Defectors and those seeking to surrender were not reported from any positions. The struggle, as a result, will be harder than those in Poland and the Western campaign”. By 09:40 hours, aerial reconnaissance reported significant numbers of unidentified Red Army soldiers withdrawing toward the Neman River, seemingly attempting to regroup and fortify their defensive lines.

Capitalizing on this retreat, the 7th Panzer Division raced toward the crossings at the town of Alytus. The 7th Panzer Division already had some standing as one of the best divisions in the Heer. It had been commanded in France by then Major General Rommel, who built his reputation first in the daring assaults after the breakout of the Panzers near Sedan. By 12:45 hours, the German forces had secured the bridges, providing a vital foothold. However, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, the commander of the Soviet Northwestern Front, had other plans. He dispatched his 5th Tank Division to disrupt the German advance and push the Panzers back over the Neman River. The first elements to arrive were 44 T-34 tanks, which, facing only 20 German tanks, seemed poised to turn the tide. This should have spelled doom for the German advance; however, the ineptitude of the inexperienced Soviet tank crews, combined with timely Luftwaffe air support, meant that the T-34s were effectively neutralized in place. This encounter was a total victory for the Wehrmacht. The presence of the superior Soviet tanks was barely noticed at the highest levels of the Heer’s command, but soldiers who had encountered them first hand were shaken. One soldier recounted how a T-34 had absorbed dozens of anti-tank rounds without effect. This was a portent of things to come, though it would be weeks before the highest levels of the Heer took notice of the superior Soviet tanks. While this engagement delayed the advance by several hours, it cost the 7th Panzer Division a not insignificant portion of its combat strength. Ultimately, by the end of the day, the 39th Panzer Corps had successfully secured its bridgehead across the Neman River and began to drive a wedge between the Soviet Northwestern and Western Front commands. This advancement set the stage for the anticipated encirclement of the Western Front. Commanders on both sides recognized the significance of the growing gap and directed their best efforts toward sealing it, knowing that the outcome of this maneuver might determine the success of the campaign.

Next in line was the 9th Army, commanded by Colonel General Strauss. His forces were deployed along a formidable front spanning 200 kilometers. At 03:00 hours, Strauss’s troops crossed the line in conjunction with the rest of the front. His primary focus was on the left flank, where 3 of his divisions advanced from Suwalki toward Grodno. They soon found themselves engaged in fierce combat against the Soviet 29th Tank Division of the 3rd Army, which mounted a determined resistance. This sector proved to be no easy battleground. Elements of the 9th Army would become some of the first German troops to encounter the Soviet heavy KV-1 and medium T-34 tanks, although only 2 KV-1s and 26 T-34s were present during this initial engagement. The KV-1 and T-34 tanks had not been produced in nearly the same numbers as the lighter tanks of the Red Army, and those that had been produced had not been concentrated. It was not uncommon to have 1 T-34 for every ten lighter tanks, like the T-37 or T-26.

Details about the confrontation remain scarce, but it appears that these Soviet tanks were largely ineffective in their debut against the well-trained Heer. However, this would not hold true in future encounters, as the Soviets would quickly adapt to the challenges presented by the German forces. Despite the fierce opposition, the 9th Army made significant progress, fighting their way to the outskirts of Grodno. However, the city itself would not fall until the following day. At that time, Lieutenant General Vasily Kuznetsov commanded the Soviet 3rd Army, which was headquartered in Grodno. By the close of the day, Kuznetsov found himself in a perilous situation, facing the real threat of encirclement. As the day unfolded, his superiors struggled to grasp the true extent of his predicament, a situation that was not uncommon on this day or in the days that followed. German special forces operating in the region had successfully disrupted communication lines, further complicating the command and coordination of Soviet forces. This disruption would continue to plague the Stavka (the Soviet high command) throughout the campaign, as it sought to counter the rapid and aggressive maneuvers of the Wehrmacht. By the end of the day, the 9th Army had not only advanced along their entire front but also achieved the majority of their first-day objectives. This success enhanced the overall momentum of the German offensive and underscored the effectiveness of their strategic planning in the early stages of the campaign.

On the right flank of Strauss’s army was Field Marshal Heinz Guderian’s 4th Army, commanding a front that measured 100 kilometers. Despite having a significant area of responsibility, this was still only half the size of the 9th Army’s front. Unlike many of the other infantry armies engaged in the offensive, Kluge’s assault was preceded by a substantial artillery and aerial bombardment, designed to soften enemy defenses and pave the way for the main offensive. The Army’s assault engineers had to push across the Bug River in order to clear the border area and build bridges for the oncoming main body of troops. This went off without a hitch. By 12:30 hours. However, once across the river, the 9th Army began to encounter more serious resistance from the Soviet forces. This unexpected opposition slowed the German operations somewhat, as troops learned, just like their comrades in other sectors on this day, that the bypassed Soviet forces were not surrendering without a fight. The Red Army soldiers displayed remarkable tenacity, often engaging in fierce resistance even when cut off, a contrast to the experiences of the Heer during their previous campaigns in the West. This determined defense by the Soviets took the German soldiers by surprise, challenging their expectations and underscoring the resilience of the Red Army in this early phase of the Eastern Front conflict. As the day progressed, the 4th Army, although facing delays, continued to adapt to the evolving situation. The initial advantage of surprise began to erode as the fierce fighting tested the mettle and resolve of Kluge's troops, indicating that the campaign in the East would demand more from them than the swift victories of their past engagements in Western Europe.

Despite the intense fighting, the Soviet Western Front, commanded by General of the Army Pavlov, was disintegrating under the relentless pressure of the German advance. The most pressing issue facing Pavlov was the command and control of his armies. He struggled to establish communication with the headquarters of several divisions, leaving them unable to effectively command their subordinate units. The day before Operation Barbarossa commenced, Pavlov had personally petitioned Joseph Stalin for permission to mobilize his forces, but his request was summarily denied. This denial would prove catastrophic for the Red Army, severely impacting their ability to mount a cohesive defense. Nowhere was this lack of preparedness more evident than in the sectors facing Army Group Center. As the first day of battle drew to a close, Soviet divisions found themselves scattered and ill-equipped. Many units possessed little more than rudimentary plans to resist the impending German assault, demonstrating a severe lack of coordination and resources. In this chaotic environment, the 4th Army made only limited progress, advancing an average of 10 to 30 kilometers along the front. Among the Soviet formations, it was the 263rd Infantry Division that achieved the greatest success on this day, managing to secure the town of Bryansk. However, this modest gain was overshadowed by the overall disarray of the Soviet forces, highlighting the dire situation that Pavlov faced as the campaign unfolded. The inadequate response to the German offensive illustrated the broader challenges that the Red Army would need to overcome in the days to come, as they grappled with both internal disorganization and external aggression.

Anchoring the right flank of Army Group Center was Colonel General Heinz Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, which operated along a front of 100 kilometers. Guderian is another of the various Generals who would go on to play an outsized role in the outcome of the war. His habit of disobeying direct orders from even the highest of authorities would get him in trouble as the war progressed, but he managed to get himself in and out of trouble due to his willingness to play coy with Hitler. The OKH and Army Group Center ensured that Guderian's Panzers were among the most heavily supported forces in the entire theater, receiving the highest priority for Luftwaffe assets and being assigned the bulk of the Army Group’s dedicated formations. These dedicated formations included assault guns battalions, artillery batteries, anti-tank and flamethrower support among others. As the assault commenced on the morning of June 22, 1941, the 12th Infantry Corps launched an attack to encircle the fortress at Brest. The Brest fortress was exceptionally unprepared for the assault and many of the defenders fled in the earliest hours. However, those that stayed behind put up a heroic defense of the citadel that lasted until at least June 30, 1941. In 1965 it was memorialized as a “Hero Fortress” , a unique decoration in Soviet History. Its individual equivalent is the “Hero of the Soviet Union.” Twelve cities were eventually decorated as “Hero City” as well for various roles in the war. The fortifications were manned by approximately 9,000 soldiers from various Soviet units who fought tenaciously and refused to surrender.

The 2nd Panzer Group, operating 190 kilometers to the south of Hoth, encountered a considerably more challenging advance. While some bridges across the Bug River, acting as the German-Soviet border, were successfully seized during the initial German assault, it would require the German Army’s assault engineer teams to figure out how to cross the Bug River for not just infantry but also heavy vehicles and Panzers. Compounding the difficulties, General of Panzer Troops Joachim Lemelsen, commander of the 47th Panzer Corps, which included the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions, the 29th Motorized Division, and the 167th Infantry Division, reported significant challenges in crossing the captured bridges. The approach roads were literally sinking into the swamplands under the heavy weight of traffic, severely hindering the movement of troops and equipment. This necessitated the construction of pontoon bridges, causing delays in their penetration. However, by midday, at least nine bridges were operational. To expedite the crossing, the 18th Panzer Division utilized 80 specially outfitted Panzer III and IV tanks to ford the Bug. These were known as Teuchpanzers. They had originally been designed for the abandoned Operation Sealion. These special amphibious conversions were viewed with some suspicion by the men that used them. However, they worked perfectly on this day. They were equipped much like modern fording capable tanks. The tanks were sealed against any water inflow and set up with a large air breather tube. These tanks were instrumental in defending the expanding bridgehead as engineers continued their work on the pontoon bridges.

Before noon, the 47th Panzer Corps successfully crossed the Lesna River, approximately 10 kilometers beyond the city of Brest-Litovsk, moving further into Soviet territory. To the right of the 12th Infantry Corps was the 24th Panzer Corps, whose main effort was aimed at advancing as far as possible toward Minsk, located more than 300 kilometers away. Although it was not anticipated that they would reach the city before the end of the first week, it was vital to push toward Minsk quickly to achieve the grand encirclement intended by Adolf Hitler. Standing in their way was Lieutenant General Korobkov’s 4th Army. Late in the day, the 22nd Tank Division was committed to the fight. However, German air superiority sealed the fate of the Soviet tank columns, with the Wehrmacht’s coordination in the field proving overwhelming for the inexperienced and unprepared Red Army troops. By the end of the first day of Operation Barbarossa, the 47th and 24th Panzer Corps had advanced approximately 20 kilometers. While this was not as spectacular as the gains achieved in other areas of the front, it was notable given the stiff resistance they encountered and the serious terrain obstacles they had to overcome. This initial movement set the stage for further advances in the coming days as the German forces continued to push into Soviet territory.

Army Group South, commanded by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, was divided into two halves by the Carpathian Mountains. The southern sector, situated along the Prut River in Romania, would not initiate offensive operations until July 2. Therefore, the forces stationed there, including the German 11th Army and the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, remained passive during the first week of Operation Barbarossa and will not be covered this week. In contrast, the northern sector held the majority of the Army Group’s combat power. On its northern flank was the 6th Army, led by Field Marshal Friedrich Reichenau. Half of the divisions within the army were designated to support the 1st Panzer Group, commanded by Colonel General Hermann Kleist. These armored forces moved across the border in coordination with the rest of the front and engaged in fierce combat against Soviet positions fortified by the 15th Rifle Corps.

The northernmost units, particularly the 44th Infantry Corps, faced exceptionally stiff resistance from well-prepared Soviet defenders. As the day progressed, they endured hundreds of casualties and managed only an average advance of 15 kilometers under heavy enemy fire. In the southern portion of the front, the 17th Infantry Corps engaged in combat as well, but initially encountered far less resistance compared to the 44th Infantry Corps. However, this relative calm changed dramatically before midday as soldiers from the 15th Rifle Corps fought desperately to defend their bunkers. Even after German forces believed many of the bunkers had been cleared, Soviet defenders continued to mount tenacious resistance, demonstrating their determination to hold their positions. This fierce fighting persisted until the day's end. Despite the challenges, elements of the 6th Army were able to advance approximately 15 kilometers beyond the border in some sectors. This progress, while limited in comparison to the advances in other sections of the front, showcased the tenacity of both sides and set the stage for the ensuing battles as the campaign unfolded.

The supporting infantry of the 1st Panzer Group relentlessly battered the Soviet bunkers along the Bug River. By midday, a small gap had been opened, allowing Colonel General Hermann Kleist’s Panzers to spring into action and begin their assault. However, the advance was soon hampered by bunkers that had been accidentally bypassed by the infantry in front of them, leading to fierce fighting and mounting casualties. As a result of these challenges, only one of the five Panzer divisions within the 1st Panzer Group managed to cross the border on the first day: the 11th Panzer Division, commanded by Major General Crüwell. This division advanced a relatively modest distance of 25 kilometers, but given the circumstances, it represented a significant gain for the German southern front on the first day of Operation Barbarossa. While the Red Army was unprepared for the vast offensive along the entire front, the defenses along the Bug River had one advantage: Soviet forces were able to resist from prepared defensive positions. The armies defending this region possessed more tanks than anywhere else on the Eastern Front. Although these tanks were employed with a level of incompetence, they still managed to score some hits against the advancing German forces. Despite the initial setbacks, it became clear that the Soviet defenders would continue to provide resistance in the days to come, using their fortifications and remaining armored assets to contest the German advance along the Bug. The fighting in this sector would prove to be a harbinger of the challenges that awaited both sides as the campaign unfolded. Theories emerged that the Soviet Union was seeking to preemptively attack Romania or Romania and Germany together are unfounded in reality. The Red Army was in the middle of a massive reorganization that rendered it incapable of offensive action. Colonel Glantz, considered by many to be the foremost expert on the subject of the Eastern Front, has definitely put the topic to bed in his 1998 book, Stumbling Colossus.

The first day of Operation Barbarossa was a definitive success, with many of the objectives for the initial assault not only met but exceeded. Prior to the launch of the offensive that morning, numerous leaders within the Wehrmacht had expressed concerns that while strategic surprise was achievable, tactical surprise would be unlikely. However, by the end of the day, these apprehensions had proven completely unfounded. The Germans had achieved an unprecedented level of tactical and strategic surprise, an accomplishment that seemed fantastical just weeks prior. This successful outcome marked the latest in a series of remarkable victories that contributed to the growing legend of the Wehrmacht. Following their swift conquests in Poland, France, and the Low Countries, the rapid gains in the Soviet Union further solidified their reputation as an unstoppable military machine. The intoxicating success of the first day fueled unbridled optimism among many of the highest-ranking leaders, particularly Adolf Hitler. This victory allowed them to indulge in their expectations for the coming days of Operation Barbarossa, as it seemed that another of Hitler’s audacious gambles had paid off. The mood was buoyant, with visions of further rapid advancements and ultimate victory overshadowing any lingering doubts about the challenges that lay ahead.

However, there was a darker side to the first day of Operation Barbarossa. Beneath the surface of the victories celebrated in the opening hours, the average German soldier was quickly learning that the Red Army was not composed of mere conscripts deemed as "Untermensch" with no will to fight. Instead, they encountered determined and cunning professional soldiers who displayed remarkable courage and resilience in the face of overwhelming odds. Complicating the narrative of victory, logistics soon proved to be a significant issue for the Wehrmacht. Some of Hoth’s Panzers had run out of fuel during the fighting, and Kluge’s men discovered that the roads of the Soviet Union were a far cry from those of France. Throughout Army Group Center, units found that what had been marked as proper roads on their maps were, in reality, little more than sandy trails carved through dense forests. This lack of reliable infrastructure meant that trucks often became mired in the terrain, necessitating the use of manpower and horses to pull them free. The inefficiency of these tracks posed further challenges, as tanks consumed significantly more fuel when traversing such rough terrain. Additionally, the roads were seldom wide enough to accommodate two-way traffic, complicating the routing of troops and supplies. For many of the junior officers and soldiers engaged in the combat, it became increasingly evident that there would be no easy days on the Eastern Front. The initial successes had come at a high cost, and the harsh reality of the campaign loomed large, hinting at the grueling challenges that lay ahead.

Stalin and his command staff were taken aback by the swiftness and brutality of the German invasion. For days, if not weeks, rumors had been swirling in the capital regarding a potential attack. Just hours before the Germans launched their offensive, Stalin had personally ordered his men not to mobilize, fearing that such a move might provoke Hitler. Perhaps, reminiscing about the events of September 1939, he hoped that a last-minute diplomatic deal could be struck to avert war. He was gravely mistaken.

Hitler was resolute in his plans for invasion, driven by a necessity rooted in his ideological beliefs. This madness propelled him to commence the largest military campaign in history, one that would ultimately be doomed to fail. As the first few hours of the invasion unfolded, Stalin’s high command began to reassess their strategy and resolve to resist the onslaught. They were determined not to allow the Red Army to collapse without a fight. Under the leadership of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, the Soviet Generals swiftly issued orders for immediate counter-attacks while simultaneously planning larger counter-offensives for the days ahead.

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Thus on June 22 of 1941, Hitler has unleashed Operation Barbarossa, one of the largest military operations of all time. German soldiers, fueled by Nazi ideology, prepared with grim determination as they received orders just hours before the assault. The attack began with artillery and air raids at dawn, catching the Soviets off guard. Initial successes marked the first day, with German forces advancing deep into enemy territory, despite facing unexpected resistance. However, the harsh realities of the Eastern Front, including logistical challenges and resilient Soviet defenders, foreshadowed a grueling campaign ahead, one that would test the Wehrmacht's might like never before.