Last time we spoke about the fall of Kyiv. In September 1941, as the German forces encircled Kyiv under General Guderian's leadership, desperation loomed large for the Soviet Red Army. Despite their valiant efforts to withstand the siege, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers found themselves trapped, leading to mass surrenders. Amidst the chaos, General Zhukov took command in Leningrad, rallying his troops with the stern order: “Not a step back!”. This grim scene was compounded by the chilling decision by Nazi leaders to execute thousands of Jews at Babi Yar, demonstrating the brutal lengths to which they would go in retaliation for resistance. The battle marked a turning point; while Germany celebrated its victory, deep-rooted issues within its ranks, including dwindling supplies and morale, were beginning to surface. The horror of war had only just begun, marking a tragic chapter in history that echoed far beyond the battlefield.

This episode is the Fall of Kyiv

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Last week, we left off with the destruction of the Southwestern Front and the capture of Kyiv. The job of defending Leningrad was tossed over to Zhukov. Meanwhile a massive reorganization was unfolding for a new operation aimed at Moscow. Yet before we jump into that I wanted to first talk about something else, how was the German propaganda machine telling the folks back home what was going on in the east? Under Hitler’s regime, there was no clear structure for producing and disseminating state propaganda. Officially, Josef Goebbels served as the Minister of Propaganda, but he lacked absolute control over the nation’s various media outlets. Instead, he competed for influence with the Wehrmacht’s Office of Propaganda Troops and other branches of the civilian government.

While the Wehrmacht’s office was primarily supposed to focus on internal messaging, it often released reports to the press. This was a strategic move to amplify the OKW’s preferred narrative on the frontlines and promote a military-friendly storyline. Goebbels himself was less concerned with glorifying the military or its achievements unless it directly benefited the Nazi Party or bolstered his own power. For Goebbels, serving Hitler was the ultimate priority. While many others in the government were driven solely by a hunger for power, Goebbels was a true believer in Hitler's vision, which became evident in his reporting and propagandistic efforts. Despite the growing challenges of the eastern campaign, the German command remained largely convinced that a final major offensive could bring an end to the war against the Soviet Union. Recent successes in the North and South, namely, the encirclement of Leningrad and the capture of Kyiv, had revitalized enthusiasm and heightened expectations that the Soviet state was on the brink of collapse.

A pivotal factor in fostering this belief was Goebbels’s series of Sondermeldungen, or special news bulletins, which publicly proclaimed that the war was nearing its conclusion. However, the soldiers at the front had a different perspective on the accuracy of such claims. While some were buoyed by the optimism, many voiced skepticism. General Wilhelm Groener, who directed the German occupation of Ukraine in 1918, had warned against complacency in campaigning in the East. He stated, “Anyone who wants to grasp the strategic nature of the eastern theatre of war must not overlook historical recollections. Beside the gate of the vast lowland between the Vistula and the Urals, which is the home of one state and one people, stands the warning figure of Napoleon, whose fate should implant in anyone who attacks Russia a sense of horror and foreboding.” On September 26, soldier Heinz Rahe wrote to his wife about the anticipated offensive toward Moscow. He expressed hope that Moscow would be reached within fourteen to twenty days, but then added with a hint of doubt, “—but not by us.” Similarly, a non-commissioned officer with the 79th Infantry Division expressed his reservations on September 24. He noted, “Whether Russia can be defeated this year, I doubt very much. The Soviet military might is indeed broken, but the country is too vast, and capitulation is not an option for the Russians. Because two men can’t agree on their ideas, millions of men have to bleed.” In another poignant letter dated September 28, Alois Scheuer shared his experiences in the East, hinting at the numerous difficulties he faced. He remarked, “What I have experienced and lived through in this quarter of a year in Russia, I cannot put into words. There is so much I wish to forget and never be reminded of again. I always try not to lose hope and courage, but there are hours when the loneliness and desolation are almost unbearable.”

While many soldiers at the front expressed their doubts and yearned for an end to the war, Goebbels's victory propaganda continued to resonate effectively, particularly within Germany. Classified reports from the SD or “Sicherheitsdienst”gauging public opinion revealed that, as of September 25, fears of positional warfare in the East and the likelihood of a winter campaign had largely faded. A follow-up report on September 29 confirmed that more and more people were beginning to believe in a German victory before winter set in. Despite this success, Goebbels was troubled by the extent of the rising optimism. In his diary entry from September 27, he observed, “The depression is now completely gone. At times, the mood of the people goes far beyond the real possibilities. Once again, there’s hope that this winter the war will be over, and we have much to do in the next weeks to temper this extreme optimism to a more realistic level.” This palpable sense of optimism was felt even at the front, where many desperately clung to the belief that victory was near. On September 28, Hans-Albert Giese wrote to his mother, “In the next few days, we will again march somewhat further. We look forward to it because the quicker we advance, the sooner we can return home to Germany. The news from the past few days has been really great. These Bolsheviks won’t last much longer.” Another soldier, Ernst Guicking, shared similar sentiments in a letter to his wife dated September 29. He stated, “Kiev is done. Now it’s the turn of Army Group Centre. The great final chord will soon be played in the East. All our hopes are pinned on the coming four weeks.

As the war progressed, Goebbels struggled to balance the expectations and morale of the civilian population with the harsh realities of the situation. The Wehrmacht was experiencing victories, but things had not unfolded as planned, despite what Hitler proclaimed to the public. While official reports boasted that the Red Army was on its last legs, Goebbels was increasingly anxious about public opinion, especially as the war inevitably stretched into 1942 and beyond. Throughout the conflict, the messaging from the German state regarding the situation in the East was anything but clear. Evidence suggests that this lack of clarity impacted morale both within the armed forces and among civilians. Hitler had never been entirely secure from the threat of an internal coup, and his security situation would continue to deteriorate over the coming months and years. This decline wasn't solely due to waning morale caused by inconsistent and vague propaganda that diverged from the realities of war. Initially, Hitler’s strategic management had helped stave off coup attempts during his reign. However, his forthcoming failures would ignite discontent in the future. Propaganda had been a crucial element of the Nazi state's success in maintaining control over Germany, but the cracks were starting to show in its armor. By the end of September 1941, even ordinary soldiers were beginning to openly question the wisdom of the war. For instance, in the aftermath of the fighting around Kyiv, one soldier reflected on these sentiments in a letter home “Three months ago today the campaign against Russia began. Everybody supposed at the time that the Bolsheviks would be ripe for capitulation within no more than eight to ten weeks. That assumption, however, was based on a widespread ignorance of the Russian war materiel...Just this morning we happened to hear that, for example near Kiev, 600 guns and 150,000 men were captured. What kind of figures are those! Russia is almost inexhaustible”.

Things began to grind to a halt at Leningrad. The German advance, now almost entirely devoid of armored support, was stalling at the Pulkovo Heights. The suburban areas surrounding the city proved to be a tough challenge. In the North, the Finns hesitated to attack, leaving their German allies struggling to push them further. Any hope for a link-up on the eastern shores of Lake Ladoga had to come from Army Group North, but with the 4th Panzer Group reassigned to Army Group Center for the foreseeable future, this prospect was all but impossible. On September 25, the 16th Army was pushed back from the eastern bank of the Neva River. The Soviets continued their assault, but by the 27th, Luftwaffe air support began breaking up their attacks. Throughout the remainder of the month, the Red Army launched small-scale offensives from the Valdai Hills, pressing west into the German lines, yet they gained little ground. Inside Leningrad, Zhukov was not content to simply wait for the Wehrmacht to come to him. He ordered the 54th Army to attack. Although these counterattacks ultimately proved unsuccessful, they troubled General Leeb. The commander of Army Group North recognized that he was stretched too thinly and that the weight of command was eroding his remaining confidence.

As the offensive capabilities of the Army Group waned, Hitler sought alternative methods for the destruction of Leningrad. A notable instance of this shift occurred on September 29, when a directive was issued by the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, clearly outlining the invaders' intentions. “The Fuhrer has decided to have St. Petersburg wiped off the face of the map. The further existence of this large town is of no interest once Soviet Russia is overthrown. The intention is to close in on the city and raze it to the ground by bombardments of artillery of all calibers and by continuous air attack. We have no interest in keeping even part of this great city’s population. The consequences arising from the extinction of St. Petersburg will be worked out at Supreme Command”. This directive, among others, made it clear that there was little hope for the city to surrender. In response, the resolve of both soldiers and civilians in Leningrad strengthened. Alongside Zhukov’s earlier order of “Not One Step Back,” Stalin issued his own commands, directing Zhukov to purge the city of potential fifth columnists. Defeatism could not be tolerated if the Soviet Union was to achieve victory. Though no one could foresee the horrors that awaited the city in the years to come, Stalin remained unwavering in his stance against perceived enemies of the state. He called for the eradication of both willing and unwilling collaborators with the invaders. In practice, this meant the murder of innocents and the relentless elimination of dissenters who might assist the Germans in their quest to take Leningrad.

Throughout the last week of September, Army Group Center was abuzz with activity. A new German offensive, codenamed Operation Typhoon, was being formed, aimed to create a massive breach in the center of the Soviet front. The objective was to eliminate the bulk of the Red Army before Moscow, seize control of the Soviet capital, and bring major operations on the Eastern Front to an end before winter set in. To achieve this, the OKH which directed operations on the Eastern Front, ordered a significant reorganization of the Ostheer or “Eastern Army” to provide the necessary forces. Army Group Centre was poised to receive the highest concentration of panzer, motorized, and infantry divisions ever assembled by Nazi Germany. In total, Bock’s army group commanded seventy-five divisions, including approximately forty-seven infantry divisions and fourteen panzer divisions. On October 2, the designated start date for Operation Typhoon, over 1,500 panzers and 1,000 aircraft were set to combine for a blitz-style offensive intended to overwhelm the Soviet front and enable rapid exploitation into the Soviet rear. Engaging more than a million Soviet troops necessitated battles of immense scale, with no guarantees of success. Even a battlefield victory would not necessarily lead to an end to hostilities. As the Germans had learned repeatedly since June 1941, there was a significant gap between operational success and strategic triumph. Operation Typhoon needed to be more than just another extension of the German front claiming more Soviet prisoners; it had to establish the conditions for a definitive victory in the East. Consequently, the OKH concentrated everything it could spare for one vast final offensive. This was a last-ditch effort to break the looming specter of a stalemate and avoid the uncertainty of a winter campaign. Capturing Moscow and ending the war in the East was always going to be a daunting task. Yet, more than at any other time in 1941, the strategic situation in mid-October convinced the German high command that victory against the Soviet Union was within reach. Even the Soviet government was preparing for the loss of Moscow, designating a new capital some 800 kilometers further east. Thus, despite the challenges facing the panzer groups, Hitler’s October offensive seemed to reinvigorate Germany’s war in the East and, in the eyes of the German command, brought the Ostheer closer than ever to outright victory.

Preparations for Operation Typhoon reached their peak as last-minute deliveries of fuel, ammunition, and reinforcements arrived at their jump-off points. Halder recorded in his diary on the 26th that the entire front line of Army Group Center was eerily quiet. This silence lasted until the 28th, when the Red Army began to launch probing attacks along the line. German reconnaissance reported that Soviet divisions were being transferred elsewhere. Halder noted, almost nonchalantly, that this was likely due to the Stavka attempting to organize a defense in depth, a suspicion that would prove to be more than valid in the coming weeks. The plan for the offensive was now fully outlined. In the northern part of the attack, the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group would form the line, serving as the most northern arm of the first encirclement, aimed at closing in on Vyazma. This would create a relatively small pocket, a reflection of two key factors. First, the reduced combat power of the army played a significant role. Second, and perhaps more critically, the small size of the encirclement indicated that Hitler had triumphed in the arguments of July. These discussions had focused on the large-scale operations of Army Group Center's early encirclements. Hitler advocated for scaled-back operations that targeted smaller sections of the Red Army. It was apparent that the dictator was able to impose his will on Field Marshal Bock’s planning for Operation Typhoon, at least in this respect.

In the center of the front, the 4th Army, led by Field Marshal Kluge, would collaborate with Hoth’s 4th Panzer Group to launch an attack on both sides of the major highway connecting Roslavl to Moscow. They would operate in two distinct groups. The northern group would form the second arm of the first encirclement, meeting the 3rd Panzer Group at Vyazma. Meanwhile, the 9th Army would screen the far northeastern flank of the advance. This significant extension of the 9th Army’s lines could have been avoided. However, it required Leeb to push his lines further east, which was unrealistic given his lack of armor since those resources were being concentrated for Operation Typhoon. Consequently, Army Group Center had to dilute their forces, covering positions that could only have been adequately defended if the panzer forces had been permitted to support Army Group North for a longer duration. This circular reasoning reflects the declining state of strategic thought within the Wehrmacht at this juncture. Additionally, it illustrated how the army in the east was being pushed to the absolute breaking point. The other leg of the center advance was tasked with holding the highway and continuing the offensive toward Moscow. This effort was crucial to pushing the front forward and securing the flank of the encircling panzers in the center.

The southern wing of the offensive was composed of Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group and the 2nd Army under Colonel General Weichs. The infantry held the middle ground, while the panzers formed the tip of the Army Group’s front. Guderian’s objective was to break across the Desna River and then advance in a northeast direction. This maneuver would accomplish the second encirclement through a sweeping hook. Weichs would converge with the panzers around Bryansk, facilitated by the shorter distances the infantry would need to march. Field Marshal Reichenau’s 6th Army was tasked with guarding the southern flank of the entire operation. This army remained under the operational control of Army Group South. Reichenau was required to advance and attempt to keep pace with the center, even as his lines grew increasingly stretched. This risk was likely deemed acceptable due to the devastation at Kyiv, where the Red Army was in dire straits during the last week of September. However, the march alone would present a daunting challenge, just as it would for the soldiers of the 9th Army in the North.

Two key points underpin the entire concept of operations for the impending offensive. First, the logistics situation was dire. The Wehrmacht was attempting one of the largest offensives in military history on a shoestring budget. There simply were not enough trains arriving to fulfill the needs of the operation. Despite ongoing promises from the Army Quartermaster, shortages persisted. General Wagner served as the quartermaster of the Army, grappling with the challenge of securing enough trains to supply the forces as the invasion progressed deeper into Soviet territory. He faced severe difficulties with the Soviet Union's track system; relaying tracks to the appropriate gauge was only part of the battle. German locomotives required fuel and water more frequently than their Soviet counterparts due to their smaller size. This necessitated the allocation of significant resources toward building the necessary facilities for them. Coupled with the capacity limitations of the single-track lines, even when Wagner did manage to acquire trains, they often could not reach their intended destinations. This lack of resources critically affected the staying power of the offensive and would prove vital in the coming weeks. The second key factor in the preparations for Operation Typhoon was the absence of real reserves. It took everything the Heer could assemble just to bolster the first-line units and maintain a continuous front from Leningrad to the Dnepr. Bock was unable to establish a meaningful reserve force. This same issue had plagued the first stage of fighting in June and July, and now it had returned with renewed intensity. The Wehrmacht was not only weaker but also faced a larger front without the element of surprise. Despite these challenges, Army Group Center had been revitalized into an impressive fighting force, becoming the largest single field command in German history. Millions of men were preparing for what many believed would be the climax of the entire war.

To defend against the impending offensive, the Stavka had been preparing since before the Battle of Smolensk. Their defense in depth was impressive in its execution. The Red Army was far from finished. The Stavka had to dispatch significant forces south to Ukraine to reform the Southwestern Front under Timoshenko. Although Kirponos died during the breakout attempt, there was little time for grief. Command of the Western Front passed to Colonel General Konev. The Bryansk Front managed to evade encirclement at Kyiv when Guderian split its lines, with Eremenko still in command. Marshal of the Soviet Union Budyenny had taken charge of the Reserve Front. Together, they mustered around 1.25 million men in fifteen field armies. The entire defense strategy hinged on these forces performing better than they had in previous encounters. They were outnumbered and equipped with fewer tanks, artillery, and aircraft. They had to hold the line; the fall of Moscow was not an option. Stalin had already resolved that if Moscow succumbed, the war would shift further east. A second capital had been designated at Samara, located about a thousand kilometers southeast on the Volga River. From there, the Soviet Union would continue to fight. However, Zhukov remained resolute. He believed the Red Army could surpass even Alexander I in 1812 and successfully defend Moscow against foreign seizure. Zhukov told Stalin so, and it was exactly what Stalin wanted to hear. But Stalin was also visibly agitated and sought the truth in whatever form it might take. Zhukov recounted a moment of questioning from Stalin: “Are you sure that we will hold Moscow? I ask you about this with a pain in my soul. Tell me truthfully, as a communist.” Zhukov’s response was blunt and unequivocal, reflecting his uncompromising nature: “We will, without fail, hold Moscow.” Of course, Zhukov’s assurance was not infallible, and Moscow continued to face a clear and present danger. However, he had a significant advantage: he had already learned from his defense of Leningrad that to defeat the Germans, he did not need to destroy their forces or advance his front to a distant objective. In the autumn of 1941, his goal was simply to prevent the Germans from seizing their prize and thereby secure victory by default. This task was anything but straightforward. With the entire Moscow region rapidly transforming into a fortified military district, Bock was destined to face a bloody battle, and time was not on his side as autumn conditions worsened.

As both sides readied their forces for the impending clash in the center, Army Group South continued its advance through Ukraine. The attack on Crimea commenced on September 24th. Manstein’s 11th Army launched a bold assault across the Perekop isthmus, aiming to capture Crimea. Defending this position was the 51st Army, which had established strong fortifications along the five-kilometer-wide isthmus. However, they were quickly overwhelmed. By the 26th, the invaders had pierced the line of the Tatar Ditch. The Tatar Ditch was part of a line of fortifications that extended across the width of the Isthmus. There have been several ditches or canals dug across the Perekop, but this one was suspected to have been from the 1500’s. It had been fortified by the Red Army in preparation for the attack by the Germans. Manstein was relatively well supplied with engineering equipment and heavy artillery, especially considering the overall state of the Wehrmacht and ongoing operations elsewhere. Just as he prepared to break through into open territory, bad news arrived. Manstein had divided his forces, deploying the 54th Infantry Corps as his assault force on the Perekop. His other forces, the 49th Mountain and 30th Infantry Corps, were tasked with holding the line alongside Romanian brigades between Melitopol and the Dnepr. He was in the process of pulling the 49th Mountain Corps out of the front lines to use it as an exploitation force toward Sevastopol. As the 49th Mountain withdrew, the Soviet 18th Army probed the Romanians and discovered them weakly deployed. Hours later, they broke through the defenses, leading to the crumbling of Romanian lines. Soon, they turned to attack the 30th Infantry from two sides. A sixteen-kilometer-wide gap opened in Manstein’s lines, threatening a serious disaster. In response, he ordered the 49th Mountain Corps to turn around and patch the gap. As the month ended, this effort was still underway. The advance across the Perekop stalled as the Soviets began to strengthen their positions, while Manstein found himself distracted by crises unfolding further north.

On September 24, a major conference was hosted by Bock at Army Group Centre to finalize plans for the long-awaited renewal of the offensive towards Moscow. In attendance were the heads of the OKH, Halder and the commander-in-chief of the army, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, as well as the commanders of Bock’s three armies: Strauss, Kluge, and Colonel-General Maximilian Freiherr von Weichs. The three panzer group commanders, Hoth, Hoepner, and Guderian, were also present. The assembled commanders were informed of their duties according to the OKH’s plan, which had been formulated over the past month. In the north, Strauss’s Ninth Army, together with Hoth’s Panzer Group 3, was to attack from the area near Dukhovshchina, forming the northern arm of the first major encirclement, closing at Viaz’ma. While Hoth’s panzers would provide the striking power, Strauss’s infantry had to cover the northern wing of the entire offensive, as it had proved impossible to extend Leeb’s army group any further to the east.

Kluge’s Fourth Army and Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 were tasked with attacking on both sides of the Roslavl–Moscow highway in the center of Bock’s front, also heading for Viaz’ma to close the pocket from the south. Meanwhile, Weichs’s Second Army and Guderian’s Panzer Group 2 were positioned further south to break through the Soviet positions on the Desna River and cooperate in an advance to the northeast, focusing on an encirclement centered on Briansk. Additionally, Reichenau’s Sixth Army, attached to Army Group South, would press forward in the direction of Oboian to protect as much of Bock’s southern flank as possible. At the conclusion of the conference, it was decided that the new offensive would begin on October 2. Hoth advocated for a start date of October 3, but was overruled. However, Guderian requested and received permission for his panzer group to begin two days earlier, on September 30. He claimed his request was motivated by two factors: firstly, the absence of good roads in the area where he would operate, necessitating a full utilization of the short period remaining before the autumn rasputitsa; and secondly, his expectation of additional air support prior to the opening of the rest of Army Group Centre’s offensive. Despite Guderian’s reasoning, it was not these factors that convinced Bock to authorize the early start. He was concerned that Guderian was operating so far to the south that his offensive would have little influence on the main attack for the first four or five days.

On September 27, Guderian’s five panzer divisions, along with the specialized “panzer flame” detachment, fielded a total of 256 operational tanks, a significant drop from their combined strength of 904 tanks on June 22, 1941. At the same time, estimates suggested that Hoth’s Panzer Group 3 had diminished to approximately 280 tanks, down from a starting total of 707, while Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 numbered roughly 250 tanks, a reduction from 626. Even these remaining tanks were often in a highly provisional state of repair. Halder later reflected on this after the war, noting, “When the battle of Kiev ended, after ruthless demands on the already seriously worn motors, Hitler ordered the attack in the direction of Moscow, which first required that strong elements be pulled back out of Ukraine. Now it was too late. The motors were at the end of their strength.” Although his troops were exhausted, they followed the lead of their commander. This was the peak of Guderian’s legend. He had defied orders numerous times and remained undefeated, earning the admiration of the Panzer force as a whole. However, this reputation also garnered him scorn from many of his fellow officers. Guderian’s trademark impetuosity was beginning to prove dangerous for the men under his command. Many tanks, men, and trucks would have benefited from an additional two days of rest, but Guderian was not inclined to grant them that necessary reprieve. The attack commenced before Guderian could fully position his right wing. As the day progressed, he managed to make some advances, but there was nothing to indicate a significant breakout. Halder noted in his diary that reports indicated the initial attack had caught at least some Soviet units by surprise.

On the front lines, the 4th Panzer Division was the lead element of the attack. They broke through the 283rd Rifle Division with ease but soon encountered a company of tanks. Colonel Bakharov’s 150th Tank Brigade was equipped with new production T-50 light tanks, a mix of older models, and a few T-34s. When the lead elements of the 35th Panzer Regiment made contact in the town of Essman, they faced two of these T-34s. The Soviet medium tanks were well positioned, providing excellent coverage of the road. Dug in, they halted the advance of the entire German division for several hours. The Germans attempted a flanking maneuver but were caught in the open, resulting in the loss of a Panzer III. Following this setback, they called in air support, prompting the T-34s to retreat rather than risk being targeted by the Luftwaffe. Once the air support arrived, the first town fell, allowing Guderian to get his division back on schedule. Meanwhile, Eremenko was misled by his field commanders about the size of the attack, and his intelligence picture remained weak. As a result, he concluded that the 4th Panzer Division's assault was merely a diversion. The Bryansk Front failed to act to counter this penetration, a decision that would ultimately prove to be a significant mistake.

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Amidst the chaos of September 1941, the German forces encircled Kyiv, trapping countless Soviet soldiers, leading to mass surrenders. Meanwhile, the Nazi propaganda exaggerated victories, claiming impending German domination. Soldiers, however, expressed doubts and despair in their letters, questioning Russia's capacity for defeat. As logistics strained the German advance and Soviet defenses strengthened, preparations for a new offensive, Operation Typhoon, were unveiled. With a fate hanging in balance, both the Germans and Soviets braced themselves for a brutal struggle over Moscow.