Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Typhoon. In September 1941, Leningrad faced a brutal siege. Amidst this chaos, General Zhukov rallied his troops with the grim order, “Not a step back!” While the Axis celebrated victories, soldiers at the front grew skeptical of the Nazi propaganda that inflated confidence. As the Germans prepared for Operation Typhoon, a decisive offensive aimed at seizing Moscow, logistical strains became apparent. The advance stalled, and any hope for quick victory faded. However, both sides braced for a monumental clash. Stalin and Zhukov vowed to defend the capital, with the latter asserting that they would hold Moscow at all costs. With over a million troops and abundant resources, the Germans believed victory was within reach. Yet, the Soviet defenses, fortified and resolute, stood in their way. Both the Axis and the Red Army prepared for battle, knowing the outcome would alter the course of the war. The struggle for Moscow loomed, a pivotal moment that promised a harrowing chapter in history.

This episode is Winter is Coming

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Massive formations of Panzers advance through the heart of the Soviet Union, sweeping aside all resistance. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers find themselves encircled, with little hope of breaking free to fight another day. The siege of Leningrad tightens as the Nazis press their advantage. In the south, the Southwestern Front still bears the scars of the devastating battle of Kyiv, where countless men now lie dead across the steppes. Meanwhile, Crimea faces a new assault, as the invaders prepare to drive towards the Don River. The conflict over Leningrad continues to devolve into a stalemate, and Army Group South grapples with the vastness of Ukraine while contending with its scarce resources. As we move into October, the weather shifts noticeably along the entire front. Snow has already begun to fall in the north, while rainstorms have caused intermittent delays. In summer, such storms typically lasted only days; now, they stretch on for weeks. Fall is firmly upon us, and winter approaches quickly. The weather was beginning to change. As Ned Stark said “Winter is coming”.

During the first week of October, significant changes were implemented in the organization of the Ostheer by Hitler and the OKH. Most notably, the Panzer Groups were re-designated as Panzer Armies. This change was more than just a new title; it reflected the increasing importance of armored units within the German military strategy. Previously, these groups had been subordinated to field armies, which often resulted in friction between commanders, particularly between Guderian and Kluge during the early phases of operations. This friction created significant challenges throughout the chain of command. It began even before the war and persisted into the campaign in France. Guderian and Kluge’s personal animosity added to the strain. However, they were not alone in their frustrations; other commanders also felt the negative impact of the previous organizational structure. This hierarchy caused confusion within the chain of command and left Panzer leaders feeling constrained, desiring greater independence in their operations. Now, with the new designation as Panzer Armies, they would report directly to Army Group Commanders. This shift was aimed at enhancing the coordination of resources and expanding strategic options across the front. In theory, this new structure would streamline decision-making and improve the effectiveness of armored units in combat.

By October 1, the offensive capabilities of Army Group North had diminished significantly. Leeb informed Hitler that he could not launch any major offensives without additional reinforcements. Given the limited reinforcements received in late September, he had to work with what he had. Leeb still commanded 2 Panzer divisions and 2 motorized infantry divisions within General of Panzer Troops Schmidt’s 39th Corps. He intended to employ these mobile forces in a limited offensive. Leeb considered 2 options for his attack. The first was to break through the Soviet 8th Army at Oranienbaum, a promising choice. However, Leeb ultimately decided to focus on linking up with the Finns. This plan involved launching an attack northeast toward Volkhov, aiming to destroy the Soviet 54th Army in the process.

Hitler intervened and rejected the proposed plan. He insisted that Leeb instead attack toward Tikhvin first, then counter-march northeast to encircle the 54th Army at Volkhov. This plan likely appeared more appealing on the map tables of the dictator’s bunker than Leeb’s modest proposal. However, it overlooked crucial factors. An operation of this scale required more troops than Army Group North could muster, and it disregarded the fragile condition of the forces besieging Leningrad. Nonetheless, in a clear demonstration of Hitler’s growing disconnect from reality, and the weak resolve of the Nazi generals, Leeb accepted the plan. After some back and forth, the dictator ultimately got his way. Schmidt’s Corps was designated as the main effort toward Tikhvin, supported by 4 infantry divisions on the flanks. The 11th, 21st, 254th, and 126th Infantry Divisions were positioned south of the Shisselburg corridor and would need to redeploy to support the Panzers. Due to this requirement and the need to stockpile supplies, the attack was scheduled for October 16. Notably, the distances involved were relatively short, at less than 100 kilometers. When accounting for the delays in redeployment and logistics, the contrast with the early days of Operation Barbarossa becomes stark. The Wehrmacht remained an extremely competent and dangerous adversary, but its period of absolute dominance was clearly fading. Meanwhile, the Stavka was not resting idly. Even while addressing the potential collapse of the Western Front, they had to focus on developments in the Northwest. The Leningrad and Northwestern Fronts were instructed to prepare for another attempt to breach the vital German corridor at Shisselburg. A launch date was set for later in the month, pending the completion of preparations and a reorganization of the command structure.

Further south, Operation Typhoon represented far more than just another offensive; it was the culmination of months of intense fighting and hundreds of thousands of German casualties. The Nazi state had convinced itself, from top to bottom, not only of the inevitability of victory but also of its swiftness. Although the disappointment over the failure of Operation Barbarossa to destroy the Soviet Union was palpable, it was only mentioned obliquely. On the night of October 1, 1941, just hours before Operation Typhoon was set to begin, Adolf Hitler issued a proclamation that was to be read aloud to the troops on the eastern front “Soldiers! When I called on you to ward off the danger threatening our homeland on 22 June, you faced the greatest military power of all time. In barely three months, thanks to your bravery, my comrades, it has been possible to destroy one tank brigade after another belonging to this opponent, to eliminate countless divisions, to take uncounted prisoners, to occupy endless space … You have taken over 2,400,000 prisoners, you have destroyed or captured 17,500 tanks and over 21,000 guns, you have downed or destroyed on the ground 14,200 planes. The world has never seen anything like this!”.

While Hitler emphasized the unprecedented nature of the Ostheer’s success, his comments also hinted at Operation Barbarossa’s failure to eliminate Soviet resistance. “This time,” he confidently promised, everything would proceed “according to plan” to deliver the long-awaited “deadly blow” to the Soviet Union. With characteristic bravado, Hitler declared: “Today, the last great decisive battle of this year begins.” Yet not everyone was convinced. Wolf Dose, a soldier in the 58th Infantry Division, wrote in his diary “The Führer has told us that the decisive battle in the east is beginning, a battle that will finish off the Russians, but how and where he did not say. I do not believe that the Soviet Union will capitulate.”Others were more outspoken. “The last great decisive battle of the year, my God! And what is the decisive result supposed to be, Moscow, Kharkov, the Volga?” Throughout Germany, morale had been boosted by the recent wave of Sondermeldungen, but for those German soldiers in the forward trenches of Bock’s army group, those who had resisted fierce Soviet attacks for the past 2 months, there were far fewer illusions about the difficulties of ending the war in the east. The new drive on Moscow presented daunting challenges. In the immediate prelude to Operation Typhoon, Heinrich Haape recorded the activity observed on the Soviet side of the line “East of the Mezha, the Russians prepared a strong system of trenches, bunkers, tank-traps and barbed-wire entanglements. They laid minefields, reinforced their front-line troops, brought up supplies and gathered their strength to stand against us once more. We had to sit helplessly … and listen to stories brought back by our patrols of the rapidly developing Russian defensive system, and to read reports from our Luftwaffe spotter aircraft which saw the movement toward the front of fresh troops, guns and supply trains”. Summing up the early October period another German soldier declared “the real hardships were about to start. The experience so far was only a prelude”. Both the Wehrmacht and Hitler managed to delude themselves into believing they could still end the war with one final push. Deceiving the public was dangerous, yet it could be justified if the Communists could be crushed before the year's end. As October 1 dawned and the front lines erupted into violent clashes once again, the fate of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union hung in the balance. Taking Moscow was unlikely to end the war, but it would make victory significantly harder for the Soviet defenders.

At 05:30 on the morning of October 2, Bock’s offensive opened with a massed artillery bombardment followed by air and ground assaults. Heinz Otto Fausten, serving in the 1st Panzer Division, wrote of “a massive barrage of preparatory fire. At around noon, we crossed flattened enemy positions, our river of troops and vehicles flooding eastwards.” Infantryman Helmut Pabst wrote home in a letter: “06:00. I jump on top of a dugout. There are the tanks! Giants rolling slowly towards the enemy. And the planes. One squadron after the other, unloading their bombs across the way. Army Group Centre has launched its attack.” The war diary of Colonel Georg von Bismarck’s 20th Panzer Division labeled October 2 “a historic day.”

Panzer Group 2, however, had been in action since September 30, and by the evening of October 2, Guderian felt his forces had achieved a “full breakthrough.” In less than 3 days, his subordinate 47th Panzer Corps recorded capturing 3,800 POWs, destroying or capturing 17 Panzers, 42 guns, 77 trucks, and 300 horses. To the north, Hoepner’s Panzer Group 4 advanced up to 15 kilometers into Soviet positions on the first day, and although the enemy it encountered was reported to be “surprised,” they nevertheless “resisted bitterly.” Hoth’s Panzer Group 3 drove 20 kilometers into the Soviet lines on the first day and found enemy resistance to be less than expected. The rapid advance was also attributed to the good weather, which, according to Panzer Group 3’s war diary, “benefited all movement on the bad roads and tracks.” Where the roads became problematic, the dry conditions allowed for off-road detours, avoiding serious delays. The weather report for central Russia on October 2 was “clear and sunny,” reminiscent of the conditions during the opening of Operation Barbarossa 103 days earlier. The 5th Panzer Division’s war diary simply labeled it “offensive weather.”

At Army Group Centre, Bock was elated. That night he wrote in his diary: “The army group went to the attack according to plan. We advanced so easily everywhere that doubts arose as to whether the enemy had not in fact decamped.” Yet intelligence gathered from captured Soviet officers soon confirmed that no order for withdrawal had been issued, and the defending armies had been ordered to hold their positions at all costs. German radio intelligence further confirmed the Red Army’s dogged determination to resist and not surrender ground. Soviet intercepts read: “Reinforcement not possible, the crossings are to be held”; “the commander is dead, I have taken over command”; “I cannot hold any longer, destroying the radio.”

As Helmut Pabst observed, the German superiority at Panzer Group 3’s point of main concentration was overwhelming. “Tanks roll by, close to the gun position. A hundred have gone by already, and they’re still coming on… It looks like chaos, but it works to the minute, like clockwork. Today they want to break into the Dnieper line, tomorrow it will be Moscow. Armoured scout cars are now joining the columns.” After almost 4 hours watching the main grouping of Hoth’s Panzer Group pass by, Pabst concluded: “By now I think we’ve seen the last come by. It’s getting quieter… Any war film would pale by comparison. ‘That was really some show!’ the boys are saying.”

While Typhoon’s opening success seemed complete, there were still some bitterly contested positions, costing many German lives. Lieutenant-General Heinrich Meyer-Bürdorf’s 131st Infantry Division suffered very heavy losses on October 2 while trying to clear Soviet positions opposing its front. The Panzer divisions also encountered the familiar problem of inadequate bridges and, more ominously for the first day of an offensive, fuel shortages. Even before the offensive had begun, fuel reserves were recognized to be worryingly small, and plans were made to bring up more fuel using transport aircraft and towed gliders. Yet there could be no question that Army Group Centre was making significant gains across a wide section of the eastern front, and that was the message Bock relayed to Colonel Rudolf Schmundt, the Führer’s chief military adjutant at the “Wolf’s Lair” , Hitler’s secluded East Prussian headquarters.

The news confirmed for Hitler that the war was nearing its end, and he was in a celebratory mood. On October 3, at the annual opening of the War Winter Relief Organisation (Kriegswinterhilfswerk) in Berlin, Hitler delivered his first national address since the war began in the east. It was an auspicious occasion, allowing Hitler to recast the conflict from a failed blitzkrieg to a seamless military operation on the verge of victory. He stated: “On the morning of June 22, this greatest struggle in the history of the world began. Since then, three and a half months have passed. Today I can state everything has gone according to plan.” Yet even Hitler could not overlook the scale and cost of the fighting in the east, and he admitted that Germany had been caught unawares. “However, something did deceive us,” he told the German people; “we had no idea how gigantic the preparations of this opponent against Germany and Europe had been.” It was a surprisingly frank admission, probably inspired by his confidence in the impending defeat of the Soviet Union, which he now promised in the most direct terms. “I say this here today because I may say today that this opponent has already broken down and will never rise again!”

Not only was Hitler forecasting the end of the war in the east, but he also admitted he had switched industry away from army production. “Today, it is only a question of transport. Today, we have taken care in advance so that, in the midst of this war of materiel, I can order further production in many spheres to cease, because I know there is no opponent whom we would not be able to defeat with the existing amounts of ammunition.” Hitler’s speech may have reassured many of his followers, but it also reflected the depths of delusion inhibiting the German command and the credibility gap that had arisen between war propaganda and the actual situation in the east. Nevertheless, in the short term, soldiers like Wilhelm Prüller rejoiced at Hitler’s address. Writing in his diary, Prüller noted: “What a lift his words give us, as we crowd around the wireless set, not wanting to miss a single word! Is there a finer reward after a day of battle than to hear the Führer? Never!” Erich Hager noted in his diary that after the speech, “all sorts were really enthused. Many were drunk.” Other soldiers, however, were less convinced and seemed confused by the emerging dichotomy between the public representation and personal experience of the war. Hans Jürgen Hartmann expressed: “Perhaps it is only ‘talk’ that our enemy is broken and will never rise again. I cannot help myself, I am totally bewildered. Will the whole war still be over before winter?” Certainly, those with a broader perspective on events were not taken in by Hitler’s confident ruse. The Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, wrote in his diary on October 3 “Speech by Hitler in Berlin, which was unexpected, or almost so. First impressions are that he has tried to explain to the German people his reasons for the attack on Russia and to justify his delay in ending the war, about which he had made very definite commitments. There is no doubt that he has lost some of his vigour … As for us, we are given no particular attention; he lumped us with the others, and this will not produce a good impression in Italy, where the wave of anti-German feeling is growing stronger and stronger”.

Reality was, not everything was going perfectly smoothly. Some infantry units were suffering heavy casualties as they attempted to break the Soviet lines. There was no retreat; the Red Army was fighting for every inch of ground. This obstinacy proved to be a double-edged sword. Stiff resistance was slowing the German infantry down, ensuring they paid dearly for their gains. However, it was also setting up the Soviet field armies for encirclement by the fast-moving Panzers. There was still little the field armies could do to effectively counter the penetrating Nazi armor. At Yelna, the 9th Infantry Corps under the 4th Army was hammered by Red Army counterattacks. The Soviet 24th Army refused to sit idly by and attempted to force the Germans onto the defensive.

On October 2, the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions under General of Panzers Lemelsen’s 47th Corps encountered a counterattack by the 141st Tank Brigade. The Soviets were reasonably well-equipped with heavy tanks. In weeks past, they would have wreaked havoc on the advancing Panzers for hours or even days. Not anymore. The Germans had started to equip each Panzer battalion with an 88mm anti-aircraft gun and a 105mm howitzer to help counter the Soviet heavy tanks. Here, this modification proved its worth when the lead battalions quickly knocked out several KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, breaking up the counterattack almost immediately. By the morning of October 3, Guderian had a battalion of tanks more than 100 kilometers from his starting point. They seized bridges over the River Okta and began advancing on the city of Orel, which was a major population center of over 100,000 people and an important waypoint on the highway to Moscow. Furthermore, it cut Eremenko’s lines of communication with the Stavka and any real hope of reinforcements. After months of slogging across Ukraine, Guderian had finally broken out into the open. This was a real breakthrough that had not been seen since the early fighting around Smolensk.

In a daring move, a single company stormed the city of Orel. They lost three tanks but managed to overwhelm the confused defenders. The company was reinforced later that day, but here the advance stalled. OKH’s failure to properly stockpile supplies came back to haunt the Panzers. On the advance to Orel, some units ran out of fuel on the road. They had taken the city, wiped out two tank brigades, and inflicted over 10,000 casualties on their Red Army opponents. However, there was simply no more fuel. Guderian tried to persuade the Luftwaffe to airdrop fuel at the captured Orel Airfield, but to no avail. The VVS was still active, and there were too many Soviet fighters in the area. The Luftwaffe could not spare an escort for supply planes, and Guderian’s request was denied. This meant that his Corps had to drive their own trucks back to supply depots and gather as much as they could carry. They started out late on the fourth, but it would take four more days before they could return.

Further to the north, Hoth was determined to break the connection between the Western Front’s 19th and 30th Armies.

To accomplish this, he concentrated all of his Panzer Divisions at this point. The Soviets were ill-prepared to fend off the German armor here; they had no armored reserves at either the Army or Front level. There were few anti-tank guns in the rifle divisions, and unit cohesion was lacking. Additionally, many of the units making up these armies were worn down from fighting around Smolensk in August. Hoth had two infantry corps under his command for the operation: the 5th and 6th Infantry Divisions, which were used to launch fixing attacks against the front lines of the 19th and 30th Armies. Just as Hoth hoped, the Soviet Armies waited for Western Front commander Colonel General Konev to release armored reserves that could have been used to prevent the flanks of the field armies from being turned instantly. However, Konev did not have the numbers necessary to defeat the Panzer incursion. What he did have, he threw into the fight. First, Konev ordered three heavy artillery regiments to create a wall of fire on the advancing Panzers. This failed to stop them. Next, he sent his tank brigades to attack. In rapid succession on October 3, the 143rd, 126th, and 128th Tank Brigades were deployed. They were repulsed, losing over 100 tanks in the process. The continued poor performance of the Soviet tank formations is attributed to a complicated and interlocking series of issues. The tank brigades were more manageable than their larger tank corps counterparts had been. However, poor deployment planning and ongoing failures to coordinate operations both horizontally and vertically resulted in piecemeal attacks. These shortcomings would continue to haunt the Red Army well into the war. In the first week, Hoth faced little difficulty from the Soviet defenders. Like his counterpart Guderian, however, he struggled with resupply and fuel reserves. They reached Vyazma before the end of October 7 and managed to secure the northern flank of the city. The Western Front’s mobile reserves under Major General Dovator were forced to retreat. The 19th and 30th Armies were being cut off, leaving little hope for a successful retreat.

Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Group was completely transformed for its role in Operation Typhoon. He now commanded three corps, compared to the two he had when the campaign in the east began. Additionally, he received a much greater share of the resources and supplies to ensure his success. His formations would smash the Reserve Front and secure the southern half of the Vyazma encirclement. On the first day, his two lead corps made it across the Desna River. The Reserve Front under Marshal Budyonny had only two tank brigades as its mobile reserve. Budyonny decided to hold these further back, choosing not to contest Hoepner’s crossing of the Desna. This proved to be a mistake, as his two field armies were quickly crushed in rapid movements. By the end of the fourth day, the 33rd and 43rd Armies had been defeated and had to retreat. To make matters worse, the Marshal had been caught in the retreat during a visit to a field headquarters, meaning he was unavailable to direct the battle during much of the critical opening phase.

It was at this moment that Hoepner’s increased strength proved to be decisive. He had kept his 57th Panzer Corps under General Kuntzen in reserve and committed Kuntzen on October 5. The battle quickly devolved into little more than a rout. Early on October 6, the town of Yukhnov fell to elements of the 10th Panzer Division. The Panzers were now just 200 kilometers from the center of Moscow. This was an unmitigated disaster for the Soviet defense of the capital, with the bulk of the Western Front now trapped in the Vyazma pocket. On October 5, Stalin called Zhukov from Leningrad and placed him in charge of the defense of Moscow. The Western and Reserve Fronts were subordinated to him, and Zhukov set his plans into action immediately. On October 6, he sent orders for the rebuilding of the Mozhaisk Defensive Line. This was not a new position; it had been started back in July, but the fighting around Smolensk had depleted much of the manpower reserved for its garrison. Now, it was to be the last line before Moscow itself. The defense would run through four critical towns: Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, and Kaluga, forming an approximately 230-kilometer line west of Moscow that needed garrisoning. The capital was mobilized for a struggle unlike any other. Anything that could be considered a military resource was requisitioned and sent to the line. At least three regiments were formed from students of the military schools in Moscow and sent off. The situation was dire, but Zhukov remained confident in the Red Army. By this point, Zhukov had established a strong reputation as a fixer who did not yield to political pressures when he believed he was right. He had not yet lost a battle against the invaders and had proven capable of turning them back at Yelna and Leningrad. Now, he would defend the capital.

As the first week of Operation Typhoon ended, it looked like a repeat of the early victories of the summer. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were again encircled or in imminent danger of being encircled. The front line was collapsing once more. In Ukraine, the invaders were experiencing a mixed bag of results. The push to clear the eastern bank of the Dnieper was mostly successful, as Kleist was able to take Zaporozhye on the first. This was a boon for Manstein’s 11th Army, which had been forced to split his forces to support the collapsing Romanian 3rd Army. Fearing encirclement, the Soviet 9th and 18th Armies decided to pull back. However, this withdrawal was not entirely successful, and large numbers were caught up. This opened the path to Mariupol, and the Germans were prepared to take advantage of the space. Meanwhile, attempts to break through the Perekop Isthmus were stalling without additional support. Halder and the OKH staff had hoped that Manstein would be able to take the entire peninsula in a quick surprise attack and cut across the Kerch Strait to reach the Caucasus. It was becoming clear even now that this would not be easy. The city of Odessa was still holding out against the Romanians and their German allies. The defenders just would not break, but as the first week of October ended, the situation was looking dire. The Stavka was not ready to give up the city yet, but that time seemed to be approaching rapidly.

Sometime during this week, Hitler decided that Army Group South would focus its attacks on securing the Black Sea Coast, Crimea, and the Donets River basin. This meant that the drive on Kharkiv was abandoned in order to free up the forces necessary to secure the line from Mariupol to Donetsk. After this, Kleist would advance to Rostov, and the Don River would be secured. The Donets River Basin was home to many industrial centers and enormous coal reserves. At this point, Germany was suffering from shortages in coal and industrial capacity. Hitler was desperate to secure these resources before the coming winter to alleviate the effects of these shortages on the civilian economy. This plan of attack did not require any major encirclements, but it depended on Stalin being unable to rebuild the Southwestern Front. This was a significant contingency, but Halder and the OKH were convinced that the Soviets were concentrating all their resources in defense of Moscow. They also believed that the Red Army had nothing left in the tank. This was a critical mistake. No German general could claim ignorance of the demonstrated force generation capabilities of the USSR thus far. The only evidence they could muster to support their hypothesis was the number of armies they had destroyed. To their minds, it seemed illogical, if not impossible, that the Red Army would be able to raise more troops and place them in the path of the Wehrmacht. This ignorance was fundamentally rooted in the widespread belief in Nazi racial propaganda. The Soviets were perceived as barbarians, incapable of the effective governance that long-term mass conscription required. While the Nazi leadership would be disabused of this notion before the end of the war, they never relinquished their supposed racial superiority over the Soviet soldier.

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As Operation Typhoon began, the stakes for both the Nazis and Soviets escalated dramatically. General Zhukov urged his troops to hold their ground amidst a crippling siege in Leningrad. Meanwhile, massive German formations advanced, encircling hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers. Despite initial successes, the harsh weather and fierce Soviet resistance posed significant obstacles. With Hitler proclaiming imminent victory, doubts lingered among soldiers about the true state of the conflict. As both sides prepared for a pivotal battle, the looming clash for Moscow promised to alter the war's course.