Last time we spoke about the Panzer’s Greatest Victory. Amidst the chaotic landscape of late August 1941, the siege of Kyiv escalated under General Guderian's command against the resilient Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Timoshenko. September brought relentless rain, complicating the push toward Leningrad, while Finnish forces threatened Soviet defenses. The German army, once poised for a swift victory, grappled with critical supply shortages as they aimed for a massive offensive on Moscow, codenamed Operation Typhoon. Hitler's altered directives and a deteriorating situation on the ground forced the Wehrmacht to cope with dwindling resources. Meanwhile, the Soviets, despite significant losses, began to regroup, bolstered by non-active reserves. They only needed to endure, allowing Germany's offensive strength to exhaust itself as winter approached. As the campaign wore on, deepening battles of attrition transformed the initially swift Blitzkrieg into a grueling war of attrition, marking a significant shift in the conflict. Both sides braced for a war that would last far longer than anyone anticipated.

This episode is the Fall of Kyiv

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

So it's September 17th, and the Commander of the Southwestern Front has finally received permission from Stalin to order a retreat. But it's too late. His armies now find themselves completely surrounded by the German forces. As Kyiv falls, General Zhukov is making preparations in Leningrad, readying for a desperate battle to the last man. Meanwhile, in the center, Field Marshal Bock is poised to launch an offensive aimed at bringing an end to the war once and for all. Now last week we covered the dramatic closing of the Kyiv pocket. The capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, along with a significant portion of the Southwestern Front, has become a giant trap. Generals Guderian and Kleist have fought vehemently for weeks, successfully linking their forces southeast of the city. Many of Stalin's generals fervently urged him to allow a retreat, yet he refused to grant them this option. Now, hundreds of thousands of soldiers are encircled.

The battle for Leningrad was reaching a critical juncture. General Zhukov had been appointed to take command in the second week of fierce fighting. With his usual energy and determination, he set about overhauling the city's entire defensive strategy. Prior to his arrival, the defenses were on the brink of collapse, and Zhukov was not willing to let morale deteriorate further. He made the tough decision to dismiss several officers who had lost their fighting spirit, replacing them with trusted subordinates. This was not merely a matter of favoritism; the men he replaced were demoralized, and Zhukov needed leaders who still had the will to win. This aspect of command is often overlooked: the ability to maintain composure and inspire resilience after weeks of setbacks is crucial in any army. For the Red Army, it was vital to continue fighting after experiencing some of the most significant defeats in military history. On September 17th, Zhukov issued an order to all his subordinate commands "Not a Step Back! Do not give up a single verst of land on the approaches to Leningrad!"

On September 16th, the 8th Army found itself completely surrounded and cutoff from Leningrad. This grim encirclement would come to be known as the Oranienbaum Pocket. The fighting around the city had grown increasingly desperate. During early September, Hitler made the pivotal decision not to directly assault Leningrad. Instead, a strategy was devised to encircle the city and starve its defenders into submission. To achieve this, Army Group North needed to connect with Finnish forces to the east of Lake Ladoga. However, merely cutting off land connections would not suffice. Everyone knew that the Soviets were already supplying Leningrad across the lake. The only way to prevent this was to expel the last remaining Red Army units from the eastern shore, a task that seemed nearly impossible. Leeb's Army Group was on the brink of exhaustion, and the expected transfer of Hoepner's Panzers to Army Group Center proved to be the final straw. By the end of the third week of September, Army Group North was left with little to no offensive power.

Zhukov ordered counterattacks to push back the German forces, but by the 20th, it became clear that these efforts wouldn't yield significant results. Nonetheless, there were three key benefits from Zhukov's initial counterattack. First, it bolstered the morale of the Leningrad Front. Zhukov proved that he would fight to the last man, and his decision to remove incompetent and broken leaders from command was crucial. Second, the counterattack took the German command by surprise. Generals Leeb and Halder had assumed that the Soviets were on the verge of collapse. This misjudgment would not be the first, or the last, time they underestimated the fighting spirit of the Red Army. This unexpected resistance, combined with Hitler's relentless order to transfer panzer units to Army Group Center for a renewed offensive towards Moscow, sent shockwaves through German command. In response, Halder arranged to transfer several infantry units to Leeb’s command to compensate for the loss of the Panzers. Finally, the fierce combat had dulled the strength of Army Group North. Since July, they had suffered losses of around sixty thousand men, with replacements failing to match the quality of those who had fallen. The Heer, as of June 1941, was staffed with experienced non-commissioned officers and junior leaders who served as force multipliers. Non-commissioned officers, along with platoon and company leaders, form the backbone of a any modern industrialized army. They play a crucial role in maintaining discipline and possess vital institutional knowledge about tactics and weapons handling. The losses sustained in the early months of the campaign drained their ranks of many of these capable men, making their absence felt far beyond mere numbers. The battle for Leningrad was far from over; it remained a grueling fight rather than a static siege. The casualties suffered in the latter half of September pushed the conflict towards a siege mentality, with both sides paying dearly for every inch of territory. As the month drew to a close, both the Soviets and Germans focused on reorganizing and redeploying for one last major attempt to seize the city before winter set in.

The commander of Army Group Center finalized his plan for the decisive offensive. After weeks of heated discussion, Field Marshal Bock had secured his objective: Moscow would again be the focal point of the German campaign, and he was to spearhead the effort. As the third week of September began, the plan had been named, Operation Typhoon. Hitler had designated Army Group Center to receive the bulk of the panzer units, even permitting some enhancements to their capabilities. Yet, Bock often voiced his frustrations, claiming he was expected to achieve great things with inadequate resources. While Hitler refused to allocate everything at his disposal, he believed Bock was equipped with everything necessary for success. The reality, however, lay somewhere in between. Army Group Center was far from receiving the full support one would anticipate for such a crucial offensive. Hitler had declined to release sufficient spare parts to fully repair the panzer units, let alone provide additional tanks. Although the panzer divisions received some replacements, it was nowhere near enough to restore them to full strength. August’s losses had been too great, and the limitations of Germany's supply capabilities in September 1941 were evident. As we discussed last week, Hitler released only a small portion of the reserve production of new tanks.

The logistical buildup was also lackluster. The harsh Russian winter, notorious for decimating Napoleon’s army, loomed on the horizon. Every soldier in the German army understood the challenges winter would bring. Yet, supplies of winter uniforms were grossly insufficient. Even before the end of the third week, some units were informed they could only expect to receive 25% of their required winter clothing. To make matters worse, the 19th Panzer Division was notified they would no longer receive replacement boots due to leather shortages. Leather production had long been a persistent challenge in prewar Germany. The country was never self-sufficient in the textiles industry, with leather particularly dependent on imports. In 1934, as Germany began to recover from the Great Depression, leather and textile goods accounted for 26% of total imports. The demands of the greatly expanded army, combined with intense campaigning in the east, placed significant strain on the German economy. It wasn't solely production issues that hampered the buildup for Operation Typhoon. The rail supply lines were wholly inadequate. By mid-August, the 9th and 2nd Armies were surviving hand to mouth, unable to allocate any ammunition for future operations. The supply of fuel, oil, and lubricants was equally insufficient, failing to account for the poor condition of the engines, which significantly increased consumption. As they struggled to maintain even these inadequate supply levels, the trucks of the Grosstransportraum were being ruined on long journeys that should have been supported by the railroads. Hopes of a renewed offensive hinged on improvements to the railway system, but General Wagner, in charge of the military rail system, continuously made false assurances. In August, Army Group Center required at least 24 trains per day to meet daily consumption. However, in the first half of the month, barely half that number arrived. Subsequently, Wagner promised to increase the number to 30 and then 35 trains daily to establish adequate stockpiles for the next stage of the advance, but in practice, only about 18 trains a day managed to come through. In early September, it became clear that Army Group Center needed 27 trainloads of supplies each day just to maintain its current supply levels and build a stockpile for the offensive. This level of support would need to continue for at least 19 days. Wagner, assured Halder he could deliver these supplies for at least 13 days. However, by the end of the third week, it was evident that Wagner could not meet this commitment. On many days, less than half of the promised supplies made it through. Trains often arrived half-loaded, incorrectly loaded, or not at all.

Some of these hardships were self-inflicted, while others were unavoidable results of the state of the Wehrmacht and Nazi governance. Nevertheless, they existed and provided support for Bock’s complaints about priorities. However, there is substantial evidence indicating that Army Group Center was receiving the best the Wehrmacht could manage. By the end of the third week of September, Bock commanded the largest field command in military history, with three field armies and three complete panzer groups at his disposal. He oversaw 47 infantry divisions, 14 panzer divisions, 1 cavalry division, 5 security divisions, and 8 motorized divisions. In total, this amounted to around two million men, 1,500 tanks, and over 1,000 artillery batteries. This represented a significant increase in manpower and artillery compared to the Army Group’s starting strength in June. However, there were actually fewer tanks than had been present in just two panzer groups at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. This decline highlighted how far the panzer force had fallen after just twelve weeks of combat. These losses were not entirely unforeseen; the problem was two-fold. First, the panzer divisions lacked the level of spare parts and maintenance necessary to address relatively minor mechanical issues or battle damage. Second, Hitler was actively withholding replacement vehicles. Hitler clung to fantastical dreams of rebuilding the panzer divisions from scratch after defeating the USSR, envisioning a nearly instantaneous revival. He was unwilling to see his limited production trickle away in small numbers as replacements, only to be consumed by the ongoing war in the Soviet Union. A core aspect of Nazi ideology is the belief that anything can be achieved through sheer willpower. Therefore, Hitler convinced himself that although the Heer might be uncomfortable with the temporarily reduced number of panzer divisions, victory was assured by the superior willpower of the Nazi war machine. He envisioned that after the war, he would be able to ramp up production sufficiently to fully restore the divisions with modern equipment for future campaigns. This proved to be a mistake, one that would cost dearly when Army Group Center launched their attack. The kick-off day for Operation Typhoon was set for October 1st.

Guderian’s Panzer group had only just completed the encirclement behind Kyiv when they received orders to march north at the earliest opportunity. Although he had a well-stocked supply depot at Romny, his transport truck fleet was nearly nonfunctional. The Panzers had been stationary for almost a week, and fuel, along with rations, was becoming increasingly scarce. At one point, they were forced to rely on air drops from the Luftwaffe. The diary of the 47th Panzer Corps recorded on September 18th “As a result of the heavy demands over the last weeks on outrageously bad roads the state of the trucks has worsened. Owing to the failure to deliver spare parts innumerable instances of damage, often only relatively minor, cannot be repaired. This in part, therefore, explains the high percentage of … non-serviceable trucks”. Assigned to a Panzer Division Alexander Cohrs wrote in his diary “Some [vehicles] tipped over. Luckily none in our company. After 18 kilometres of marching on foot I sat on an armoured vehicle. It tipped so much that it balanced on two wheels, while the other two temporarily stood in the air; still it did not tip over. Along the way was a moor where the vehicles had to make a big detour . . . one by one vehicles got stuck or even turned over, resulting in breaks and a slow tempo”. They were in urgent need of a rest and refit period, but it was becoming increasingly clear that such a break would not be forthcoming. Instead, Guderian’s men braced themselves for the inevitable breakout attempts, as the Luftwaffe and infantry coordinated efforts to reduce the encirclement. Once that was accomplished, they would have to move north and prepare for Operation Typhoon.

The 5th Air Corps was determined to destroy as much of the Southwestern Front as possible. One officer claimed that the Luftwaffe would do “half the work of the Army.” In just the third week of September, the 5th Air Corps dropped hundreds of thousands of pounds of bombs on the region, conducting sortie levels unprecedented in the war. Simultaneously, the 2nd Air Corps was working tirelessly to hammer the Red Army in the Kyiv pocket. Together, these forces destroyed thousands of vehicles, ranging from trucks and trains to tanks and enemy planes. During this time, the Luftwaffe maintained essentially complete air superiority over the pocket. The VVS, the Soviet Air Force, rarely attempted to strike at the Germans; when they did, they were often easily brushed aside by the Luftwaffe's air cover. The few times they managed to breach it and attack the Panzers on the ground, their efforts proved largely ineffectual. Nonetheless, the losses for the Luftwaffe were mounting. Each plane lost was essentially irreplaceable. When the campaign began on June 22nd, the Luftwaffe had started with 2,995 airframes of all types. By the time the pocket was closed around the Southwestern Front, that number had dwindled to less than 1,000 operable airframes. The Luftwaffe was also suffering because hundreds of serviceable airframes were scattered across the Eastern Front. However, similar to the Panzer units, the repair process was hampered by a lack of spare parts, mechanics, and adequate facilities. Some damage resulted from poor maintenance, while other issues stemmed from battle damage that could not be repaired on site. The commander of the 2nd Air Fleet reported to higher headquarters in September that the Luftwaffe was simply overtaxed and nearing the end of its limits.

Reducing the pocket fell on the shoulders of the German infantry, as it had in every major battle before. The 6th Army, under Field Marshal Reichenau, was ordered to assault Kyiv. While the city was encircled, it remained well defended, housing the highest concentration of Red Army soldiers within the pocket. Reichenau’s 51st Infantry Corps advanced southward to the east of the city. Finally, Kirponos received permission to retreat from his superiors in Moscow and issued a withdrawal order on the seventeenth. This decision quickly devolved into a rout. On September 18th, the 51st Corps successfully linked up with the 34th Infantry Corps, effectively splitting the pocket into two distinct sections. Despite the potential for a strong defense of the city, it was not to be. The fighting concluded on the nineteenth, with the Red Army surrendering in droves after weeks of relentless bombardment. Leadership failures and a lack of resolve contributed to their poor performance. As the Red Army began to collapse within the now-divided pocket, it became inevitable that chaos and carnage would follow. Mixed orders, confused leaders, and a complete breakdown of discipline all added to the turmoil.

As the German infantry moved into the heart of the city, they encountered a horrifying new reality. The NKVD had rigged the city to explode, secretly installing radio-controlled mines in hundreds of buildings. On September 20th, the first detonation occurred, with explosives strategically placed in locations where Germans were likely to take up residence. To complicate matters further, mass looting erupted among the remaining civilians and even some Germans. The city was without power or running water, and food was becoming increasingly scarce. The NKVD had detonated the power plant, a cannery, one of the city's water towers, and all the bridges spanning the Dnieper River. Looting was particularly focused on a large flour warehouse. Additionally, the NKVD ensured that as much food as possible was dumped into the river. By September 24th, the bombs began to detonate regularly. NKVD saboteurs worked to ignite fires caused by these explosions, with a clear intent to destroy the city center. The fires quickly spiraled out of control, and the lack of running water exacerbated the situation as more bombs went off. These explosions resulted in approximately 200 casualties among the soldiers. While this might be considered relatively light, the impact on morale was significant. Furthermore, many of the dead and wounded were staff officers, which adversely affected unit cohesion and amplified the chaos throughout the city.

As a result of the Soviet boobytraps and sabotage efforts, on September 26, Major General Kurt Eberhard, the military governor, and SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich Jeckeln, the SS and Police Leader, convened at the Rear Headquarters. It was there that they made the horrific decision to exterminate the Jewish population of Kyiv, claiming “it was a retaliatory measure for the recent explosions”. Also in attendance were SS-Standartenführer Paul Blobel, commander of Sonderkommando 4a of Einsatzgruppe C, along with his superior, SS-Brigadeführer Dr. Otto Rasch, commander of Einsatzgruppe C. The execution of this order fell to Sonderkommando 4a, led by Blobel, under the overall command of Friedrich Jeckeln. This unit comprised members of the Sicherheitsdienst or “SD”, the Sicherheitspolizei or “SiPo”, the third company of a Special Duties Waffen-SS battalion, and a platoon from the 9th Police Battalion. The massacre was carried out by Sonderkommando 4a, along with Police Battalion 45 under Major Besser, and was supported by members of a Waffen-SS battalion.

In stark contrast to the "myth of the clean Wehrmacht," the Sixth Army, led by Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, collaborated with the SS and SD to plan and execute the mass murder of Kyiv’s Jewish community. On 26 September 1941, the following order was posted “All Yids of the city of Kiev and its vicinity must appear on Monday, 29 September, by 8 o'clock in the morning at the corner of Mel'nikova and Dokterivskaya streets. Bring documents, money and valuables, and also warm clothing, linen, etc. Any Yids who do not follow this order and are found elsewhere will be shot. Any civilians who enter the dwellings left by Yids and appropriate the things in them will be shot”. On September 29 and 30, 1941, the Nazis and their collaborators murdered approximately 33,771 Jewish civilians at Babi Yar. Babi Yar is a ravine just outside Kyiv. It was first mentioned in historical records in 1401, in relation to its sale by an old woman referred to as "baba," who served as the cantiniere at the Dominican Monastery. The word "yar" is of Turkic origin and translates to "gully" or "ravine."

These units were further reinforced by Police Battalions Nos. 45 and 303, along with units of the Ukrainian auxiliary police, all supported by local collaborators. Sonderkommando 4a and the 45th Battalion of the German Order Police carried out the shootings, while servicemen from the 303rd Battalion of the German Order Police guarded the outer perimeter of the execution site. Two days later, the commander of the Einsatzkommando reported “The difficulties resulting from such a large scale action—in particular concerning the seizure—were overcome in Kiev by requesting the Jewish population through wall posters to move. Although only a participation of approximately 5,000 to 6,000 Jews had been expected at first, more than 30,000 Jews arrived who, until the very moment of their execution, still believed in their resettlement, thanks to an extremely clever organization”.

According to the testimony of a truck driver named Hofer, victims were ordered to undress and were beaten if they resisted “I watched what happened when the Jews—men, women and children—arrived. The Ukrainians[c] led them past a number of different places where one after the other they had to give up their luggage, then their coats, shoes and over-garments and also underwear. They also had to leave their valuables in a designated place. There was a special pile for each article of clothing. It all happened very quickly and anyone who hesitated was kicked or pushed by the Ukrainians to keep them moving”. The crowd was so large that most of the victims likely had no idea what was happening until it was too late. By the time they heard the sound of machine gun fire, escape was no longer an option. They were herded down a corridor formed by soldiers, in groups of ten, and then shot. Hofer continued “Once undressed, they were led into the ravine which was about 150 metres long and 30 metres wide and a good 15 metres deep ... When they reached the bottom of the ravine they were seized by members of the Schutzpolizei and made to lie down on top of Jews who had already been shot ... The corpses were literally in layers. A police marksman came along and shot each Jew in the neck with a submachine gun ... I saw these marksmen stand on layers of corpses and shoot one after the other ... The marksman would walk across the bodies of the executed Jews to the next Jew, who had meanwhile lain down, and shoot him”. In the following months, thousands more individuals were seized and taken to Babi Yar, where they were executed. It is estimated that over 100,000 residents of Kyiv from various ethnic backgrounds, mostly civilians, were murdered by the Nazis at this site until their evacuation of Kyiv. On January 10, 1942, about 100 captured Soviet sailors were executed there after being forced to disinter and cremate the remains of previous victims. Furthermore, Babi Yar became a site of execution for residents of five Gypsy camps. Patients from the Ivan Pavlov Psychiatric Hospital were gassed and then disposed of in the ravine.

The Wehrmacht tightened its grip around the now-divided pocket from all sides. Despite mass surrenders, there were still determined efforts to break free. The aerial blockade in the region was far from complete, allowing several senior Soviet commanders, including Budyonny, Timoshenko, and Khrushchev, to escape by aircraft. By the evening of September 20, Colonel General Kirponos, along with the forces of the Soviet 5th Army, managed to reach Driukovshchyna, located just 15 kilometers southwest of Lukhovitsa. However, the Red Army column soon came under attack from the 3rd Panzer Division in that area. The Germans successfully captured General Sotensky, the artillery commander of the Soviet 5th Army, pushing the remaining enemy forces into the Shumikovo forests. Kirponos, along with Potapov, commander of the Soviet 5th Army, staff officers, and approximately 2,000 Soviet troops continued to resist for several more hours. While leading his men near the front line, Kirponos was seriously wounded in the left leg and taken deeper into the forest. Shortly thereafter, a mortar shell exploded nearby, claiming his life. With Kirponos killed, the remaining Soviet forces were left with no choice but to surrender. Among those lost in this battle was Mykhailo Burmystenko, the commissar of the Soviet Southwestern Front and a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. His death marked him as the highest-ranking Soviet communist leader killed during World War II.

The Battle of Kyiv was a catastrophic defeat for the Red Army, inflicting greater damage than the earlier battles of Minsk and Smolensk. The Soviet Bryansk Front launched counter-attacks to prevent such a setback but faced failure, leading to the loss of around 100,000 soldiers and 140 tanks out of an initial force of 260,000 soldiers and 260 tanks. Following these defeats, the Bryansk Front was thrown into chaos. Less than three weeks later, as the Wehrmacht's concentrated offensive toward Moscow began, it could muster only 200,000 troops to resist. With the Southwestern Front completely shattered, the Soviets had no choice but to rebuild it from the ground up, transferring forces from the central sector to fill the gaps created in the southern front line.

Victory at Kyiv was a crucial step for the advancement of Army Group Center. Now the OKH and OKW could shift their focus back to the central front and resume their push toward Moscow. German commanders found renewed hope in the success at Kyiv, as the destruction of the Soviet Southwestern Front allowed Army Group South to advance east through Ukraine without encountering much resistance. Additionally, the vast amounts of captured equipment in the Kyiv area enabled the Wehrmacht to continue their advance without waiting for resupply. Over the eight weeks of the Battle of Kyiv, Army Group Center had the opportunity to recover, strengthen its exhausted forces, and improve their supply situation. Their infantry divisions joined the motorized forces on the front lines in a methodical march eastward.

However, the Battle of Kyiv also yielded some positive outcomes for the Soviet Union. The southward advance of Panzer Group 2, aimed at encircling the Soviet Southwestern Front, delayed the German advance toward Moscow by a month. This ultimately extended the Wehrmacht's operations into the winter, which proved costly for them. Nevertheless, the Red Army suffered significant losses that could have been pivotal in defending Moscow. In dominating the vital economic regions of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht also secured the southern flank of Army Group Center, delivering a heavy blow to the Soviet Bryansk Axis forces and smoothing their path toward Moscow. Zhukov remarked on this situation “We can imagine that without operation [in the direction of Ukraine], the situation of the German Army Group Center could have been even worse than it was found to be. Reserve forces of the [Soviet] High Command, which had been used in September to fill the gaps in the southwestern sector, could have been used in an attack on the flank and rear of the central group of the German armies advancing on Moscow”.

While the fighting raged on, plans for the next phase of the campaign were already underway. Guderian initiated a strategic redeployment, positioning forces where they could be supported by infantry. Meanwhile, Kleist prepared to lead his limited forces in a bold maneuver across Ukraine, aiming for Donetsk and beyond. The Lower Dnieper remained unsecured, and the 1st Panzer Group was tasked with this critical mission alongside their advance toward Donetsk. The 11th Army received orders to prepare for an assault on the Perekop Isthmus, a crucial step toward capturing the entire Crimea and advancing into the Caucasus. The 11th Army was now under the command of Colonel General Manstein, following the tragic death of its previous leader, Colonel General Schobert. During combat operations in the southern Soviet Union, Schobert was killed when his Fieseler Storch observation aircraft crashed in a Soviet minefield. As the 6th and 17th Armies continued their eastern push, they would cover the Panzer advance from the north, ensuring a steady progression in the campaign.

The disaster at the Southwestern Front became painfully clear to Stalin as the hours ticked away. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were poised to be captured by the invaders, as the nation braced for what could be its final offensive of the war. Timoshenko was dispatched south to assemble yet another line of defenses, but the situation was dire. The encirclement at Kyiv threatened to result in at least two hundred thousand prisoners, along with hundreds of vehicles and tanks lost. The two armies not trapped in the encirclement were retreating with no end in sight. Only the 21st and 17th Armies remained intact. The 6th Army had been devastated by the breakthrough of Kleist’s Panzers at Kremenchug, and the 38th Army had been split into two fragments. The Bryansk front was nearly wiped out as well. Despite calls for reinforcements and the formation of new units, these soldiers were far from combat-ready. As the week drew to a close, Timoshenko struggled to find a viable position for a proper defensive line. It seemed that Ukraine was on the verge of falling to the invaders.

Some German officers even speculated that they could end the year on the banks of the Don River. While Rostov lay over five hundred kilometers to the east, the prevailing mood made that goal feel reachable in the wake of such victories. This was the greatest triumph in the Wehrmacht’s history and seemed to mark the beginning of the end for the campaign in the East. Yet, as we will see, it was actually the onset of a prolonged decline. Though it wasn’t the last victory for the Wehrmacht in the East, it certainly represented the high water mark of German military prowess. From this point on, unconditional victories would become a thing of the past. Even as generals celebrated their achievements, challenges loomed on the horizon. Halder noted privately, if not publicly, that there was little chance of the Soviets capitulating that year. Moreover, serious issues persisted with production and the availability of replacement soldiers, as the war in the East continued to deplete resources and manpower at an unprecedented rate.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In September 1941, the German forces, led by General Guderian, surrounded Kyiv prompting mass surrender of Soviet forces as others desperately tried to escape. In the aftermath, as the German troops entered the city, they encountered sabotage and desperation among the civilians. Soon after, in a chilling response to resistance, the Nazis executed thousands of Jews at Babi Yar. The horrors of the eastern front were only just beginning.