Last time we spoke about Day 3 of Operation Barbarossa, the encirclement of Bialystok-Minsk. The relentless German advance caught the Soviet forces off guard. As Army Group Center surged forward, equipped with nearly 1,500 Luftwaffe aircraft, they aimed to encircle Soviet armies. They swiftly captured vital positions, overcoming initial defenses with shocking ease. However, despite early successes, logistical challenges began to stifle their momentum, revealing cracks in their operational capabilities. The Soviet response, though disorganized, showcased unexpected resilience as they regrouped and launched counterattacks. The chaos within Soviet command hindered coordinated efforts, resulting in heavy losses during futile counteroffensives. Ultimately, the Germans achieved a substantial operational victory, encircling massive Soviet forces at Bialystok-Minsk, one of the largest encirclements in military history. The clash at Bialystok-Minsk marked a turning point in the campaign, revealing the grim realities of warfare and setting the stage for future confrontations as the Eastern Front unfolded.

This episode is: Day 4 Operation Barbarossa: Chaos in Ukraine

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

Well hello again, we are now in day four of Operation Barbarossa. In this podcast we are going to now focus on Army Group South, who find themselves in a large campaign in Ukraine.

Conquering Ukraine was critical to not just Operation Barbarossa, but Germany’s entire war plans. A critical challenge for the motorized supply system of operation barbarossa was the availability of fuel. Just nine days before the campaign began, Halder was informed of Germany’s oil reserves. He was warned that "fuel supplies will be exhausted by autumn," with aviation fuel projected to drop to half and regular fuel down to only a quarter of what was needed. Diesel and heating oil would be at just half of the required levels. Since the planning stages of Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht’s operations department had been monitoring the declining oil stocks. They tried to advocate for economic goals, particularly focusing on the Soviet oil-producing region in the Caucasus. This meant that part of Army Group South needed to advance towards the Donets region and then on to Krasnodar and Maykop-Grozny. In line with these objectives, the War Economic Staff sent a request to the 17th Army back on June 12, urging the swift occupation of the oil-rich region of Drogobycz in Galicia. However, Halder rejected this request, writing in his diary the next day: "Political Questions I refuse to allow economic considerations to influence the operational direction." This not only underscored the urgency of Germany’s fuel shortage, according to the War Economic Staff, but also highlighted Halder’s commitment to his operational strategy, dismissing objectives he deemed unrelated to defeating the Soviet Union. Such thinking would prove detrimental to the German war effort.

Army Group South was backed by the 4th Air Fleet under Colonel General Löhr, which included the 4th and 5th Air Corps. This Air Fleet was equipped with approximately 392 light bombers and 248 fighters. Among these aircraft were the Ju-87 Stukas, the Luftwaffe's workhorses for close air support. However, there was always a shortage of these vital planes. Another challenge was the vast distances within the operational area, which limited the effective use of the Stukas due to their short range. In contrast, the Heinkel He-111 had almost double that range, but it was less maneuverable and more challenging to use for the close precision strikes needed in air support missions. On the first day of operations, the bombers of the 4th Air Fleet carried out similar missions to those of the other Air Fleets, targeting airfields, command centers, and supply depots. As the week progressed, they successfully established air superiority, edging towards complete air supremacy. Air Supremacy and Air Superiority are two different concepts. Modern USAF doctrine defines the terms as follows: Air Supremacy is complete control over the skies, such that opposing air forces are incapable of interfering within the operational area. Air Superiority is the level of control that allows for operations without prohibitive interference from enemy air forces. This is often constrained in time and space.

Army Group South was divided into two nearly equal halves. The southern half, stationed in Romania, wouldn't begin serious operations until the first week of July. However, during the initial week, they managed to seize several bridges across the Prut River using patrol-sized units. It is unclear how large these “patrol sized elements” were. It can be inferred that they were probably company sized operations. Significant enough to seize the bridges from any border forces but not large enough to invite serious attention from the Soviet Southern or Southwestern commands. These strategic positions were held to secure a passage for the German 11th Army, along with the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, to advance into Bessarabia and southern Ukraine when the time was right. No significant resistance was encountered, likely because Soviet forces were focused on the immediate areas where the invasion was actively taking place. It wasn't until June 25 that the Soviet Southern Front was activated to defend Odessa and the southern approaches to the Ukrainian Steppe. Although this activation was late in coming, it significantly improved the Red Army's readiness in the region when the Germans and Romanians launched their larger offensive across the border in early July.

While the advance of Army Group Centre was crucial for German operations in the east, its success relied on the simultaneous progress of the northern and southern army groups. These groups not only had their own objectives but also needed to provide flank support for Army Group Centre. Rundstedt's Army Group South faced the toughest challenge, engaged with the Soviet South-Western Front commanded by Colonel-General Michail Kirponos. The Soviets mistakenly believed that Ukraine was the primary target of the German invasion. The Red Army in their pre-war planning had decided that Ukraine would be the scene of the main effort in a German invasion. This was incorrect as the Wehrmacht ultimately decided that Army Group Center aimed at Moscow would be the initial main effort. However, it did have basis in reality. There had been much discussion in the OKH and OKW about where the main effort should be directed. Hitler himself still felt that the economic objective of the war could only be achieved by taking the natural resources of Ukraine. This tension would lead to significant friction in the command structure of the Wehrmacht.

Kirponos had successfully overseen the construction of formidable fortifications along the Ukrainian border. Additionally, he had established a well-organized communication system that allowed him to receive warnings about the invasion earlier than his counterparts to the north. This advance notice did not precede the invasion itself; rather, it confirmed that the invasion was indeed underway before other front commanders were aware. Thanks to this timely information, Kirponos could begin organizing his forces and planning counterattacks within minutes, rather than hours. The Southwestern Front boasted an impressive 4,780 tanks spread across eight mechanized corps. In contrast, the 1st Panzer Group, led by Colonel General Kleist, had only 715 tanks. Although the Soviet forces appeared to have a significant numerical advantage, this superiority was diluted by the dispersion of the Soviet mechanized corps, as well as deficiencies in communication equipment, training, and effective tactics. Despite these challenges, Kleist recognized the threat posed by the Soviet troops and could not afford to underestimate them. As he advanced into open country in the war’s early days, he faced counterattacks from multiple directions, sometimes simultaneously. He worked diligently to use his panzers effectively and skillfully navigated the complexities of each situation. It was clear that the battles ahead would not be straightforward.

While the Soviets were disadvantaged in specialized weaponry, they did have superiority in the sheer number of guns they could assemble and supply with ammunition. While there were certainly significant imperfections in the Soviet employment and handling of artillery early in the war, the Germans were frequently outgunned and struggled to bring up sufficient stockpiles of shells. Later on as the conditions of static warfare began to take hold along the vast eastern front, the importance of the infantryman grew much more. No longer just tasked with securing the territory won by the Panzers, they were responsible for holding the long front together. In this role, the German infantry demonstrated good training, but their equipment was lacking, especially when compared to their Soviet counterparts. One officer from the 4th Panzer Division remarked after the war, “The equipment, which had proved efficient in previous campaigns, was not robust enough for battle under the conditions prevailing in Russia. Russian equipment seemed to be more durable and less sensitive. Therefore, whoever got hold of a Russian tommy gun kept it.” Likewise an Italian officer inspecting a Russian machine gun for the first time commented, “I loved the simplicity, easy handling, and firepower of this gun.” Colonel-General Kleist, who later rose to the rank of Field Marshal and served on the eastern front until March 1944, stated after the war, “The Soviet equipment was very good even in 1941, especially the tanks. Their artillery was excellent, and most of their infantry weapons, such as their rifles were more modern than ours and had a faster rate of fire.” Colonel-General Erhard Raus, another former German commander with extensive experience on the eastern front, wrote for a post-war US military study, “The best weapon of the Russian infantryman was the machine pistol. It was easily handled, suited to Russian winter conditions, and was one that the Germans highly regarded. The mortar also proved highly valuable as the ideal weapon in terrains where artillery support was impossible. At the beginning of the Eastern Campaign, Russian infantry far surpassed the Germans in mortar equipment and its effective use. The same was true for the Russian anti-tank gun, which was considerably more efficient than the anti-tank guns of the German infantry divisions at the start of the campaign and was readily employed whenever captured.”

Another aspect of the Red Army often incorrectly viewed as antiquated was their extensive early use of horse cavalry. This practice was fundamental to their success, as it allowed for constant movement in difficult terrain such as marshes and forests where cover was abundant and German motorized forces struggled to operate. These advantages enabled surprise raids on weak German positions and long forays into the German rear to cut supply lines and destroy vital infrastructure. Although cavalry was not a replacement for mechanized operations, it proved useful when employed on a limited scale against the exposed flanks of the overstretched German armies. In the initial hours of the invasion, the German 6th Army attempted to establish a bridgehead across the Bug River. While some bridges across the Bug River, which formed the German-Soviet border, were captured in the initial assault, Field Marshal Bock noted that at Brest, a key location on the road to Moscow, the first bridge over the river was only secured by noon.They faced opposition from two Soviet rifle divisions, the 124th and the 140th. However, the Soviets were too dispersed to mount an effective defense, and within hours, most of the German infantry was crossing the river.

Complicating the situation, General of Panzer Troops Joachim Lemelsen, the commander of the 47th Panzer Corps which included the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions, the 29th Motorized Division, and the 167th Infantry Division reported difficulties crossing the captured bridges. The approach roads were literally sinking into the swamplands under the heavy weight of traffic. Even after crossing the Bug, German forces had to deal with the Brest fortified district, which would become a persistent thorn in the army’s side long after the armored spearhead had moved on. The challenges were further compounded when a central route of the panzer group’s right wing, composed of the 47th Panzer Corps featuring the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, the 10th Motorized Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 255th Infantry Division, led by General of Panzer Troops Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenberg, was discovered to have "catastrophic road conditions" that were deemed "impossible" to traverse. Consequently, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions had to share the same road, which was described as "hardly traversable" for wheeled vehicles. These delays, along with the subsequent loss of the bridge over the Muchaviec River, meant that by the end of the day, the German advance covered only 18 kilometers when it should have ideally been 80 kilometers.

As they advanced, they encountered a series of well-prepared defensive positions. The 4th and 2nd Fortified Regions were strategically positioned to cover the major crossings in front of the river. It took the infantry of the 6th Army the entire day to battle through these positions, enduring grueling combat from bunker to bunker. This relentless fighting provided the Southwestern Front with valuable time to react, even though the Panzers had broken through by midday. Over the next week, the German forces would continue their advance. They faced fierce opposition for days, often marching seemingly impossible distances to keep up with the Panzers and fend off Red Army counterattacks, only to repeat the cycle. The infantry quickly learned the harsh realities of the war they were in. The first week proved to be incredibly challenging, and it was clear that it would never get any easier.

Late on the night of June 22, Kirponos received orders from Moscow. This was Directive Number Three, issued by Marshal Timoshenko, which called for a general counteroffensive. While completely detached from reality, the directive was rooted in the pre-war plans of the Red Army. It instructed Kirponos to leverage his supposed superiority in armor to strike at the southern lines of the German advance, severing their access to bases in Poland. However, this ambitious plan was based on two key assumptions. First, the Red Army needed time to mobilize its forces to execute the intended counterstroke. Unfortunately, by June 22, they were almost completely caught off guard, with troops scattered across the operational area. There was no time for proper mobilization and organization; divisions and corps were forced to march to their jumping-off points with little to no preparation. The second major shortcoming for the Red Army was a lack of a clear strategic understanding of where the main effort lay. The immense scale of the German assault surpassed anything they had anticipated. The entirety of the Western Soviet border was under attack, leaving little room for maneuver. Communication lines between units and commanders were severed, creating chaos. Generals had no idea where their units were, much less how they were faring under the relentless onslaught of the German invasion. These were the dire conditions facing the Front Commanders when Timoshenko and the General Staff ordered the counteroffensive. Kirponos was designated as the main effort, but he harbored no illusions about his capability to push the Germans back. Faced with no alternatives, he had no choice but to follow orders and organize the counterattack, or risk being recalled to Moscow. Given the purges that had decimated the ranks of the military leadership, the threat inherent in this order was unmistakable.

To facilitate the order for the counteroffensive, Timoshenko dispatched General Staff officers to each of the fronts, including Army General Zhukov to assist Kirponos. The nature of this assistance is unclear, but sources seem to indicate that it involved a degree of supervision. If the Front Commander did not execute his orders with a certain degree of competency then it was likely that he would not be the Front Commander for much longer. The case of Army General Pavlov comes to mind. Unfortunately for the counteroffensive, Kirponos was still in the process of concentrating his forces when the order was issued. This disarray meant that the mechanized corps, intended to serve as the main effort, had to be deployed piecemeal. Few of the corps were able to engage in battle as complete units, which was the opposite of Timoshenko’s vision. However, delaying the offensive was not an option, so Kirponos ordered his armor forward. The 22nd and 15th Mechanized Corps were directed to attack the northern and southern flanks of the German penetration. By coincidence, on the morning of the invasion, the strongest unit of the 22nd Mechanized Corps was training just north of Vladimir Volynskii. The 41st Tank Division, commanded by Colonel P. Pavlov boasted thirty-one KV series tanks and nearly three hundred fifty T-34s, placing him in an excellent position to strike at the expanding German breach. However, Pavlov’s pre-war orders dictated that he pull back to his assembly area in the event of an invasion. Compromising with local commanders who were desperate for support, he decided to send a single battalion of his lightest tanks to the front while pulling the rest of his division back to Kovel. This sort of move might seem absurd to the modern viewer. Especially one that remembers Napoleon’s maxim of fighting with your whole force. However, it is important to remember that Pavlov had no ability to communicate with his superiors. Additionally, the pre-war Red Army had a culture of strong obedience to orders, regardless of circumstances. Pavlov almost assuredly felt that he had no choice but to follow his existing orders, lest he risk his life for disobeying superior officers. In addition to this, he must’ve felt a responsibility to help his comrades. He chose the worst of all paths, dividing his forces. Lest we allow ourselves to much satisfaction, we need to remember this was made in the heat of battle. The T-26 battalion quickly faced disaster, falling victim to German anti-tank units at Vladimir Volynskii. Led by Major Suin, the battalion arrived with fifty tanks but soon lost thirty of them in the assault. The Soviets were ultimately forced to abandon the town.

Kirponos had forty-eight hours to initiate his counteroffensive with the scattered mechanized corps at his disposal. Meanwhile, Kleist had divided his panzers into two spearheads: one advancing north toward Lutsk and the other moving south to secure Berestechko. As Kirponos struggled to concentrate his forces, Kleist’s spearheads continued their relentless drive. In the south, the advance was spearheaded by General of Panzers Crüwell and his 11th Panzer Division. By midday on the twenty-third, they reached Radekhov, nearly seventy kilometers into Soviet territory, where they encountered the 10th Tank Division. Initially, they were able to push back the surprised Soviet tankers. After this initial success, Crüwell reinforced his position and established a defensive ring in anticipation of a counterattack. Anticipating the need for stronger anti-tank support, he ensured that the Luftwaffe's eighty-eight millimeter guns were brought up and emplaced. However, by the time Major General Ogurtsov managed to position his tanks to retake the town, the 11th Panzer Division was firmly entrenched in well-prepared positions. Ogurtsov obliged his adversaries by launching his attacks in waves. Early war Soviet tank tactics were a confounding mishmash of mismanagement and poor tactical sense. Local commanders attacked in waves, without infantry or artillery support. Armored cars would attack first, then light tanks and finally medium and heavy tanks in a final wave. This was a predictable pattern that allowed German defenders to save limited heavy AT ammunition. It also meant that the most vulnerable vehicles could be picked off at leisure as there was nothing else to shoot at. These tactics would soon fall by the wayside, but they were here for now. They would devastate the pre-war tank arm and cost many talented small unit commanders their lives. This misguided tactic allowed the defenders to avoid facing the full strength of his division simultaneously. After sustaining heavy losses, Ogurtsov ultimately pulled back, having lost forty-six tanks while inflicting only minimal casualties on the Germans, five panzers and a few anti-tank guns.

Kirponos was aware of the escalating attack and attempted to redirect more of his forces to the rapidly expanding battle, especially as the 11th Panzer Division dispatched a battalion to secure Berestechko. In the north, General of Panzers Kühn was leading his 14th Panzer Division toward Lutsk. Together, the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions formed the spearheads of Kleist’s advance into Ukraine. Unfortunately, the Southwestern Front's nominal advantage in armor was quickly evaporating in the face of the German assault. Given the circumstances, Kirponos had no choice but to direct his armor as it arrived on the scene, leading to piecemeal attacks that could be dealt with individually by Kleist. Throughout the initial fighting, Kirponos wisely maintained a strong reserve force, using them as a mobile fire brigade to plug gaps and repel dangerous Soviet counterattacks as they occurred. This piecemeal approach allowed him to avoid undue pressure in his efforts to hold the lines and gradually push the Germans back eastward.

On the morning of the twenty-fourth, the Southwestern Front's counteroffensive had yet to materialize. The 14th Panzer Division was advancing on Lutsk when it encountered the 5th Army’s 1st Anti-Tank Brigade. The 1st Anti-Tank Brigade was perhaps the best armed anti-tank unit in the Southwestern Front. The Brigade was in possession of 48 of the adequate F-22 76.2mm guns as well as a number of other anti-tank weapons. The encounter at Lutsk was the first significant fighting between Soviet anti-tank forces and German Panzers. The Soviets were still road marching, and the Panzers caught them off guard. The brigade's commander quickly unlimbered his guns and brought them into position, opening fire on the advancing Germans. The fighting was fierce, but the Soviets lacked any significant supporting arms. This shortcoming led to a familiar outcome: while the Red Army fought bravely, it struggled to coordinate its resources effectively at the critical moment. In contrast, the Germans excelled in creating and exploiting local advantages, consistently turning them into larger successes. By fourteen hundred, the 22nd Mechanized Corps was in position to attack the 14th Panzer Division, but they could only deploy their 19th Tank Division. As was predictable, the attack did not go well. The light Soviet tanks were quickly shredded by the German combined arms. By eighteen hundred on the twenty-fourth, the Soviets were in full retreat behind Lutsk. German artillery wreaked havoc on the withdrawing units, resulting in the death of the 22nd Mechanized Corps commander.

In the south, near Lviv, the 17th Army was pushing ever closer. The Soviet 6th Army Commander, Lieutenant General Muzichenko, directed his 4th Mechanized Corps to launch a counterattack. Unfortunately, Muzichenko alternated between marching and counter-marching his tanks along the front line, using them to attack piecemeal without adequate support in a desperate attempt to shore up his defenses. This approach led to near destruction of the Corps’ combat power, with many tanks lost to enemy action and even more succumbing to mechanical failures on the roads. The bad state of the Soviet Union’s roads did not just hamper German movement. They were a constant thorn in Red Army operations and resulted in hundreds of casualties to mechanical faults. The poorly equipped tank recovery units and disorganized command structures did not help to alleviate these issues. On the 25th, further Red Army failures were evident. Dubno fell to the Germans, as did Lutsk. The 15th Mechanized Corps, under Major General Karpezo, could not be compelled to attack the exposed flank of the 11th Panzer Division. Karpezo baffled his superiors; the normally strict Red Army command structure struggled to motivate him to engage. This was an unusual failure for a commander of Zhukov’s caliber, as he had the full weight of the establishment behind him. Yet, Karpezo remained in command, continuing to defy expectations and orders from above.

Finally, on the 25th, Zhukov and Kirponos managed to assemble their forces for the planned counterstroke, though they were considerably weakened. It had taken three days, but the troops were finally in position. On the south side of the expanding bulge were the 15th Mechanized Corps and the newly arrived 8th Mechanized Corps. In the north, the 9th and 19th Mechanized Corps had gathered at Rovno. The fighting began in the north, with the 9th Mechanized launching a small attack before quickly retreating to a defensive posture. The 19th Mechanized went all-in and was severely mauled at Dubno. The southern attack fared little better than its northern counterpart. The 15th Mechanized Corps remained in place, which allowed the 8th Mechanized Corps the opportunity to push back against the Germans. Unfortunately, the first units attacked directly from the march, with no time to familiarize themselves with the terrain, the layout of the Heer’s positions, or even to resupply with fuel and ammunition. The result was a slow-moving debacle. The fighting continued sporadically for the rest of the week.

On June 26th, the 12th Tank Division managed to penetrate the German lines. This breach was paradoxically unexpected, yet it was the very aim of the counterattack. Unfortunately, there was no plan in place to support the division's advance. The 16th Panzer Division was moved up as part of Kleist’s previously mentioned reserves and effectively halted the advance of the Soviet tanks. Just as this attack was reaching its climax, Luftwaffe reconnaissance reported a critical discovery: they had located the command posts of the two Red Army Corps. The distinctive radio trucks had revealed the positions of the two commanders. The Luftwaffe swiftly dispatched several groups of medium bombers, destroying the nerve centers of the most serious counterattack the Wehrmacht was facing. In the chaos, Karpezo was wounded, and the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General Ryabshev, was unable to maintain effective control of his units. However, he managed to regain his command the following day. A genuine victory was still within reach, despite the numerous missteps and confusion. The 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions were cut off along with parts of the 75th Infantry Division. The 8th Mechanized Corps had successfully executed an envelopment. Front lines collapsed around Dubno as both sides became intermingled in the fight. The situation was stabilized by a timely intervention from Kleist, who was greatly aided by the composure of his local commanders. He directed a counterattack that cut off the unsupported corridor the 8th Mechanized had carved out during their advance.

Despite the chaotic arrangements and various difficulties, the Soviet attack achieved some initial success. The offensive caught the Germans on the move and outside their prepared positions, with Soviet tanks sweeping aside hastily constructed German anti-tank defenses manned by motorcycle troops attached to the 48th Panzer Corps. Later, the 8th Mechanized Corps split, with some units amalgamating into Nikolai Popel's group, while a second force remained under the command of Ryabyshev. Popel's group consisted of about 300 tanks, including no fewer than 100 T-34 and KV tanks. On June twenty-seventh, Popel's forces launched a surprise attack, defeating the rear of the 11th Panzer Division and capturing Dubno, a strategically vital road crossing. This marked the most successful Soviet action of the battle, as it effectively cut off the supply lines of the German armored spearhead, the 11th Panzer Division. However, this advantage was not exploited by Soviet command, which failed to communicate with Popel and did not provide necessary supplies or reinforcements. As a result, Popel's group remained in Dubno, preparing for defense and losing the operational initiative.

The German high command considered the situation to be "serious." General Halder wrote this in the war diary"In the Army Group South sector, heavy fighting continues on the right flank of Panzer Group 1. The Russian 8th Tank Corps has effected a deep penetration of our front and is now in the rear of the 11th Panzer Division. This penetration has seriously disrupted our rear areas between Brody and Dubno. The enemy is threatening Dubno from the southwest... the enemy also has several separate tank groups acting in the rear of Panzer Group 1, which are managing to cover considerable distances." By June 28th, the Germans had gathered enormous forces. Popel's group came under attack from elements of the 16th Motorized Infantry Division, the 75th Infantry Division, two other infantry divisions, and the 16th Panzer Division. Encircled in Dubno, Popel defended his position until July first, when he was forced to retreat. The 8th Mechanized Corps found itself crushed in the midst of its best chance for victory, its vital connection to the rest of the Southwestern Front severed before it could be stabilized. The overall situation deteriorated rapidly. The German 6th Army arrived on the northern flank and managed to push the remaining Red Army units back into confusion. The last day of solid resistance was June 30th.

The impact of the hesitation and confusion in command on June twenty-seventh and its effect on the battle, as well as the German advance into Ukraine, is difficult to determine. When the Soviet forces captured Dubno and cut off the leading edge of the main German attack, Kirponos believed that the same German forces threatened to outflank and encircle the Soviet units attacking from the south. As a result, he ordered a halt to the offensive and a general retreat to rationalize and shorten his front line, aiming "to prevent the enemy tank groupings from penetrating into the rear of the 6th and 26th Armies," according to H. Baghramyan. After debating with the Front commander and his staff, Georgy Zhukov quickly countermanded these orders, issuing directives for a renewed attack just two hours later. This decision led to even more confusion, emblematic of the Soviet command’s struggles during the Battle of Brody. Rokossovsky, who commanded the 9th Mechanized Corps attacking from the north, balked at the new orders, stating, "we had once again received an order to counter-attack. However, the enemy outnumbered us to such a degree that I took on the personal responsibility of ordering a halt to the counteroffensive and to meet the enemy in prepared defenses." Meanwhile, Ryabyshev, commanding the 8th Mechanized Corps to the south, complied with the order and resumed the attack.

Ryabyshev appeared to side with Zhukov’s position at the time, arguing that if the attack had continued aggressively and without delay, the Soviets might have been successful. However, subsequent events seemed to validate Kirponos's concerns that the attack was premature and could destabilize the integrity of the entire front. Shortly after the failed Soviet counter-attack, Marshal Semyon Budyonny was given overall command of the combined Southwestern and Southern Front. Disaster soon unfolded at the Battle of Uman, where 100,000 Soviet soldiers were killed or captured and another 100,000 wounded when three Red Army formations, the 26th, 12th, and 18th Armies, were encircled as Army Group South renewed its advance by pivoting south from the positions it had achieved during the Battle of Dubno. Kirponos had foreshadowed this outcome in his arguments with Zhukov about the wisdom of the counter-attack at Dubno. The confrontation between Kirponos and Zhukov led Zhukov to tell the Southwestern Front political officer, Nikita Khrushchev, "I am afraid your commander Kirponos here is pretty weak." This charge remained unanswered, as Kirponos died in the battle of Kiev after it was surrounded.

The Battle of Dubno was not the end of the Southwestern Front, but it served as a perfect microcosm of the Soviet war machine as it stood in June 1941. Wasted opportunities, command inadequacies, and poor tactics all contributed to the Red Army’s failures across the front in the first week of the war. Many units struggled to organize their own attacks, defenses, and logistics effectively. They rarely coordinated their efforts with higher echelons or peer units. While soldiers fought valiantly and with determination, such bravery alone does not win wars. By the end of the first week, Army Group South was in a strong position. There had been moments of crisis, but cool heads and effective coordination had helped the soldiers navigate through these challenges. Luftwaffe reconnaissance and air support had operated successfully, although the area of operations remained relatively small. Logistics had also not yet become a major issue for the field units. The Panzers had worked effectively in conjunction with the infantry commanders, a dynamic that was not consistently true during the first week of Operation Barbarossa.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

Army Group South aimed for Ukraine, facing supply issues and coordination failures. Commanders struggled with communication and strategy, leading to piecemeal assaults. Though the Germans secured significant territory, the fight proved grueling. By the end of the week, both sides faced the harsh realities of war, setting the stage for continued conflict on the Eastern Front.