Last time we spoke about the collective German delusions on the eastern front. The German spear aimed at Tikhvin and Moscow, driven by hunger for a swift conquest, while the Soviets gathered courage from ruined cities and stubborn civilians who walked beside soldiers. Rasputitsa, a living mire, swallowed tanks and hope, turning advances into cautious skirmishes as fuel ran low and supply lines sagged. Stalin shuffled commanders like chessmen, swapping Khozin for Fedyuninsky to place a frontline fighter where danger burned hottest. Yet even as the 54th Army strained, the red line held at Sitomlia and along the Volkhov, a stubborn fortress against encroaching winter. The German center faltered first, then the wings, as the 259th and 288th fought to pin back armored columns near the Malaia Vishera. Finland’s cautious patience and Finland’s own war fatigue complicated a broader push, while Moscow worried about fuel, frost, and a gnawing sense that victory would depend as much on weather as on steel.

This episode is the Tikvin at Last!

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A major Soviet counterattack hit the German vanguard on the Tikhvin front, with the objective of seizing Budogosh and then Gruzino. The northern shock group opened its assault on the 2nd, followed by the southern group on the 4th. In response, the 8th Panzer, moved up from its failed push toward Malaia Vishera, was shifted into the northern sector to meet the threat, while the 20th Motorized prepared to oppose the southern advance. Both Soviet offensives endured heavy artillery fire and Luftwaffe air strikes, and after a punishing bombardment, German mobile divisions mounted counterattacks that repulsed the attacks and drove the Soviets back.

By November 6, both offensives were halted, and temperatures had plummeted to the point that rivers and streams across the region were freezing solid. The day before, Schmidt drew the 18th Motorised, the 12th Panzer, and the 8th Panzer into a concentrated push toward Tikhvin. This combined assault overwhelmed the 191st Rifle Division and brought German forces into Tikhvin on November 8. The German command claimed the offensive had yielded about 20,000 prisoners of war, along with the destruction or capture of 96 tanks and 179 artillery pieces. The Moscow–Ladoga railroad was severed, amplifying the pressure on Leningrad’s defenders and civilians. Yet Schmidt’s formations were worn down from their long advance and increasingly beset by winter. Temperatures ranged from -27 °C to -40 °C, taking a severe toll on soldiers and vehicles alike.

Soldiers faced frostbite in mounting numbers, and some even froze to death, as the Wehrmacht’s meager winter uniforms sat in depots in Poland. Ammunition and fuel remained top priorities for train shipments, yet deliveries were still far short of demand. Cold-related casualties began to surpass combat losses for Army Group North. Weapons and vehicles suffered random failures from the freezing conditions, and the oil and lubricants the Germans relied on often froze solid. Theoretically the Germans had access to freeze proof petroleum, oil, and lubrication but either it was not issued or it did not work at the temperatures reached by the winter. Many vehicles became stuck in mud when the ground froze; while the frost hardened the earth and aided movement, extracting those that were trapped required extraordinary effort, and many were irreparably damaged in the process. German locomotives were especially hard hit, as water in unprotected pipes froze and expanded. An estimated 70 to 80 percent of German-built trains sustained serious damage from burst pipes. The railway network, already unreliable, deteriorated further. For now, this problem mainly affected those in the North, as winter spread slowly southward. By November, German logistics increasingly depended on the Grosstransporttraum trucks to move supplies over long distances.

Schmidt could not advance any further. The 8th Panzer and 20th Motorised divisions were defending a 100-kilometer front along with the 126th Infantry Division, organized into a chain of small strongpoints. The 126th faced increasingly heavy attacks around Malaia Vishera. The 12th Panzer and 18th Motorised were pinned, defending Tikhvin from three sides as the Soviets tried to retake the town. Neither side was able to mount a new offensive, and morale among their troops showed little appetite for renewed assault. Leeb’s hope of linking with the Finns depended on a Finnish offensive, which remained uncertain. The northern sector also faltered. The 11th Infantry Division, reinforced by elements of the 21st Infantry, was halted again by week’s end, 14 kilometers south of Volkhov. After nearly two weeks of fighting, they had driven back the 285th, 311th, 319th and portions of the 282 rifle divisions, creating a wedge between the 4th Army and the 54th Army but not forcing the 54th Army to retreat or encircle it. Consequently, the offensive could not be halted. The 254th Infantry Division was ordered to reinforce Group Boeckmann, which was tasked with taking Volkhov and then Novaia Ladoga to complete the encirclement of the 54th Army. Elements of the 8th Panzer were also sent north to bolster Group Boeckmann. However, their attempt to outflank Volkhov’s defenses was stopped by the 310th Rifle Division at Zelenets Station.

The 61st Infantry Division was sent east to reinforce the now besieged 39th Motorised Corps at Tikhvin. In addition, the arriving 223rd Infantry Division was ordered to cover the gap between the 39th Motorised and the infantry forces around Malaia Vishera. The previously impassable swampland there was starting to freeze solid enough to allow for military movement. While Leeb remained confident in the offensive’s prospects, Hitler’s concerns loomed, and Leeb grew increasingly worried about his southern flank. The 9th Army’s difficulties in Army Group Center forced it onto the defensive, a shift that freed Soviet formations to press Leeb’s extended southern flank, giving the Soviets the initiative to renew their attacks.

Back on the 3rd, the Neva Operational Group had its headquarters reinforced by staff from the 8th Army and was ordered to attack toward Sinyavino alongside the 55th Army. Even with six rifle divisions and two additional divisions in reserve, the breakthrough at the bridgehead was immediately halted. Soviet artillery ammunition around Leningrad was insufficient to suppress the German guns, which faced a dense, target-rich Red Army force. The same was true for the seven rifle divisions and one tank division comprising the 55th Army. These offensives gained little ground and inflicted heavy casualties on the Red Army. Yet Stalin attributed the failures to a lack of will and, on the 8th, ordered Khozin to form volunteer regiments for another attempt.

Winter was beginning to bite Army Group Center as well, though not as badly as further north. Ground froze overnight but thawed by morning, leaving the terrain swollen, waterlogged, and persistently muddy. Army Group Center’s divisions were operating near subsistence levels, with deliveries far short of what would be needed to stockpile for a new offensive. Even the Panzer forces and SS formations, which enjoyed priority, did not receive enough supplies to build reserves. The supply situation was at its worst for the Kalinin front. There was only a single supply road, and it was dominated by Soviet forces occupying nearby high ground, making supply runs highly vulnerable to interdiction and attrition. The 41st Panzer Corps reported ammunition stocks sufficient for only about two days of defensive fighting. The OKH Quartermaster estimated that it would take until the end of November for Bock’s forces to be capable of launching another offensive.

Germany and Romania had exhausted their fuel stockpiles, so consumption was now constrained by refinery production rates. The only potential relief came from 190 fuel trains that had been earmarked for use in the USSR but had not yet reached the front. As a result, Panzer Group 3’s main fuel stockpile at Smolensk ran dry, forcing them to dispatch trucks all the way back to Orsha to fetch additional supplies. The only possible advantage lay in the shortage of operational vehicles, which themselves required fuel to run. For example, the 41st Panzer Corps’ 1st Panzer Division could muster only 48 functional tanks remaining.

The Panzer Group’s other Panzer Corps continued pushing toward Kalinin, but the mud and cold took a heavy toll. They were rapidly losing towing vehicles due to the constant need to recover damaged ones. The ground, oscillating between freezing and thawing, intensified wear on the 56th Panzer Corps’ vehicles. Many areas that had seen heavy fighting were cratered, with some holes up to 2 meters deep, rendering them impassable. Even the traversable roads were clogged with mud up to 75 centimeters deep. At this depth vehicles sunk up to their chassis. This rendered them immune to all attempts to free the vehicles. The depth of mud frequently caused massive damage to towed vehicles, which could only be repaired in dedicated facilities behind the lines, assuming spare parts and the ability to bring the vehicles in for repairs. The 4th Panzer Corps was also suffering under these conditions. The 46th Panzer Corps reported its troops were down to one-third rations, an unsustainable level, because heavy rains had rendered its main supply route impassable to towing vehicles as well. Despite these grave logistical problems, Hoepner remained adamant that the Corps would be ready for an offensive as soon as the ground properly froze.

Similarly, the Second Panzer Army faced logistical difficulties. Guderian noted that, given current conditions, the only viable route to supply his army was to expand the rail line from Oryol to Tula. At present, its Panzer divisions were being sustained by supplies airlifted to a forward airbase and then ferried the remaining distance by prime movers drawn from the divisional artillery. These prime movers were failing at a rapid rate due to mechanical issues, threatening the future mobility of the artillery. Guderian’s Army Corps received lower supply priority than the Panzer Corps and was thus forced to rely on “living off the land,” which contributed to the starvation of the local peasantry.

However, Nazi Germany’s military doctrine held that material constraints such as logistics should never restrict operational aims. The Army embraced the supremacy of the Will, believing that any problem could be overcome with enough motivation and that failure merely indicated a lack of willpower. For example, planned offensives against the Red Army, which would disrupt the Kalinin supply route, were affected by this mindset. Kirchner’s 41st Panzer Corps was initially slated for a minor role due to fuel shortages, but Bock overruled the plan and insisted the Panzer Corps take a larger part in the offensive, even if they had to attack on foot. Bock’ diary entry about the event. “a letter from the panzer group which arrived today held forth in great detail and in generally negative terms about the use of motorized troops as foot soldiers. In my reply I made reference to Panzer Army Guderian, which is providing daily proof that motorized forces fighting on foot are capable of outstanding feats – they just have to want to!” This optimism, often blind permeated both OKH and OKW, with neither questioning the reliability of the logistical system. In parallel, OKH proudly displayed its new winter uniform designs to Hitler that week. Wagner pledged that sufficient numbers would be produced to supply all frontline soldiers, yet this ignored the reality that several hundred additional train deliveries would be required at a moment when the railway capacity to deliver food, ammunition, and fuel was already inadequate.

By November, German forces in the East had been reduced to 2.7 million personnel after absorbing 686,000 casualties. An OKH assessment on November 6 reported that the 136 Infantry Division on the Eastern Front possessed only the fighting power of about 83 fresh divisions. The 17 Panzer divisions had the strength of roughly 6 full-strength Panzer divisions, while the 13 motorized infantry divisions had the combined strength of about 8 full divisions. Only about one-third of the Wehrmacht’s motor vehicles remained operable. Even as German forces in the USSR were pared down, Military Intelligence assessments suggested the Red Army was in worse shape: estimates placed the Red Army at 160 divisions and 40 brigades, with most units operating at less than half strength. By contrast, in the West of the USSR there were 269 divisions and 65 brigades, totaling around 2.2 million men as of November 1, with numbers rapidly increasing as new formations formed or were moved from the Far East. The Germans fervently believed the Soviet war effort was on the verge of collapse and that the Red Army would continue to retreat on all fronts except Moscow and the Caucasus. The German assessment held that the Red Army would trade space for time, aiming to rebuild its forces for late 1942. Moscow was believed to be defended mainly because of its strategic value as a railway hub for the Soviet rail network. The Caucasus, in turn, was thought to be defended not only by terrain that favored defense but also with support from the British and potentially the Americans. Yet, once again, the German High Command disastrously underestimated its foe.

On this basis, Halder submitted a plan on the 7th. In his approach, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups were to take Yaroslavl and Rybinsk. In his maximum plan, the Germans would advance to the Vologda, Gorki, Stalingrad, and Maikop lines. His minimum plan targeted reaching 50 km east of Lake Ladoga, about 275 km east of Moscow, and Rostov. For the sake of comparison, Army Group Center had managed only about 220 km of advance eastward during Operation Typhoon. Now they faced demands to push farther, despite being weaker, with even thinner supply lines, and under far worse weather conditions. The objective across these schemes was to seize as many rail hubs and industrial centers as possible to deny the Red Army the ability to rebuild. The enormous distances involved and the challenges of controlling such a vast expanse were not seriously considered by Halder and his staff. Halder pressed for these objectives to be achieved even as winter began, while Hitler treated them as operational targets for spring 1942. To Halder, the Red Army had allegedly ceased to exist, and in his perception he even claimed on the 4th that Moscow would be abandoned as it held little strategic or industrial value.Blumentritt, the chief-of-staff of the Fourth Army, during a post war recollection. “With amazement and disappointment we discovered in late October and early November that the beaten Russians seemed quite unaware that as a military force they had almost ceased to exist.” A meeting was arranged at Orsha on the 13th to discuss plans for a renewed offensive on Moscow with the staff of all three Army Groups and their Armies.

The OKH’s objectives were viewed by some commanders as insane. Bock argued that, given the depleted strength of his Army Group, only near-term, close-range goals were attainable, since a strategic encirclement of Moscow was no longer feasible. Bock on the 11th November to Halder. “In my opinion, the objectives you marked on the recently-delivered map as worthwhile surely cannot be reached before winter, because we no longer have the required forces and because it is impossible to supply these forces after reaching these objectives on account of the inadequate potential for supply by rail. Furthermore, I no longer consider the objectives designated ‘worthwhile’ by me in the army group order for the encirclement of Moscow, specifically the line Ryazan [185 km southeast of Moscow] – Vladimir [180 km east of Moscow] – Kalyazin [165 km north of Moscow], to be attainable. All that remains, therefore, is to strive for a screening front in the general line Kolomna [100 km southeast of Moscow] – Orekhovo [85 km east of Moscow] – Zagorsk [70 km northeast of Moscow] – Dmitrov [70 km north of Moscow], which is absolutely vital to the encirclement of Moscow. I will be happy if our forces are sufficient to obtain this line”

He began advocating for objectives more in line with Hitler’s original Typhoon concept—small, deliberate offensives designed to destroy Soviet forces in front of them before attempting to seize Moscow itself. Even some corps-level leaders, such as Vietinghoff, submitted carefully worded reports questioning the feasibility of their orders. “The following conclusions can be drawn: The success of an operation in the present season, where at any time serious traffic problems can arise from frosts, heavy snowfalls or snow drifts, is only guaranteed if”:

(a) the organisation of the mot[orised] division is eased and for each panzer division one viable road is available.

(b) full replenishment of these divisions with fuel, special provisions and food prior to commencement (5 daily rations) is achieved.

After careful evaluation of all experiences of the past weeks I am forced to conclude – although painful for the corps – that no benefits are to be expected from the deployment of the panzer corps under present and expected weather and road conditions. The wear on the troops, equipment and fuel bears no relationship to the possible success. The massing of mot[orised] troops is only a hindrance and not of any use.

Vietinghoff’s assessment, however, was dismissed by his Army commander, Hoepner, who scornfully labeled it overly pessimistic and an exaggeration of the likely problems. One reason for this stance was that Hoepner commanded the strongest panzer concentration in the east and yearned for the autonomy enjoyed by Guderian and Kleist, hoping to shed what he saw as the infantry general’s conservatism. It is unknown what Kluge’s reaction was to Vietinghoff’s report.

Despite the prior halt order, fighting continued across Army Group Center. The 7th Army Corps conducted local offensives in an effort to improve its position after Zhukov’s late October offensive. Yet these assaults stalled under sustained Soviet resistance, even with panzer support. By the 4th, the divisions of the Corps had been reduced to roughly one-third to one-half of their full strength. In early November, the 5th Panzer Division launched a local attack on the 3rd, but the operation quickly turned disastrous as infantry sheltered in their bunkers and refused to advance. The panzers pressed ahead, becoming isolated and subsequently overwhelmed by anti-tank forces. In the ensuing chaos, 21 tanks were damaged or destroyed before the force managed to withdraw back to German lines. Many formations used this period to consolidate depleted units and promote new junior officers and NCOs in an effort to recover from the attrition suffered by Army Group Center.

Soviet offensives also appeared along the front line with surprising frequency. Many of these assaults produced more casualties than their modest gains warranted, though they did deny German formations the rest they desperately needed. One Soviet offensive even temporarily cut the only road supplying Kalinin on the 3rd, before a counterattack forced them back. The effectiveness of Soviet attacks varied dramatically with the officers leading them: some persisted in Civil War-era tactics and resisted innovative approaches, while others were more receptive to modern battlefield methods. Some officers seemed unable to accept responsibility for failure, preferring to press on with the same inadequate tactics rather than reassessing. A stark example was the loss of 2,000 men from the 44th Mongolian Cavalry Division, who repeatedly charged the 106th Infantry Division in parade-ground assaults. Overall, the Red Army officer corps was gradually improving. It would take time to weed out the incompetent but politically connected officers, and for new officers to develop their skills. The effectiveness of the late-war Red Army came at the cost of blood shed and learning from earlier mistakes.

Guderian was growing increasingly concerned about a potential large Soviet offensive from both the east and west of Tula, targeting his overstretched forces. Reconnaissance assets had detected a substantial influx of Soviet reinforcements in the area, while his flanks remained thinly guarded. Guderian was not able to bring his entire 2nd Panzer Army to bear at Tula. For example, the 47th Panzer Corps remained trapped around Oryol due to fuel shortages and the need for infantry from the Second Army to reach and protect this vital supply hub. Other units were still bogged down on the long road between Oryol and Tula. Four depleted rifle battalions from the 4th Panzer Division were holding a line about 32 kilometers long to maintain contact between the 3rd Panzer Division and the infantry of the 53rd Army Corps. This feared assault was anticipated to begin on the 8th against the 53rd Army Corps’ 112th and 167th Infantry Divisions, and was expected to develop over the following week.

To the south, the Battle of Kursk commenced on November 1. The 9th Panzer Division had only nine tanks available for the attack and was stretched across 260 kilometers of advance. It was accompanied by the 95th Infantry, likewise dispersed, and the force could not bring any artillery to bear due to a lack of horses. Nevertheless, the assault would succeed against a weak Soviet defense, though it took until the 4th for the last resistance to be cleared. The German reports claimed that although the Red Army had abandoned much of the city and evacuated about a quarter of its population, many of the remaining civilians had been armed. This assertion was widely used to justify the perceived lack of concern for civilian casualties during the attack. Although Voronezh did not have a large Jewish population, numerous atrocities were committed in its wake, including mass executions. Clearing the city of hidden explosives, however, would take longer. Even before Voronezh could be secured, the Second Army was ordered to seize Voronezh, despite Weiss’s reports that a rest period was desperately needed. Weiss’s plea for a winter halt was denied by Heusinger, who argued that troops should not gain the impression of a winter base, or they might fail to understand the order to set out again. Halder would admit these orders were largely theoretical because the mud currently prevented the movement but still did not allow the Army to stop for the Winter and insisted they be carried out. OKH believed the Soviets in this sector were completely shattered so it was just a matter of marching there.

Von Rundstedt’s reluctance to undertake a major offensive the previous week prompted a visit from Halder on the 3rd. Halder noted down in his Diary the purpose of the visit to Army Group South on the 3rd: “some energetic ‘persuading’ would be in order to knock the lead out of them”. Hitler was also getting frustrated about the pessimism of Rundstedt. During the discussion, Rundstedt reiterated his view that the lower Don River and the Donets region represented the limit for his Army Group, arguing for a long halt thereafter. Representatives from OKH demanded more optimistic propaganda in the Army Group’s logistical forecasts and pressed for the capture of Stalingrad and Maykop before year’s end. After Rundstedt refused, Brauchitsch inquired about Rundstedt’s health, a detail Halder recorded. In a follow-up report, Rundstedt also cited poor troop morale driven by cold weather, ammunition and food shortages, and growing irritation among soldiers who felt they were being “preached at” in orders about the importance of objectives. He warned that any large winter offensive would paralyze the Army Group come spring as they recovered, making a winter halt preferable. This assessment was, unsurprisingly, rejected outright, and OKH bypassed Rundstedt to issue offensive orders directly to the First Panzer Army and the 17th Army to seize Maykop and Stalingrad, respectively.

Kleist’s Rostov offensive began on the 5th. The 14th Panzer Corps crossed the Mius River at Golodayevka and advanced about 30 kilometers eastward. The Soviet 9th Army had anticipated a direct assault along the coastline toward Rostov and was caught off guard by the northern offensive. The 14th Panzer Corps then swung south to secure a bridgehead across the Krepkaya River. Heavy rain again stalled further movement on the 7th, allowing the defenders time to establish new defensive positions along the Tuzlov River.

Manstein’s 11th Army continued its pursuit of the routing Red Army in Crimea, despite terrible road conditions and gradually returning resistance. The 54th Corps took a direct route to Sevastopol, but was halted in the steep mountains and ravines around the port fortress on the 2nd, with the 8th Marine Brigade playing a significant role in the battle. The 54th Corps would press offensives until the 8th, when mounting casualties, shortages of supplies, and exhaustion forced a pause. The 30th Corps was taking a longer route through the partisan-infested Yalta mountains and lagged behind. Any attempt to seize the fortress from its 52,000 defenders would have to await improved logistics, reinforcements, and the arrival of siege artillery. Manstein hoped to renew the offensive on Sevastopol by the end of November. However, the already chaotic logistical situation in Crimea was worsened by a prolonged rainstorm across the region. He bitterly complained that with even a single motorized division, they could have raced to the fortress and captured it before the Soviets organized a defense. "By granting this to us, we would have been spared a great deal of blood, difficult winter battles, and a future assault of the fortress; we would have also soon had available an additional army for the other operations on the Eastern Front.” Although this assessment is doubtful given the number of troops still present there from the Odessa evacuation. The 62nd Corps, which was supposed to be the weaker secondary effort, managed to bypass a hastily formed defensive line and captured Feodosia on November 3, triggering a new race to Kerch, the last major port available to the fleeing 51st Army.

Meanwhile, the Romanian Mountain Corps was tied down fighting numerous partisan bands across the peninsula. The Yalta Mountains would become a stronghold for these partisans, while at the same time they were intended to secure the southern coastline of Crimea in case of a Soviet naval attack. The 6th and 17th Armies remained largely static due to supply shortages and casualties sustained. A substantial 160-kilometer gap persisted between the 29th Army Corps at Belgorod and the nearest formations from Army Group Center, which had just conquered Kursk. The Hungarian Mobile Corps was ordered to take positions alongside the 17th Army to free up German infantry divisions for a new offensive into the Donbas.

The USSR marked the anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7. Stalin had delivered a speech the night before, broadcast across the country. Military parades had traditionally celebrated the occasion, but in 1941 they were largely abandoned due to the invasion. Stalin nevertheless insisted that a parade be held, despite widespread objections. Zhukov’s 1st November report. “It is unlikely that the opponent in the next 2–3 days will be able to advance on Moscow. To build up operational reserves, provide food and ammunition as well as tanks and other equipment, the enemy will need at least half a month, to provide everything needed for a new offensive prepared in advance in the area of Smolensk– Viaz’ma” The objections faded when Zhukov argued that the Germans were unlikely to mount a major offensive toward Moscow for several weeks, making the parade seem safe. He did, however, recommend improving Moscow’s air defenses for the event. Planning was conducted in complete secrecy to prevent any German interference. The soldiers participating in the parade only learned of it on the day itself, though many were puzzled by the sudden inclusion of marching drills and likely suspected the real purpose. More than 28,000 soldiers took part, with many proceeding directly to front-line duties outside the city afterward. In the speech held the day before and the speech after the parade, Stalin would claim the Germans had lost 4.5 million men whilst the USSR had lost only 1.7 million. He also pointed out that the USSR was supported by Britain and the USA. Stalin would also refer back to past military heroes of Russia from Aleksandr Nevskiy to Mikhail Kutuzov. Similar parades were held in Kuybyshev and Voronezh. The morale boost from the display appears to have been significant, reaffirming leadership resolve to defend Moscow and enhancing perceptions of the USSR’s strength.

Similarly, Hitler would participate in the anniversary of the Munich Beer Hall Putsch on the 8th. There he sought to bridge the growing credibility gap between the harsh realities of the war in the east and the constant propaganda announcements claiming the war had already been decided. “Right now, we have over fifteen thousand planes, over twenty-two thousand tanks, twenty-seven thousand guns. It is truly an enormous amount of material. The entire industry of the world, including German industry, could only replace such amounts slowly …. With all due respect to lightning warfare – you still have to march! . . . If you walk all the way from the German border to Rostov or the Crimea, or Leningrad, then we are talking real distances, especially considering the roads in the ‘paradise of workers and peasants ”

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In the bleak hush before winter, a stubborn battle raged from Tikhvin to Moscow. German spearheads plowed toward Budogosh and Gruzino, while Soviet defenses clung to Sitomlia and the Volkhov line, stubborn as ice. Rasputitsa turned roads to mire, tanks to statues, and fuel into a fevered memory. Commanders shuffled like chess pieces; Stalin swapped Khozin for Fedyuninsky as frost tightened its grip. German logistics buckled under -40°C, trains bursting, engines sighing. Yet both sides pressed on: Soviets probing with fresh grit, Germans chasing Marathons of supply and bravado.