SS7 Is Still Broken: How Surveillance Firms Are Bypassing Telco Defenses

Daily Security Review

Content provided by Daily Security Review. All podcast content including episodes, graphics, and podcast descriptions are uploaded and provided directly by Daily Security Review or their podcast platform partner. If you believe someone is using your copyrighted work without your permission, you can follow the process outlined here https://player.fm/legal.

9d ago 50:12

MP3•Episode home

A new attack technique is exposing just how vulnerable global mobile networks remain in 2025. Cybersecurity firm Enea has discovered a surveillance operation that bypasses SS7 firewalls by exploiting a subtle weakness in the TCAP encoding layer—allowing stealth location tracking of mobile users across borders.

The method? Tampering with the IMSI field in ProvideSubscriberInfo (PSI) requests to hide it from detection. Many mobile operators’ SS7 stacks simply fail to decode the malformed tag, allowing unauthorized tracking messages to pass security controls.

In this episode, we cover:

The technical anatomy of the IMSI hiding exploit
How this attack evades standard SS7 security checks
The surveillance firms and platforms involved—WODEN, ASMAN, HURACAN, and others
Broader SS7 weaknesses: lack of encryption, lack of authentication, and global trust architecture
The disturbing truth: most mobile networks still depend on legacy protocols from the 1970s
Why users can’t opt out—and no app can protect you

We also examine the countermeasures: advanced signaling firewalls, protocol filtering, TCAP signing, and why even now, SS7 remains irreplaceable due to the persistence of 2G/3G roaming infrastructure.

This isn’t a theoretical vulnerability—it’s a real-world surveillance method in use today, targeting phones across continents without users ever knowing.

245 episodes

#Tech #News #Tech News #Daily Security Review