Last time we spoke about how the Germans had underestimated the Soviets. General Fedor von Bock’s forces captured Smolensk, yet the Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, fiercely defended their territory, demonstrating an unexpected resilience despite heavy losses. Struggles for control intensified around Kyiv, as logistical issues plagued the Germans. Their supply lines grew thinner, causing unrest among troops facing devastating casualties. Amidst desperate counteroffensives, the Soviets mobilized millions, revealing the vastness of their manpower and determination. By mid-August, German command recognized a grim truth: they had underestimated the "Russian colossus." What started as a confident assault evolved into a prolonged struggle where victory was no longer assured. The Germans were stretched thin, while the Soviets regrouped, heralding a change in the tides of war that would resonate through the Eastern Front.

This episode is The Battle for Kyiv Begins

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.

The Red army was exhausted as she entered her third week of being invaded by Nazi Germany. However she was striking back where she could, and little by little it seemed like she was chipping at the armor of the allegedly invincible Wehrmacht. We left off last week with Army Group North advancing towards Leningrad while also attacking Vatutin. Meanwhile Guderian began a turn southwards as the Red Army frantically tried to fill gaps in their lines north of Kyiv. In June, the Soviet Air Force, known as the VVS, suffered a devastating setback. Throughout July, their operations were able to continue, but only due to their reserve aircraft and the Luftwaffe's challenge in covering such a vast front. Although the vast majority of this reserve was made up of old planes, sheer numbers allowed the Soviet Airforce to continue the fight and cover most of the front. On August 7th, they launched a long-range bombing mission targeting the heart of Nazi Germany, Berlin, the political center of the Third Reich. In a desperate bid to halt Army Group North's advance, the Soviet military committed all available resources. The Soviet Naval Staff devised a daring strategy, determining that their best chance of success lay in launching Ilyushin DB-3T torpedo bombers from a small island off the coast of Estonia, nestled in the Baltic Sea.

Strategists calculated that if the twin-engine bombers were loaded with approximately 3,000 kilograms of fuel and no more than 750 kilograms of bombs, they could undertake an 1,800-kilometer round trip to Berlin with 10-15% of reserve fuel remaining. However, this approach meant the pilots would lack the extra fuel necessary for evasive maneuvers when facing German defenses, including anti-aircraft fire and intercepting fighters. The only viable option was to fly at high altitudes in a straight line both to and from their targets, which significantly compromised the accuracy of their bombardments. Tactical precision was, however, not the primary goal of the Berlin raid.

On August 2nd, fully loaded Soviet DB-3T bombers set off from the makeshift airfield to test the feasibility of using such an airstrip. The test revealed that skilled pilots could indeed take off under such challenging conditions. Then, on the night of August 4th, five Soviet aircraft embarked on a reconnaissance flight over Berlin, departing from the island airstrip. The Germans had established a formidable anti-aircraft perimeter that extended 100 kilometers around their capital, complete with powerful spotlights capable of illuminating an area of 6,000 cubic meters. Remarkably, the Soviet planes successfully traversed Berlin without detection. The pilots were now ready for an audacious bombing raid.

On the evening of August 7th, 1941, fifteen Ilyushin DB-3T torpedo bombers from the Baltic Fleet ascended into the sky, heading straight for the German capital. With Soviet fighters lacking the range to escort them, altitude became their sole defense. Surprisingly, the German military did not anticipate such a mission originating from the Soviet Union. In fact, despite previous small-scale bombing raids by the British, Nazi propaganda perpetuated the belief among German citizens that there was no threat from the East, insisting that the Soviet Air Force had been decimated following Operation Barbarossa. The idea of a Soviet bombing raid on Berlin in the summer of 1941 seemed almost unfathomable to the German military leaders and Nazi officials.

At that time, Berlin's streets were illuminated by the warm glow of apartment windows and streetlights, as blackouts were not enforced. The clear night of August 7th allowed the Soviet bombers to navigate directly toward the heart of the city. Approaching their targets from an altitude of 7,000 meters, the bombers encountered no anti-aircraft fire, and the searchlights remained dormant. As the bomb bay doors swung open, over 11,000 kilograms of bombs cascaded through the night sky, raining down upon central Berlin. With their loads released, the aircraft, now significantly lighter, turned to return to Estonia. The stillness of the night at 7,000 meters was suddenly shattered by the explosion of anti-aircraft shells. Miraculously, the Soviet bombers returned unscathed, accomplishing their mission. Initially, the German propaganda machine claimed that British RAF planes had conducted the raid, reporting six downed aircraft. This narrative was quickly refuted by newspapers in the UK, forcing the German government to reluctantly concede that it was, in fact, Soviet aircraft that had struck Berlin.

While the bombing raid caused no notable damage to the German capital, the Kremlin celebrated it as a major victory over the enemy, mirroring the triumphant spirit witnessed the following year when the U.S. executed the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo. In both instances, such bold strikes represented a crucial morale boost for populations that had only experienced defeat at the hands of Axis powers up to that point. The Soviet Union continued its bombing missions against Berlin, but the German defenses thereafter became ever more vigilant in preparation for the VVS bombers. The second raid, executed on August 10th, echoed a similar fate. This time, twenty-six bombers took off with a mission to strike Berlin. Of those, only six made it to the city, and tragically, just two returned to base. Nevertheless, this series of operations highlighted the VVS's resilience and growing power, a testament to their ability to conduct missions deep into enemy territory, even amidst adversity.

Throughout the early weeks of the war, the Luftwaffe struggled to recover from even the relatively mild losses it had sustained. As the conflict expanded, new aircraft production was being stretched thin across three theaters of operation. In the Mediterranean and Africa, the demand for air support grew increasingly critical as Italian forces began to falter, while British forces intensified their assaults on Axis shipping routes. If you want to hear a 10 podcast rundown of the entire Africa Campaign, might I interest you over at the Pacific War Channel for the video version or Echoes of War for the audio only version. Me and my co-host Gaurav go through the entire campaign with a lot of detail on the issue of logistics, honestly it was a fun and great series!

Now Back in Germany, the British Bomber Command initiated a campaign targeting industrial sites since the summer of 1940, during the height of the Battle of Britain. Initially, these bombing raids inflicted only minimal damage on German infrastructure and morale. It wasn’t until 1942, with the launch of the combined bomber offensive, that British attacks began to seriously threaten German capabilities. However, even at this early stage, the presence of Bomber Command’s operations required the Luftwaffe to divert fighters and anti-aircraft installations that could have been deployed elsewhere. This constant need for defensive resources added pressure on the Luftwaffe, making it increasingly difficult to maintain a balanced and effective response across all fronts.

On the Eastern Front, the conflict was intensifying as the Soviet Air Force began to recover from the initial shock of invasion. The Red Army demanded more air support across broader fronts than ever before, pushing the limits of their already strained resources. As the front lines advanced, the Air Corps found themselves moving squadrons further away from their well-equipped bases. The forward airfields they established were often little more than dirt strips, making supply logistics a daunting challenge for the Luftwaffe, just as it was for the army. In the vast, undeveloped areas where they were forced to operate, spare parts, fuel, and even medical attention for pilots and crew members became increasingly scarce. By the third week of August, as the assault on Leningrad intensified, the 1st and 8th Air Corps had been conducting nonstop missions for weeks. They targeted VVS airfields and rail lines leading into the city, provided crucial close air support, and attempted to disrupt concentrations of the Red Army. However, with too few planes and personnel available, the effectiveness of these missions suffered.

Amidst these challenges, the VVS struggled to capitalize on their opportunities. In Army Group Center, Luftwaffe activity was limited, as most of the 1st Air Fleet had been redeployed north and south to support Hitler’s key objectives in Kyiv and Leningrad. However, the VVS did not stand idle. In the south, the 5th Air Corps worked diligently to defend General Kleist’s panzer divisions from the increasing threat of Soviet air assaults. Despite the odds stacked against them, VVS pilots displayed remarkable bravery and determination to inflict damage on German forces. Meanwhile, Wehrmacht anti-aircraft artillery units were activated to defend critical crossing points over rivers. These bridges served as vital arteries for sustaining the Heer’s combat power, facilitating the movement of troops and supplies. Likewise, bridges positioned behind the Red Army provided essential routes for retreats and allowed for the steady influx of reinforcements to the front lines. Both sides dedicated significant resources to denying the other access to these crucial bridges, making air power a primary means of achieving their objectives.

Facing numerous uncertainties in the ongoing operations, Hitler’s customary decisiveness had temporarily eluded him. Day after day, he stood at military conferences, grappling to find a way to close the Pandora’s Box he had opened in the east. Caught between his instinctive strategic judgment and the fervent opposition of his commanders, Hitler anxiously sought a solution that would accommodate all options. On August 10th, Jodl submitted a proposal to Hitler that echoed much of what Halder had suggested in their meeting on August 7th. This endorsement was infused with Halder’s characteristic optimism. Central to Jodl’s argument was the ongoing push toward Moscow by Bock’s armored forces. He portrayed the two flanking army groups as robust enough to fulfill Hitler's objectives, providing a semblance of reassurance to the Führer amidst the strategic stalemate. Not surprisingly, Hitler found some solace in this proposal, as it seemed to propose a joint solution to the contentious debate over the campaign's strategic direction. While not fully accepted in its original form, Jodl's submission was persuasive enough for Hitler to initiate changes in an amendment to Directive 34, which would be known as Directive 34a. Dated August 12th, this new directive marked a significant shift toward the Moscow alternative, albeit with Hitler’s stringent conditions attached. Directive 34a clearly stated that Rundstedt’s army group was expected to achieve its objectives in Ukraine without assistance from Bock. Likewise, Leeb’s army group was tasked with encircling Leningrad and forming a connection with Finnish forces. In this scenario, Bock was instructed to extend his front further north, allowing for a greater concentration of forces to support Leeb’s offensive. Additionally, the directive reiterated Hitler’s long-standing demand that Bock decisively address the Soviet forces on his southern flank before he could renew his advance eastward. Regarding Moscow, the directive stated:

“Only after these threats to our ranks have been entirely overcome and armoured formations have been rehabilitated will it be possible to continue the offensive, on a wide front and with echeloning of both flanks, against the strong enemy forces which have been concentrated for the defence of Moscow. The object of operations must then be to deprive the enemy, before the coming of winter, of his government, armament, and traffic centre around Moscow, and thus prevent the rebuilding of his defeated forces and the orderly working of government control”.

The new directives sent panic into the top ranking commanders. As noted in the war diaries describing some back and forth between Halder and Bock:

BOCK : In this case I don’t know any more how I can move the army group forward. Today is the beginning of positional warfare! The units to be given up can only be moved in a partly finished condition [owing to their incomplete refitting]. I must make you aware, that after the loss of this corps an attack by Strauss’s army, except for the special action towards Velikie Luki, is no longer possible. The offensive intention of 9th Army is dead.

HALDER: In my opinion this goes for 2nd Army too.

BOCK : Please inform the Commander-in-Chief of the Army [Brauchitsch], that with this order any thought of an offensive posture by the 9th Army, and as a result probably by the whole army group, ceases to exist. It is also to be borne in mind, that going over to a defensive position is not possible given the current position. The existing line is not adequate for a lengthy defence. I have the intention to inform the Fuhrer’s chief adjutant [Schmundt] of the ¨ same thing.

HALDER: I don’t know myself what I should do. I am utterly desperate and will try to save what there is to save.

Even before the order arrived instructing Hoth to allocate forces to assist Army Group North, a report from Schmidt’s Panzer Corps cautioned that the planned operation to recapture Velikiye Luki would necessitate an entire panzer corps. This was due to the diminished strength of the existing panzer divisions. Sent on August 14th, Schmidt’s report indicated that even if the operation was delayed for six more days, until August 20th, it would still have to be executed with limited numbers of trucks and without any replacement manpower. A critical issue highlighted in the report was the acute shortage of replacement tank engines, which had become a significant source of frustration for the command. Hoth, having already awaited reinforcements since early August, noted on August 15th that the long-awaited motors and spare parts were only expected to arrive on August 16th or 17th.

Despite the immense pressure facing the 9th Army and the disappointing outcomes of the refitting period, Hoth remained resolute in his decision to proceed with the offensive against Velikiye Luki. He preferred an aggressive approach to regain the initiative and push the Soviets onto the defensive. Originally set for August 21st, the offensive was postponed by one day due to inclement weather. The operation was to be executed by Kuntzen’s LVII Panzer Corps, led by the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions, and supported by the 40th Army Corps. The attack achieved immediate success, and by August 26th, the Germans had captured Velikiye Luki, taking 34,000 prisoners and seizing more than 300 artillery pieces. However, Bock was acutely aware that limited offensives like this one would not lead to the destruction of the Red Army, nor did they sufficiently relieve the pressure on his front. In his diary on August 24th, he reflected on the situation, expressing his concerns about the campaign's direction and effectiveness:

“This is the seventh or eight time in this campaign that the army group has succeeded in encircling the enemy. But I’m not really happy about it, because the objective to which I have devoted all my thought, the destruction of the enemy armies, has been dropped. Perhaps we will overrun the Russians in front of my northern wing and thus get things going to the point that at least the pressure on my eastern front is relieved. It can’t hold much longer the way things look now. I am being forced to spread the reserves which I so laboriously scraped together for the hoped for attack behind my front just to have some degree of security that it will not be breached. If, after all the successes, the campaign in the east now trickles away in dismal defensive fighting for my army group, it is not my fault”.

Further north, the fighting around Lake Ilmen continued. On August 16th, the Germans retreated from Staraia Russia and Gorki. Vatutin’s offensive was making progress, but signs indicated that the situation was not likely to remain in the Red Army's favor. As discussed last week, the challenging terrain had hindered the Soviet advance, and communication issues were prevalent throughout the ranks. In response, Leeb directed Manstein to relieve the beleaguered 10th Infantry Corps. By August 19th, Manstein was in position and launched a counter-attack. He achieved complete surprise as the 3rd Motorized Infantry struck on the left flank, while the SS-Totenkopf division attacked on the right. The Soviets struggled to respond effectively; Vatutin failed to coordinate a proper reaction and watched helplessly as Manstein's counterattack forced his men back. By the end of the week, it became clear that Vatutin could not maintain his territorial gains, and he found himself back at his original starting point. The offensive had significantly weakened his positions, costing him several thousand men.

However, from a theater-level perspective, it cannot be declared a total failure. While Vatutin did not significantly disrupt the Wehrmacht's advance or reclaim substantial territory, his offensive succeeded in distracting Army Group North from its primary objective. Leeb had been drawn into diverting resources away from the main effort, violating the command doctrine that emphasized the importance of the Schwerpunkt, or main effort. In German military doctrine, the success of the schwerpunkt was paramount, and Leningrad was the strategic objective of Army Group North. Capturing and holding the city was one of the two main goals upon which the entire campaign hinged during this phase of operations. Unfortunately, Leeb compromised these principles to protect his weakened southern flank. Forces under Manstein were withdrawn from the main effort and sent south to defend what, at that moment, was a strategically insignificant line. It became evident that Vatutin lacked the necessary forces to achieve a real breakout. Leeb’s failure in command at this critical moment dealt a serious blow to the Wehrmacht’s chances of fulfilling Hitler's order to capture Leningrad. As the assault began to stall, the absence of Manstein's forces might have been the crucial factor needed to sustain the momentum of their advance.

In addition to Leeb's strategic missteps, Army Group Center was embroiled in its own battles of attrition that could shape the campaign's strategic outlook in the region. The situation at the Yelna Salient continued to unfold dramatically. Zhukov had the advantage of numbers, positioning, and strong political backing for his impending attack. Bock had never endorsed Guderian’s advance across the river in the first place. Army Group Center had been weakened due to the diversion of its panzer forces to neighboring Army Groups. As the commander of Army Group Center, Bock felt slighted by this shift and raised his concerns with the OKH and OKW. Moscow had been his objective from the outset of the campaign, and he consistently requested more troops. However, following two of the largest encirclement battles in history and a remarkable string of successes during the advance to Smolensk, his Army Group had been significantly curtailed.

Germany’s offensive strength had weakened, but it had by no means entirely diminished. Zhukov, the Chief of the General Staff, recognized impending dangers for the Central Front, particularly facing Guderian’s 24th Panzer Corps and Weichs’s 2nd Army. Back on July 29th, Zhukov was summoned to a meeting with Stalin to provide a comprehensive report on the situation. During this meeting, he articulated his concerns clearly and decisively, laying out the challenges that lay ahead:

“On the strategic axis of Moscow the Germans are unable to mount a major offensive operation in the near future owing to their heavy losses and they lack appreciable reserves to secure the right and left wings of Army Group Centre. On the Leningrad axis it is impossible for the Germans to begin an operation to capture Leningrad and link up with the Finns without additional forces”.

The situation in Ukraine remained complex, with the Uman encirclement still unfolding. According to the Soviet Chief of Staff, the real danger was that Bock might temporarily abandon his thrust toward Moscow and redirect his focus southward. This shift could resolve the threat to his overstretched southern flank and aid Army Group South by penetrating the rear of Kirponos’s South-Western Front. This scenario was especially perilous because, as Zhukov highlighted, the Central Front covering this section of the line was "the weakest sector of our line," and its armies were "badly equipped." To address this vulnerability, Zhukov recommended reinforcing the Central Front with three armies: one from the Stavka Reserve, one from the Western Front, and another from the South-Western Front. He proposed that the movement of these forces could later be supplemented by reinforcements arriving from the Far East. Zhukov also advocated for Kirponos to withdraw his front behind the Dnepr River, a strategy that would necessitate abandoning Kyiv. He laid out a solid military rationale for this difficult decision. However, Stalin was incensed by the mere suggestion of giving up Kyiv, accusing Zhukov of “talking nonsense.” Zhukov, one of the few Marshals willing to speak candidly to Stalin, insisted, "If you think the Chief of the General Staff talks nonsense, then I request you relieve me of my post and send me to the front."

And Stalin did just that, dismissing Zhukov from his position and assigning him to command the newly formed Reserve Front, replacing him with the more agreeable Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov. Stalin’s hasty dismissal of the threat to the southern flank would have dire consequences in the future. The Soviet dictator remained convinced that Army Group Center would continue its advance toward Moscow after a brief pause for reorganization and repair. To preempt this potential course of action, Stalin ordered Timoshenko to prepare for large-scale offensives across the front. The aim was to disrupt the next phase of German operations before they could begin. Furthermore, Stalin directed all Front commanders to organize new counter-offensives to commence from mid-August. This coordinated effort would stretch from Staraia Russa in the north to the approaches of Kyiv, with the most significant concentration of force aimed against Bock’s Army Group.

At this point in the war, several generals had been executed for incompetence or even the appearance of disobeying Stalin’s orders. Zhukov demonstrated not just a strength of character to not bow to the dictator but also bravery. For this he had been rewarded with dismissal from the Stavka but also the retention of his life. It is unclear why Stalin did this, but it was to pay off for the Soviet Union as the war progressed as Zhukov was to prove perhaps the Red Army’s most capable commander. Now was his opportunity to save both his reputation and his life. Zhukov had been relentlessly pounding the salient for days, and as the third week of August commenced, the Germans were starting to feel the cumulative effects of the unrelenting Soviet attacks. On August 18th, Zhukov found himself compelled to pause his offensive at Yelna. He had exhausted his resources and required time to position reinforcements effectively. Simultaneously, Timoshenko was orchestrating a large counteroffensive aimed for the end of August. Together, the renewed forces from the Red Army’s Western and Reserve fronts would strike against the weakened Army Group Center. The remainder of the month would essentially be an operational pause for both sides, as they had been battering each other nonstop for nearly eight weeks.

Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group had become the focal point for the high commands on both sides of the conflict. With his advancing panzers now rested, Hitler aimed to crush the Red Army in the south and seize the abundant resources of the Ukrainian Steppe. Stalin, on the other hand, was desperately funneling men and materials into Guderian’s path, but to little effect. Last week, the Bryansk Front was established specifically to stop Guderian's advance. Meanwhile, the already nearly destroyed Central Front was dissolved, and its remaining forces were transferred to Eremenko’s command. On August 19th, Gomel fell to the Germans. In the aftermath of this capture, Army Group Center’s southern flank was in significantly better shape than it had been just a week earlier. Another Soviet Front had been effectively dismantled, and the German lines had been straightened.

Hitler’s prolonged indecision regarding strategy in the east had significant repercussions for front-line commanders. The lack of a clear strategic directive created hesitancy and confusion about where specific forces should be deployed along the front and the expected timetable for the initiation of operations. Major strategic questions loomed, such as the fate of the Yel’nya salient, which was being defended not based on sound military logic but rather on an assumption about the next phase of the campaign. This uncertainty was particularly troubling for Guderian, who found himself uncertain about how much strength to allocate to his offensive in the south. On August 18th, he expressed his frustrations in a letter to his wife: “This situation has a bad effect upon on the troops, for everyone is aware of the absence of harmony. That is the product of unclear orders and counterorders, absence of instructions sometimes for weeks . . . we are missing so many opportunities. But it is annoying when no one knows the reasons. These most probably cannot be put right in this war which we will win despite it all. That is human nature in great moments and with great men”.

Guderian’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein, also observed the lack of clarity and the outright contradictions in the issuing of orders, leading him to conclude, “The troops must think we are crazy.” While Guderian's forces were continually being pushed south by Hitler’s desire to secure the southern flank and exploit successes, Army Group Headquarters, under Bock’s determined leadership, attempted to resolve the ambiguity by prioritizing Moscow. On August 17, Greiffenburg met with Weckmann to clarify the upcoming offensive operations. The Chief of Staff of Army Group Center instructed his counterpart at the 9th Army, stating, “The enemy in front of the army group is to be destroyed. The armies will break through in the general direction of Moscow.” Similarly, on August 19, Bock firmly set his sights on Moscow, urging Weichs to expedite operations in the south. He believed that a successful advance toward Velikie Luki would enable the entire army group to shift its focus eastward.

However, the joint proposals prepared by Warlimont and Heusinger on August 18 had yet to receive a direct response from Hitler by August 20. Consequently, Heusinger was sent to meet with Jodl to gauge the mood at the Wolf’s Lair. While Jodl had previously favored Halder’s plans, his conversation with Heusinger revealed significant doubts. Jodl, familiar with Hitler’s moods, sensed the dictator’s renewed determination and stubborn unwillingness to consider any further deliberation on his chosen strategic path. He was also cautious about challenging Hitler now that his mind was made up, influenced partly by raw pragmatism and partly by the enduring Fuhrer myth of which Jodl was a compliant disciple. According to Heusinger’s account, Jodl was increasingly reluctant to engage with the OKH’s plans. Undeterred, Heusinger pressed the importance of focusing on Moscow and defeating the “life strength” of the Red Army, asserting that “everything else will fall into our lap.” To this, Jodl reportedly replied, “That’s what you say. Now let me tell you what the Fuhrer’s answer will be: There is at the moment a much better possibility of beating the Russian forces. Their main grouping is now east of Kyiv.”

Heusinger, however, remained steadfast and raised concerns about the impending winter, reminding Jodl that it would arrive earlier in the northern and central sectors than in the south. Ultimately, Jodl agreed to do what he could to support the OKH’s plans, although his resolve was clearly weakening. He cautioned Heusinger, “You must admit that the Fuhrer’s reasons are well thought out and cannot be pushed aside just like that... One must not try to compel him to do something that goes against his inner convictions. His intuition has generally been right; you can’t deny that!” The diminishing support from Halder at the OKW directly stemmed from Hitler’s newfound sense of purpose and the emphatic tone with which he now dictated the campaign's strategic goals. On the same day that Heusinger was appealing to Jodl for continued support (August 20), Hitler unequivocally rejected the OKH’s memorandum. With clear directives for the future course of the war, the subservient OKW quickly abandoned any independent ideas and sought to rein in the wayward OKH.

On August 21, the head of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, visited Halder’s headquarters with the task, according to Warlimont, of winning Halder over to Hitler’s viewpoint or at least weakening his opposition to Bock’s panzer diversion. Keitel likely knew that Hitler’s mind was already made up; he was, however, careful not to dash all of Halder’s hopes, leaving him with the impression that Hitler’s final decision was still pending. Instead, Keitel conveyed that Hitler insisted on proceeding with the northern operation towards Leningrad and aimed to eliminate the Soviet 5th Army in the south. If Keitel attempted to persuade Halder of Hitler’s strategic wisdom, it was probably nothing more than what Halder expected from someone so blindly obedient to the Fuhrer. In any case, Halder neither hoped for nor counted on support from Keitel. Whatever transpired during their meeting that day, Halder seemed to remain unaware of how far events had turned against him. On the same day (August 21), Hitler instructed Jodl to draft new orders for the OKH detailing the direction of future operations. These orders would reach Halder’s office late that evening and strike, according to Heusinger, “like a bomb.” Hitler’s army adjutant, Major Engel, simply described it as “a black day for the army.” Upon reading Hitler’s new directives, Halder realized that all his plans and hopes had come to nothing. The order proved to be a devastating blow, leaving Halder uncertain about how the war could be won. In his diary, he ominously noted, “It is decisive for the outcome of the campaign.” Hitler's directive began:

“The proposal by the army for the continuation of the operations in the east, dated 18.8, do not meet with my approval. I order the following: The principal objective that must be achieved before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but rather in the south the occupation of the Crimea and the industrial and coal region of the Donets, together with the isolation of the Russian oil regions in the Caucasus. In the north, the encirclement of Leningrad and the union with the Finns”.

Many leading commanders of the Wehrmacht opposed this plan, with Bock and Halder being the most vocal. Both had long been staunch advocates for maintaining a focus on Moscow since the early days of the campaign. Their egos played as significant a role in this opposition as did the war's strategic considerations. They were reluctant to acknowledge that the path they had staked their reputations on, that capturing Moscow was the only way to win the war, might not be the best approach moving forward. Bock, in particular, was unwilling to see his command diminished in order to facilitate the campaign's success. He feared that Guderian would take all the glory for himself, a prospect that did not sit well with anyone in the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, Hitler remained resolute in his decision, dismissing the objections he perceived as mere whining from the generals. He believed that, left to their own devices, none of his achievements would have materialized. He envisioned Germany still mired in depression, too fearful to conquer its enemies. In Hitler's mind, he alone had willed the war into existence. He had driven the Wehrmacht into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Low Countries, France, and now into the heart of the Soviet Union. While his egomania had not yet reached its zenith, he was not going to be swayed by the generals. He considered himself a chosen man, a genius destined to lead Germany to victory; the generals were merely instruments to fulfill that vision.

On August 19, the same day Gomel fell, Eremenko managed to penetrate the rear areas of Schweppenburg’s 24th Panzer Corps. Units from the Central Front’s 45th Rifle Corps were wreaking havoc on the limited supply lines of the Panzers. In a call to Guderian’s headquarters, Eremenko had to report an extraordinary admission of weakness: he would be unable to seize the town of Novozybkov on the Gomel line. This was a remarkable acknowledgment for a Panzer commander in 1941, and it may have been unprecedented. Schweppenburg was not known for timidity, but his men and vehicles were simply worn out. The next day, Guderian ordered him to resume the advance, but Schweppenburg clarified the dire situation at the front. The 3rd Panzer Division had essentially no fuel, the 10th Motorized Infantry had lost more trucks than they could count, and the 4th Panzer was out of position. The 4th Panzer reported that they were running on fumes, with only forty-four operational tanks remaining. The relentless campaigning was not merely dulling the edge of the Wehrmacht’s sword; it was destroying it. The 4th Panzer had begun the campaign on June 22 with one hundred seventy-six tanks, but the past seven weeks had reduced the division to just twenty-five percent of that number. Clearly, the victories of the initial weeks had come at a significant cost. Despite these challenges, Hitler felt the time was ripe to strike south and envelop Kyiv. On August 23, he ordered Guderian to lead Schweppenburg’s 24th Panzer and the 47th Panzer Corps under Lemelsen to link up with Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group, which was advancing north from Kremenchug.

The 1st Panzer Group had been struggling to make significant progress, which partially motivated the decision to deploy part of Guderian’s forces to assist in encircling Kyiv. By late July, it had become evident that Army Group South was incapable of capturing the city without substantial support. On August 16, Stalin finally authorized the 5th Army to withdraw behind the Dnieper River. The 5th Army had fought valiantly, giving the Germans a formidable fight under the circumstances. However, the Southwestern Front was on the verge of collapse. On the opening day of Operation Barbarossa, Kirponos commanded what was arguably the strongest armored force in the world, consisting of eight mechanized corps and four thousand four hundred tanks in his Front's order of battle. Now, just eight weeks later, he had been reduced to a single weak division. The 32nd Tank Division remained the only reserve force in the entire region with any substantial mobility. The entire front was worn out, yet the Southwestern Front still maintained reasonably strong defensive lines, effectively forcing the infantry of Army Group South to pay for every inch of ground they gained. The threat to the front did not stem from an imminent collapse of the defensive lines; by now, even the weakest Red Army units were no longer susceptible to the kind of dissolution that could have been expected in the early days of the conflict. The soldiers were becoming veterans, and the prospects of winning battles were increasingly tangible. Every Front had witnessed the Germans' vulnerabilities firsthand: the invaders could indeed be defeated, man-to-man.

However, the key factor in every battle so far had been the mobile forces. If the armor and mounted infantry could remain nimble, victory was within reach. Herein lies the challenge: despite becoming overstretched, the Germans were still able to deploy multiple corps-sized combined arms teams that exhibited strong mobility. In contrast, the Red Army struggled to match this capability. While the Soviet inventory contained more tanks than the Germans, the challenge lay in effectively fielding them in cohesive units, led by experienced commanders, and guided by strong strategic direction. Until these deficiencies could be addressed, the situation for the Soviets would remain dire. Only time would reveal whether they could overcome these obstacles.

I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.

In August 1941, the Soviets began to rally against the seemingly unstoppable German advance toward Kyiv. General Fedor von Bock's forces faced unexpected resilience from the Red Army, commanded by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. Despite heavy casualties, the Soviets adopted counteroffensive strategies, mobilizing millions and revealing their vast manpower. But while the battle for Kyiv raged, tension grew within the German command as they grappled with logistical issues and the realization that their initial plans for a quick victory had spiraled into a protracted struggle.